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Working memory is the active part of the brain that is occupied with short-term 
maintenance and active processing of information. If information such as stimuli and 
goals is task relevant, it is activated in working memory. Processes such as retrieving, 
manipulating or combining information also use working memory. Working memory is 
capacity limited, something that is revealed when working memory is increasingly 
taxed, for example when you have to remember a large list of groceries, or when you 
have to perform more tasks at the same time. Therefore, to study working memory and 
its limitations, it makes sense to increase the information burden of working memory 
systematically, and to investigate performance impairments. In this thesis, this is 






Figure 1.1. Conducting the two tasks from a dual task takes longer than conducting a single task. This 
is caused by a capacity-limited process (block β; in grey), while processes before and after this 
capacity-limited process (blocks α & γ; in white) are not affected. The lower panel illustrates a model in 
which two competing processes share the available capacity (e.g., Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). 
 
 
Dual tasking, or doing two things simultaneously, is something we engage in 
our daily lives, for example when we drive a car and talk on our handsfree phone at the 
same time. When driving on an empty motorway, talking on the phone is relatively 
easy to do, but talking on the phone while crossing a large, busy roundabout is more 
difficult. In the end, the easiest way to talk to someone on the phone remains when you 
are at home, sitting on the settee. Responding to one task is always faster than when 
you combine that same task with another task (e.g., Bertelson, 1967; Gottsdanker, 
Broadbent, & Van Sant, 1963) as a consequence of the limited capacity of working 
memory (see Figure 1.1). The response delay that arises by doing two tasks instead of 
one depends on the circumstances. The size of that delay is determined not only by 
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Logan & Schulkind, 2000). The available research does not explain what exactly these 
limitations are, how they come about and what they are dependent on. This thesis is 
aimed to rectify this situation. 
In this introduction, first a brief history and several important dual-task 
paradigms are described. Then, the different subprocesses involved in dual-task 
processing are explained to a wider extent, together with the meaning of attention in 
general and for dual-task processing specifically. Subsequently, an introduction in 
electrophysiological processing is presented; a method that is used in a later chapter. 
With this information, the occurring delays in dual-task processing are explained, as 
are the most important models that are used to describe results from dual-task 
experiments. Then, two specific classes of limitations are set out: structural and 
functional limitations. They are part of different models and they both predict different 
outcomes in situations that will be investigated later in the empirical section of this 
paper. Lastly, the thesis question and the outline of the thesis will introduce and 
structure the chapters that follow.  
 
Early dual-task studies  
In the early dual-task literature, research focused on discerning the amount of 
impairment between different task combinations, similar to measuring the delay that 
occurs when you use your mobile phone and drive your usual car compared to when 
you use your mobile phone and you drive a van with a trailer. In the latter case that will 
be harder to combine. Fitts (1954) conducted several dual tasks in which two closely 
related motor tasks were combined. Results showed a decrease in performance speed 
that suggested that combining two closely related motor tasks was capacity limited. 
Fitts (1954) concluded that this decrement was caused by a limitation in the monitoring 
process of these movements (see also: Michon, 1964; 1966). Likewise, Posner and 
Rossman (1965) showed decreasing performance on a memory task with increasing 
difficulty of the additional mental task. These data were confirmed by Norman and 
Bobrow (1975) who described a general model for the limitation of dual-task 
processing. They assumed that there is a fixed amount of resources that can be used, 
and dual-task processing is delayed when more resources are required than there are 
available (see also: Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 1979). Subsequently, the 
focus shifted from a more capacity oriented approach to a more task-combination 
oriented approach. For example, research investigated whether the combination of 
task modalities (e.g., auditory modality, visual modality, etc) influenced dual-task 
performance. Driving a car and talking on the phone is easier than driving a car and 
looking at the map to see where you need to go (for obvious reasons). Baddeley and 




spatial storage modality, an auditory storage modality, and a central executive that 
controls the operations on the stored information. Applying the model to dual tasks, it 
can be argued that performance on dual tasks restricted to one modality, the visual, 
say, suffers more than performance on dual tasks presented in two different modalities, 
the auditory and the visual, say (see also Brooks, 1967, 1968). Later, interest arose 
into the effect of cross-talk between tasks (e.g., Navon & Miller, 2002). During cross-
talk, properties of one stimulus can influence the response to the other stimulus when 
they are presented at the same time in the same visual field. Navon and Miller (2002) 
suggested that when two tasks overlap, the available resources can be divided among 
the two tasks, although the first task (T1) will have priority. Because both tasks – and 
particularly the capacity-limited processes of the tasks - can be active at the same 
time, cross-talk can occur and properties of the second task (T2) can influence the 
reaction time for the first task (RT1). T1 properties can always influence the reaction 
time for the second task (RT2), even without cross-talk, for example when T2 is a 
repetition of T1.    
 
Dual-task paradigms 
  There are multiple dual-task paradigms that show the limitations that we 
experience when we do two things at the same time, for example the dichotic listening 
paradigm (Broadbent, 1958), the task switch paradigm (Jersild, 1927; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995), the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm (Telford, 1931) 
and the Attentional Blink (AB) paradigm (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). The latter 
two will be used in the current thesis. In all four paradigms, working memory is 
overloaded, which makes it possible to measure the boundaries of working memory. 
Additionally, in the dichotic listening paradigm and the attentional blink paradigm 
attention plays a significant role.  
In the PRP paradigm two stimuli – stimulus 1 (S1) and stimulus 2 (S2) - are 
presented shortly after each other (see Figure 1.2A). The time between S1 
presentation and S2 presentation is called the Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA), 
which typically varies within a range of 50 ms to 1000 ms. Response to S1 and S2 (R1 
and R2) is speeded. At short SOAs there is more task overlap and the reaction time to 
RT2 is longer compared to RT2 at longer SOAs (when there is less task overlap; 
Welford, 1952). This is expected considering that a large SOA more closely resembles 
a single task, especially when the response to the RT1 has already been given. The 
response to both the stimuli is still slower than when the tasks would have been 
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Figure 1.2. (A) An example of a PRP trial. After the fixation that indicates the boundaries in which the 
stimuli are presented, S1 is presented and after a delay – the SOA – S2 is also presented on the 
screen. Responses for both stimuli are speeded. (B) An example of an AB trial. After a fixation that is 
used to centre people’s attention, a rapid stream of letters is presented. Within the stream, two digits 
are presented that serve as targets. The distance (lag) between the two digits can vary. Unspeeded 
responses are required at the end of the trial.  
 
 
In a typical AB paradigm, a series of characters is presented one after the 
other in the centre of the screen in rapid succession (see Figure 1.2B). Two targets are 
placed within that series with a variable number of distractors in between them. The 
two target stimuli require unspeeded responses at the end of each trial. The accuracy 
of reporting Target 1 is generally high, whereas the accuracy of reporting Target 2  
depends on the place it takes after Target 1 (i.e. the lag) and the number of targets 
separating them usually varies from zero (lag 1) up to 8 (lag 9). Long lags show good 
Target-2 performance while lags up to 500 ms show impaired Target-2 performance 
(Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). This impairment is 
called the attentional blink and it is considered to express an inability to process Target 
2 up to a conscious level when Target-1 processes have not yet been completed 
(Sergent, Baillet, & Dehaene, 2005; Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998). Both the PRP 
paradigm and the AB paradigm investigate dual-task interference. The former 
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and the latter investigates interference as after-effect of Target 1 processing. The two 
paradigms are often attended to separately, although occasionally they are treated 
together (e.g., Jolicœur, 1999). Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1999) suggest that the AB 
magnitude and the PRP effect are based on similar mechanisms (see also Jolicœur, 
1999), an idea that was further investigated in this thesis. Additionally the PRP effect 
and AB magnitudes were compared with a variety of constructs like working memory 
and IQ that might explain their similarity. Working memory and IQ were both measured 
because they are related but they are not the same (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; 
Süβ, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002). If participants would make use 
of working memory when they execute the PRP paradigm as well as when they 
execute the AB paradigm, then increased working memory costs would have an effect 
on AB and PRP performance although research shows that this effect is not as 
straightforward (e.g., Akyürek, Hommel, & Jolicœur, 2007). 
Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1999) investigated memory encoding in a dual task 
and proposed a two-step mechanism on how information is encoded into memory. 
Information is transported via sensory encoding to a more sustainable perceptual 
encoding stage. During sensory encoding, the to-be-encoded information can be 
overwritten by other sensory input, for example by masking. When the information has 
reached the perceptual-encoding process stage, masking can no longer overwrite the 
information, but the information in here needs to be consolidated or it will decay. As 
soon as the information is consolidated, it becomes conscious and will be stored in 
memory. In two dual-task experiments, Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1999) showed that 
short-term consolidation of a character in an identification task postponed response 
selection of a tone-distinction task independent of which task was presented first. This 
demonstrated that memory encoding is capacity-limited just as response selection.  
The AB is particularly useful to study short-term consolidation and delay, 
because of the speed of the rapid presentation of visual stimuli that all mask each 
other, including the two targets that need unspeeded response at the end of each trial. 
Chun and Potter (1995) suggested that the blink occurs because short-term 
consolidation of the first target defers short-term consolidation of the second target. As 
a consequence of the mask presented immediately after the second target, Target 2 
will decay and accordingly will fail to reach visual short-term memory. 
In this thesis, the PRP paradigm is mainly used because the concurrent 
presentation of two stimuli creates an ideal opportunity to investigate dual-task 
interference. The PRP paradigm shows that performing multiple tasks is not possible 
without costs. These costs are expressed in longer reaction times or lower accuracy on 
the tasks. The costs can occur when priming T1 properties (e.g., features) influence 
the performance on the secondary task (T2), or vice versa. Consider a task in which 
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people need to respond with their right hand to a red circle and with their left hand to a 
green circle. They will tend to respond quicker to a red circle if it was preceded by 
another red circle than if it was preceded by a green circle. This repetition effect is 
called priming. If R2 is a repetition of R1, then RT2 is quicker than if R2 is different 
from R1. Vice versa, T2 properties can influence T1 performance only when T2 
properties are already activated before the T1 response decision has been made. In 
our example, this situation would translate to a facilitation of R1 if this was followed by 
a similar color compared to if it was followed by a different color. Since this effect 
works in opposing direction (from T2 to T1) and it describes compatibility for features 
or processes (e.g., color), this effect is called the backward-compatibility effect (which 
depends on cross-talk). The backward-compatibility effect gives us information on what 
T2 processes are available before T1 response decision and is therefore a very useful 
tool to study in what way two tasks can be performed concurrently, and which 
processes are limiting this concurrent processing.  
 





Figure 1.3. A discrete serial three-stage model (cf. Sternberg, 1969) 
 
 
As described in the first part, it is the overlap of processes between the two 
tasks that causes dual-task slowing. In order to study this, performance on these tasks 
can be subdivided into different processes and subprocesses. This makes it easier to 
distinguish which (part of the) process causes the slowing. Sternberg (1969) proposed 
discrete serial models such as a three-stage model (see Figure 1.3) in which several 
subprocesses are differentiated from stimulus onset to when the response is executed. 
When a stimulus is presented, first early, perceptual processes (e.g., color) are 
performed, ending with the classification of the stimulus. Next, response selection is 
initiated, which constitute the capacity-limited part of processing (see e.g., Pashler & 
Johnston, 1989). After the response has been selected, response execution can 
commence. Adapting this model for dual tasks made it possible to distinguish which 
processes are operated in what order and how they overlap. Although there is 











(e.g. Miller & Hackley, 1992), serial stage models have proven to be useful in 
investigating sources of dual-task interference. Drawbacks of the model are that in 
reality, the distinction between the different subprocesses is not so clear-cut, and in 





Figure 1.4. Schematic presentation of the early vs. late selection models of attention 
 
 
Attention selects relevant information, and it monitors what we store in our 
memory. Two main models have been put forward that describe the way attention 
operates: the early-selection model (Broadbent, 1958) and the late-selection model 
(Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963) (see Figure 1.4). In the early selection model (Broadbent, 
1958), information is encoded up to perceptual encoding, but no meaning is added; 
instead, information is encoded according to physical characteristics. In the late 
selection model, all information is processed beyond perceptual encoding, up to the 
level of semantic analysis. At the late selection point it is decided which information is 
entered into memory to be identified (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). Because of the decay 
that occurs after short-term consolidation (see Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua, 1999) 
information that is not selected into memory will decay (i.e. will be forgotten).  
Both attentional models show that there are limitations to our capacity to 
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capacity-limited processing. It is currently unclear to what extent these attentional 
limitations are caused by the same mechanism as dual-task limitations (e.g., Brisson & 
Jolicœur, 2007a; 2007b; Johnston, McCann, & Remington, 1995; Pashler, 1991). 
Therefore it is necessary to investigate the role of attention in dual-task processing, 
and how it relates to the limited-capacity processes responsible for dual-task 
interference. In this thesis, the effect of visual-spatial attention was measured in a dual 
task. Visual-spatial attention is used to locate information at a specific position on a 
visual screen. If attention occupies the same limited-capacity process that is also 
responsible for dual-task interference, attention should be delayed by competing 
processes.  
 
Event-related potential (ERP)-measurements in dual-task processing 
 Electrophysiological measurements can be used as a tool to distinguish 
different processes and to study whether they can overlap or delay each other. Some 
electrophysiological measurements are markers for the timing of different 
subprocesses. Any electrophysiological activity related to a particular event is called an 
event-related potential, or ERP. The so-called “P3” is an example of an ERP 
component that is represented as a peak-amplitude on a waveform. Factor-related 
modulations of the P3 are thought to reflect target processing up to a level of 
consciousness (Donchin, 1981; Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005) and are 
only sensitive to the duration of processes preceding response selection. In the AB 
paradigm, the P3 is only seen when the target has received the correct response. 
When an incorrect response is given by the participant, the waveform doesn’t show a 
P3 (see Figure 1.5). This modulation of P3 shows that only when information is 
processed up to a conscious level, participants are able to report the second target. 
Furthermore, when the second target is missed, other processes (i.e., Target 1 
processes) must be occupying capacity-limited processing space; and the access of 
second target information to some of the more advanced processing levels is deferred. 
Other electrophysiological measures that indicate different subprocesses are for 
example the event-related potentials P1 and N1 whose factor-related modulations are 
measures of perceptual processing (Hackley, Woldorff, & Hillyard, 1990; Mangun, 
Hillyard, & Luck, 1993; Regan, 1989). Visual-attentional processes can be measured 
by investigating differences in modulation of the N2pc (Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a, 
2007b; Eimer, 1996; Luck and Hillyard, 1994, Woodman & Luck, 2003). Motor-
response preparation processes are reflected by modulations of ongoing activity that is 
commonly referred to as the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) that measures 























Figure 1.5. An example of an event related potential waveform measured over the medial posterior 
side of the head. Target 2 is presented at 360 ms and the P3 starts to rise 400 ms later at 750 ms with 
a peak at 900ms. The dotted line represents the correct (no-blink) trials and is high in amplitude. The 
bold line represents the incorrect (blink) trials and is heavily attenuated (Pannebakker, Band, 
Ridderinkhof, & Hommel, 2007).  
 
 
Process overlap in dual tasks 
The separation of the information processing stream into different 
subprocesses from stimulus presentation to response has helped the investigation of 
the source of dual-task slowing. Dual-task slowing appears when two (sub-) processes 
cannot be conducted concurrently (i.e. in parallel) and cause a delay. The prime 
objective in dual-task research has been to see which processes show no slowing – 
could be conducted in parallel – and which processes did. Processes prone to dual-
task slowing can be identified by independently changing the subprocesses. Research 
has shown that capacity-limited processes cause other capacity-limited processes to 
be put on hold. The location of this limitation process was identified as the response 
selection segment in Sternberg’s model. Further research has shown that processes 
like short-term consolidation (Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998), mental rotation (Van Selst 
& Jolicœur, 1994), and memory retrieval (Carrier & Pashler, 1995) are also considered 
capacity-limited processes. In sum, all subprocesses of the two tasks can be 
conducted in parallel; except for the combination of T1 capacity-limited processes and 
T2 capacity-limited processes. 
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Attentional processes like visual-spatial attention have also been investigated 
on whether they have capacity-limited properties. Results from behavioural research 
showed that visual-spatial attentional processes do not cause interference in a dual 
task, and therefore visual-spatial attention was assumed not to be capacity limited 
(Johnston et al., 1995; Pashler, 1991). Recent electrophysiological research (using the 
N2pc as an electrophysiological measure) however, showed that there was indeed a 
postponement of visual-spatial attentional processes by limited-capacity processes of a 
preceding task (Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a; 2007b). Research in this thesis will 
investigate whether these recent results can be extended to other capacity-limited 
processes than the one used in Brisson and Jolicœur (2007a; 2007b). 
For processes that are known to be capacity limited, we can predict how the 
modulation of the different subprocesses would affect RT2 (see Figure 1.6), with 
different predictions for short and long SOAs and for serial and parallel capacity-limited 
processing. During T1 capacity-limited processes (block β) at short SOAs, T2 
perceptual processes (block α) are likely to have finished and T2 capacity-limited 
processes (block β) are on hold, creating waiting-time or slack-time for T2 (see Figure 
1.6A). At long SOAs, T2 is presented later in time, and therefore the slack-time will be 
shorter or non-existent (see Figure 1.6B). Because T2 capacity-limited processes can 
only commence after T1 capacity-limited processing has finished, RT2 will be longer at 
short SOAs compared to long SOAs. Any manipulation of perceptual processes will 
have an effect that is absorbed by the slack-time and will therefore not fully affect RT2. 
Thus, the effect of perceptual difficulty will be underadditive to the effect of decreasing 
SOA. T2 manipulations that tax capacity-limited processes, such as the complexity of a 
stimulus-response translation rule will have an effect that is additive to the effect of 
decreasing SOA. That is because in case of serial processing the starting point of T2 
capacity-limited processes is always the same: at the end of the T1 capacity-limited 
processing (see Figure 1.6A). If (partial) parallel capacity-limited processing occurs, T2 
capacity-limited processing doesn’t have to wait for T1 capacity-limited processing to 
finish and a shorter SOA would not linearly affect RT2. This results in an underadditive 
effect for RT2 at short SOAs compared to long SOAs (see Figure 1.6C). At long SOAs, 
there is no slack-time and T2 processes experience no delay (because T1 capacity-
limited processes have finished before T2 perceptual processes have finished), which 
is manifested in an additive effect (relative to the short SOA situation) and to an overall 































slack time  
 
Figure 1.6. An overview of the time course of the serial processing model and the parallel processing 
model for short and long SOA 
 
 
In sum, the serial capacity-limited processing model and the parallel capacity-
limited processing model can be distinguished by their performance on T2 for short 
SOAs. The serial capacity-limited processing model predicts an additive effect of RT2 
with decreasing SOA because T2 processing has to wait for T1 capacity-limited 
processing to finish. The parallel capacity-limited processing model predicts an 
underadditive effect of RT2 with decreasing SOA because T2 capacity-limited 
processing can start before T1 capacity-limited processing is finished.  
These predictions have been tested and the results show evidence for both 
models, although more evidence is available for parallel capacity-limited processing 
models. Research supporting the serial capacity-limited processing model was 
proposed by Carrier and Pashler (1995) who conducted a PRP paradigm in which T1 
was a tone discrimination and T2 was an episodic memory-retrieval task. Tone 
discrimination was made between a high and a low tone. In the memory-retrieval task, 
participants practiced words that later had to be recalled in the test phase. Results 
show that when SOA was shorter, RT2 became longer; this effect was additive for 
RT2. Carrier and Pashler (1995) argued that this dual-task slowing was caused by a 
response-selection bottleneck that postponed S2 response-selection processes (but 
not any other processes like perceptual or motor processes).  
Results supporting the parallel capacity-limited processing model were 
conducted by Van Selst and Jolicœur (1994) who also used a PRP paradigm, in this 
case with tone discrimination task (T1) and mental rotation task (T2). In a mental 
rotation task, a stimulus - often a letter or a digit - can be presented in normal or mirror 
image. This normal/mirror discrimination takes longer when the stimulus is in a greater 
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angle from upright (Corballis, 1986). Results showed a delayed RT2 for shorter SOA, 
but this delay was underadditive with SOA implying parallel processing up to some 
extent. Moreover, Van Selst and Jolicœur (1994) found that varying the angle from 
upright in the mental rotation task - thereby varying working-memory load - influenced 
RT1. This is an indication that mental rotation started before R1 selection. Any 
influence of T2 processes on RT1 is an indication of activation of particular T2 
subprocess before T1 capacity-limited processing has finished, which can only be 
explained by a parallel capacity-limited processing model. In sum, a processing delay 
occurs in dual tasks, although parallel processing up to a certain extent is possible. 
 
Limitations: structural vs. functional  
 At the start of the introduction I have discussed how talking on the phone is the 
most convenient when you are sitting on the settee, giving the person you talk to your 
full attention. When talking on the phone takes place concurrently with another activity, 
in this case driving, this can affect your ability to drive as well as your ability to talk on 
the phone. This impairment will be bigger when the tasks are more demanding, or take 
up more working memory. Apart from the effect of working-memory load, the 
combination of tasks can also affect how well two tasks can be conducted together. 
For example, talking on the phone can be combined more easily with driving than with 
listening to a third person. Similarly, when dual tasks are studied, limitations can be 
due to working-memory load or capacity limitations, or they can be due to feature- or 
process-combination limitations. The former has been studied in research that is 
focused on limitations of the task load and the capacity of processing hardware, that is 
structural processing limitations. The latter has been studied by investigating whether 
the combination of the task properties (features or processes) or for example the 
strategic settings during a task can increase performance given the same task load, 
which points to functional processing limitations. 
Some dual-task models explain the dual-task delay solely by structural 
processing. One example is an experiment by Tombu and Jolicœur (2002), who 
suggested a graded form of capacity sharing (see also: Kahneman, 1973; Navon & 
Gopher, 1979; Navon & Miller, 2002). In their experiment, they presented a tone task 
(T1) and a discrimination shape-matching task (T2) in a PRP paradigm. The stimuli in 
T2 were two polygons presented in three possible sizes. Participants were required to 
make a mirror/same judgment by comparing the two polygons and ignore the 
difference is size. T2 difficulty was manipulated by changing the size ratio of the two 
presented shapes-to-match as an increased ratio results in a longer RT (Bundesen & 
Larsen, 1975; Jolicœur & Besner, 1987). Results showed an additive effect of T2 




response-selection bottleneck. At the same time, RT1 varied with SOA indicating that 
T2 capacity-limited processes were activated before T1 response decision was made, 
which was taken to suggest that T2 processes started at the cost of a longer duration 
of capacity-limited processes of T1. 
 Other dual-task models take into consideration that combinations of different 
features or processes can also influence the size of the dual-task delay (functional 
processing limitations) (Hommel, 1998; Logan & Schulkind, 2000). Hommel (1998) 
conducted a series of dual-task experiments in which he investigated the contribution 
of functional processing limitations to dual-task slowing. He presented a red or green H 
or S that required a manual response to the color (T1) and vocal response to the letter 
(T2). The two responses could be compatible or incompatible, i.e., pressing left and 
saying “left” would be considered compatible while pressing left and saying “right” 
would be considered incompatible. The backward-compatibility effect compared the 
effect of compatible versus incompatible feature-response combinations at RT1. 
Results showed a facilitation effect for RT1 (i.e., less dual-task slowing) in case of 
compatible responses. This could only occur when R2 is activated before S1 response 
selection. Any effect of R2 features on RT1 is direct evidence for parallel processing. 
More importantly, in the experiment by Hommel (1998), the working-memory load of 
the compatible and the incompatible conditions did not differ: there were no differences 
in structural processing limitations. However, the combination of features did differ; the 
key press and the vocal response could be compatible or incompatible. Therefore the 
functional processing limitations were different. Because there was no difference in 
working-memory load, any difference in the dual-task delay could be attributed to the 
features of the stimuli and how they were combined. Whether compatibility between 
processes would also show facilitation, independent of task load, has not yet been 
investigated and will be one of the aims of this thesis. 
 
Aims of thesis 
Research up to now has shown that dual-task paradigms like the PRP can be used 
to investigate working-memory limitations. Furthermore, research has already shown 
that the delay that occurs when two tasks are conducted simultaneously can be due to 
structural processing limitations, and recently, also some functional processing 
limitations of dual-task processing have been identified. However, we still do not know 
the exact nature of the delay in dual tasks. The general aim of this thesis was to 
investigate the functional limitations in dual-task processing, to obtain a better 
understanding in the reason why they occur and to what extent they are limited, in the 
relation between different dual tasks, in the attentional processes involved during dual-
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task processing and in working memory in general. More specifically the purpose was 
to:   
1. investigate the relative contribution of functional limitations in the backward-
compatibility effect in a dual task; 
2. explore the relation between the dual-task costs that occur in the PRP 
paradigm and in the AB paradigm. Additionally, it was explored whether the 
dual-task limitations in the PRP and AB paradigm can be explained by similar 
factors. This was accomplished by investigating the correlation between PRP, 
AB, working-memory operation span and IQ to examine the role of working-
memory operation span in the two paradigms (independent of IQ); 
3. investigate the process overlap in a dual task between mental rotation and 
visual-spatial attention electrophysiologically to clarify whether attention can be 
used independent of capacity-limited processes, or whether they might share a 
common resource; 
4. explore whether an additional working-memory load affects the relative 
contribution of functional limitations in the backward-compatibility effect in a 
dual task. Additionally, the purpose was to investigate which processes (i.e. 
so-called implementation processes and execution processes) in a dual task 
other than response selection are capacity limited.  
 
Outline of thesis  
This thesis consists of four chapters (Chapters 2-5) reporting empirical work on dual-
task limitations. 
In the second chapter, the effect of backward compatibility between processes 
in a PRP paradigm is investigated. In the first experiment, we present two mental-
rotation tasks and vary rotation compatibility (by compatible or incompatible rotation 
direction) and category match (both mirror or both normal for match; mirror and normal 
for mismatch) orthogonally. Results show that parallel processing can be modulated by 
the response match between categories, but only in case of rotation compatibility 
between tasks (and not in case of an incompatibility). This suggests that only one 
rotation process can be active (either clockwise or counterclockwise rotation) but that 
this process can be applied to (at least) two stimuli. When this happens, property 
information of S2 (i.e. category-response match) can influence RT1, and in case of 
matching response categories there is a facilitation. When the two processes are 
incompatible, S2 won’t be activated because only one process can be activated at the 
time. These circumstances do not allow for T2 category-response match to influence 




upright stimulus that moved in an irrelevant path around S1. In this case, T2 is low in 
task load. Still, category response match facilitates R1 in case of rotation compatibility.   
In the third chapter, a study is presented of the correlation between the PRP 
effect, the AB magnitude and two factors that can predict PRP and AB performance to 
some extent: working-memory operation span and IQ. Results show a correlation 
between performance on PRP and AB paradigms: participants with high dual-task 
costs in the PRP also show a greater difficulty to report T2 in the AB (at intermediate 
lag). Furthermore, both the PRP effect and the AB magnitude show a correlation with 
working-memory operation span: people who score high on working-memory operation 
span have a better PRP and AB performance. In case of the AB magnitude but not the 
PRP effect, this is independent of IQ performance. This suggests that at least some 
but not all variance in the two effects is unique to a paradigm. 
In the fourth chapter, the effect of a specific capacity-limited process, mental 
rotation, on T2 visual-spatial attention is examined. The ERP-components N2pc –a 
measure of the deployment of attention– and sustained posterior contralateral 
negativity (SPCN) –a measure of the arrival of information into visual short-term 
memory– are taken to measure attentional delay. Results show that increased difficulty 
in T1 mental rotation delays succeeding visual-spatial attention. This suggests that 
mental rotation and visual-spatial attention share capacity-limited properties.  
In the fifth chapter, the modulation of process-compatibility effects by  working-
memory load is investigated. Just as in Chapter 2, a PRP paradigm is presented with 
two mental rotation tasks; effects of rotation compatibility and category match are 
measured. An additional working-memory task – involving either a high or low working-
memory load – is presented at the start of the trial, and the information is kept active 
for recall at the end of each trial. Results show facilitation for category-match trials only 
if the rotations are compatible, confirming Chapter 2 results. This interaction is not 
affected by the working-memory load. Working-memory load does, however, reduce 
the category-match effect. This suggests that stimulus activation – which leads to 
response facilitation in case of compatible mental-rotation directions – does not take up 
significant working-memory space, but the results of these operations do. The aim of 
the second experiment is to specify which part of mental rotation causes the delay. 
Thereto, a PRP paradigm is presented in which two stimuli both require mental 
rotation. To investigate whether mental rotation can be separated in an implementation 
process and an execution process, a cue is presented at the start of each trial to validly 
predict the second stimulus 75% of the time. Only if participants are able to implement 
the cue before S2 is presented, we would expect faster S2 responses when S2 is 
validly predicted by the cue compared to when the cue is an invalid predictor. Results 
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suggest that two operations can be implemented simultaneously, but only if the two 
processes are rotated in the same direction.  
 
The work reported in the four empirical chapters in this thesis has been 
submitted or accepted for publication. The list is presented below to acknowledge the 
valuable contributions of the co-authors.  
Pannebakker, M.M., Band, G.P.H., & Ridderinkhof, K.R. (2009). Operation 
compatibility: a neglected contribution to dual-task costs. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 35, 447-460.  
Pannebakker, M.M., Colzato, L.S., Band, G.P.H, & Hommel, B. (submitted). What do 
PRP and AB have in common? Experimental Psychology. 
Pannebakker, M.M., Jolicœur, P., Van Dam, W., Band, G.P.H., Ridderinkhof, K.R., & 
Hommel, B. (in prep). Does mental rotation affect T2 spatial attention in a dual task? 
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Traditionally, dual-task interference has been attributed to the consequences of task 
load exceeding capacity limitations. However, we demonstrate that in addition to task 
load, the mutual compatibility of the concurrent processes modulates whether two 
tasks can be performed in parallel. In two psychological refractory-period (PRP) 
experiments, task load and process compatibility were independently varied. In 
Experiment 1, participants performed two mental rotation tasks. Task load (rotation 
angle) and between-task compatibility in rotation direction were varied. Results 
suggest more considerable parallel execution of compatible than of incompatible 
operations, arguing for the need to attribute dual-task interference not only to structural 
but also to functional capacity limitations. In Experiment 2, it was tested whether 
functional capacity limitations to dual-task performance can be caused only by 
demanding processes or whether they are also induced by relatively automatic 
processes. It was found that an irrelevant circular movement of Stimulus 2 interfered 
more with mental rotation of Stimulus 1 if the rotation directions were opposite than if 
they were equal. In conclusion, compatibility of concurrent processes constitutes an 
indispensable element in explaining dual-task performance. 
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Introduction 
 
Performance on demanding tasks is known to be limited by temporal overlap 
with other demanding tasks. Although it is common practice to depict processing 
limitations in terms of task load, the current study takes the perspective that the notion 
of task load is in itself insufficient to predict the extent to which two tasks can be 
performed simultaneously. We study the relative contribution of task content, and in 
particular inter-task compatibility to concurrent processing and show that this is another 
important but neglected dimension in dual-task research. Task content is defined here 
as task features that do not contribute to task load, but nonetheless contribute to the 
extent to which two tasks can be performed simultaneously.  
Research on dual tasks has shown that when two tasks are presented in rapid 
succession, the reaction time to the second stimulus (RT2) is increased, while the 
reaction time to the first stimulus (RT1) is much less affected, compared to conditions 
without temporal overlap. The effect of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) on RT2 is 
attributed to interference of task 1 (T1) processes onto task 2 (T2) processes and is 
called the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) effect. This effect is shown to be very 
robust (e.g., Logan & Schulkind, 2000; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b; Pashler, 1994; 
Van Selst & Jolicœur, 1994).  
Several models have tried to account for the PRP effect. Most of these 
emphasize structural processing limitations. Structural processing limitations are 
determined by the combination of the task load and the capacity of processing 
hardware. As a result, such limitations are not diminished by a different way of 
performing on a task or by varying the compatibility between them. For example, 
limited-capacity models assume that the PRP effect reflects the delay that occurs when 
the sum of processing demands required for separate tasks exceeds the available 
capacity.  
Few models take into account that the combination of operations can also induce 
processing limitations. We will refer to such limitations as functional processing 
limitations, defined here as processing limitations imposed by the emergent properties 
of a combination of two tasks beyond the properties of the tasks separately. The 
associated costs may be attributed to strategic settings, additional cognitive control 
requirements, or to interference caused by crosstalk between concurrent processes. 
This definition implies that given the same task load, some task combinations are 
easier to perform simultaneously than others. Even though crosstalk can reduce dual-
task costs by optimizing the circumstances for parallel processing, it can also open the 
door for stimulus or response conflict, resulting in increased dual-task costs. When the 




more cautious, serial mode of processing. In this way, when features or processes are 
less compatible, the deployment of parallel processing will decrease.      
 
Structural-limitation models 
Structural capacity limitations have been postulated in several dual-task models. 
Some of these assume all-or-none use of the available capacity, whereas others 
assume that capacity allocation can be graded. According to the structural-bottleneck 
model, there are fixed limitations to parallel processing that affect only central 
processes such as decision making or mental rotation. Such bottleneck processes of 
T2 can only start after the bottleneck processes of T1 have finished (Pashler, 1994, 
see also: Keele, 1973, Kerr, 1973, Welford, 1967). The idle time in T2 processing 
between the offset of pre-bottleneck and the onset of bottleneck processes (slack) is 
thought to determine the size of the PRP effect. A reduction of SOA will lead to an 
increase of slack and consequently longer RT2, whereas on longer SOAs there is no 
slack and RT2 is relatively short. 
Carrier and Pashler (1995) introduced the so-called locus of slack logic to 
distinguish between pre-bottleneck and bottleneck processes. Because bottleneck 
processes cannot continue during slack, changes of the duration of bottleneck 
processes will have the same effect on conditions with and without slack. In contrast, 
pre-bottleneck processes of T2 can continue while bottleneck processes of T1 are 
taking place. Therefore, experimental manipulations of pre-bottleneck process duration 
will be absorbed by the slack and will have a smaller effect on RT2 at short SOAs 
(where slack is present), than at long SOAs (where slack is absent). This pattern of 
results translates into an additive effect of decreasing SOA and any factor that affects 
the duration of bottleneck processes, but an underadditive effect of decreasing SOA 
and any factor that prolongs the duration of pre-bottleneck processes.  
Ruthruff, Miller, and Lachman (1995) investigated whether mental rotation 
qualifies as a bottleneck process. In four PRP experiments using sound discrimination 
for T1 and a mental rotation task for T2, they observed additive effects in three, and 
underadditive effects in one experiment. They concluded that mental rotation requires 
a bottleneck system and that the results give evidence for a single-channel mechanism 
like the structural bottleneck model (but see: Van Selst & Jolicœur, 1994; Heil, Wahl, & 
Herbst, 1999; Schumacher et al., 2001).  
Van Selst and Jolicœur (1994) used a similar task as Ruthruff et al. (1995) 
investigating the effect of mental rotation (T2) on T1 processes. Earlier research on 
mental rotation (Corballis, 1986) had established that mirror/normal discrimination in a 
mental rotation task can only occur after the rotation has taken place. Van Selst and 
Jolicœur showed that RT1 was affected by T2 rotation angle, suggesting that T1 
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processes were slowed down by mental rotation in T2. This result is consistent with 
central capacity sharing models, which assume that demanding processes can run in 
parallel, but that parallel processing is limited by the load of concurrent tasks relative to 
the available processing capacity (Bornemann, 1942; Kahneman, 1973; Navon & 
Gopher, 1979; Navon & Miller, 2002; Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Tombu & Jolicœur, 
2003).  
 
Functional-limitation models     
Functional-limitation models are a category of models that assert that the 
relationship between two tasks influences the amount of dual-task costs, independent 
of task load. They attribute dual-task interference, at least in part, to changes invoked 
by the combination of tasks involved: some combinations facilitate parallel processes, 
attenuating the interference. Although they are related in the sense that they do not 
focus on processing load -like structural models- there are also differences between 
functional models in explaining in what way this limitation occurs.  
The first type of functional limitation involves the delay imposed by coordination 
over the tasks that are combined. Meyer and Kieras (1997b) argued in their adaptive 
executive control (AEC) models that central processes such as response selection can 
take place in parallel. Perfect time sharing (Schumacher et al., 2001) may even be 
possible with certain task combinations if subjects engage in performing with the 
appropriate strategy. Nonetheless, subjects usually show performance that is more 
consistent with serial processing. According to Meyer and Kieras (1997a), deferment of 
T2 is a way to accomplish the instructed task goal and reduce the risk of errors that is 
inherent in certain task combinations. This deferment causes RT2 to be delayed on 
short SOAs, but the size of the delay depends on the content of the concurrent tasks.   
Consistent with AEC models, Luria and Meiran (2005) argued that task overlap is 
modulated by control demands. In two PRP experiments, they varied control demands 
by a task switch and T1 response selection difficulty by number of response 
alternatives. The carry-over effect of T1 selection difficulty onto RT2 was used as a 
measure for parallel processing. Results show a carry-over effect on switch trials, but 
not on repeat trials. This led Luria and Meiran to argue against structural limitation of 
parallel processing; instead they suggested that a higher control demand shifts the 
processing from parallel to serial.   
The second type of functional limitation involves the delay imposed by the control 
requirement in the transition from one task to another, such as proposed in the 
Executive Control Theory of Visual Attention (ECTVA, Logan & Gordon, 2001). 
According to ECTVA, there are three effects at work in the PRP task; concurrence 




required for keeping more than one task set active, and are independent of the 
relationship between tasks. However, set switching costs vary with the number of 
parameters that require adjustment. Finally, crosstalk between two tasks occurs if the 
tasks involve overlapping stimulus or response sets. Because the priority is never fully 
assigned to processing one stimulus and not the other (cf. the capacity allocation 
policy, Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003), the set of one task may be applied to the stimulus 
from another task.  
Finally, the third source of functional limitations stems from the interaction at the 
representation level between feature codes belonging to two concurrent tasks. 
Features that are activated by one task can interfere with feature representations for 
another task. This leakage of information between channels is commonly referred to as 
crosstalk (e.g., Hommel, 1998; Logan & Schulkind, 2000). When two tasks facilitate 
each other, an increase of parallel processing occurs, while interference because of 
crosstalk would give rise to a more serial modus of processing. As much as conflicting 
information between an irrelevant and a relevant channel within a task renders a 
response slower and more error prone (Stroop, 1935; Simon, 1969), features can also 
affect performance between tasks. A requirement for interference seems to be the 
presence of dimensional overlap (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990) between 
competing codes. For example, activation of a left-hand code interferes with the 
activation of a right-hand code, but not with an unrelated vocal response because 
these are not mutually exclusive.  
An obvious source of interference following crosstalk is the competition between 
concurrently activated response codes (e.g., Stoet & Hommel, 1999), but interactions 
have also been shown between feature codes belonging to stimuli and those belonging 
to responses. Müsseler and Hommel (1997), for example, showed that observing the 
direction of an arrow was impeded by the simultaneous planning for a response on the 
same side. This and other observations have led to the postulation of a unified coding 
environment for all active features; both stimulus and response features, by the theory 
of event coding (TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). TEC predicts 
that dual-task costs due to concurrently activated features are modulated by the 
correspondence of these features. 
 
Backward compatibility and the category-match effect 
Support for the predictions of TEC for PRP performance comes from Hommel 
(1998), who showed in a series of dual-task experiments that RT1 was sensitive to the 
match between S1 and R2. For example, in Experiment 2, colored letters were 
presented, and subjects were to respond first to the color, and then to the identity. 
Because the vocal response to the identity of the letter was the word “red” or “green”, 
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there was feature overlap between S1 and R2. Hommel found longer RT1s to a 
nonmatching S1-R2 combination (e.g., GREEN-RED) than to a matching combination 
(e.g., GREEN-GREEN).  
Hommel’s (1998) results are a clear sign of crosstalk between the two tasks. 
Moreover, crosstalk occurred between stimulus and response representations, 
consistent with the TEC notion of a unified encoding environment. This notion also 
plays an important role in Experiment 2 of the current study, in which crosstalk 
between stimulus representations and concurrent operations is demonstrated.  
The match effect that Hommel (1998) reported also has implications for the 
plausibility of strictly serial models. The effect from T2 processes onto RT1 implies that 
stimulus classification processes (like decision and selection processes) of T1 only 
finished after R2 was activated. It demonstrates that response activation processes 
can run in parallel, and that concurrent task content affects the speed of mental 
operations in a dual task.  
An important methodological innovation of Hommel’s (1998) study is that it 
demonstrated parallel processing with priming effects of T2 features onto RT1. This 
technique has been developed further by Logan and Schulkind (2000). They tested 
whether semantic memory retrieval can happen in parallel for two alphanumeric stimuli 
presented on either sides of the center that had to be classified as letter vs. digit. 
Consistent with Hommel’s (1998) results, matching response categories (digit-digit or 
letter-letter) led to a shorter RT1 than mismatching response categories (digit-letter or 
letter-digit). Logan and Schulkind concluded that, at least when two similar tasks are 
combined, R2 information becomes available before R1 is selected. Due to crosstalk, 
the similarity between response categories affects the speed by which R1 is selected. 
Category-match effects are typically even larger on RT2 than on RT1, but RT2 effects 
can not exclusively be attributed to crosstalk taking place during parallel processing. 
The category-match effect is a robust finding that has been replicated with a 
variety of task combinations (Band & van Nes, 2006; Logan & Delheimer, 2001; Logan 
& Gordon, 2001; Lien, Schweickert, & Proctor, 2003). It is therefore suited to 
demonstrate differences between conditions in the degree of parallel processing. In the 
current study we adopt the category-match effect as an index of parallel processing in 
tasks that involve the same versus opposite operations.  
 
Current experiments 
In this paper, we aim to investigate the relatively unrecognized contribution of 
task content as a factor in the explanation of dual-task interference. We expect that the 
task content of two competing tasks modulates the extent to which tasks can be 




both tasks will modulate dual-task performance. We manipulated the task content and 
task load independently with a mental rotation task (Shepard and Metzler, 1971) which 
invokes the imagined turning of a tilted stimulus to an upright position. This process 
needs to be executed before the subject is able to decide whether the stimulus is in 
normal- or mirror-image (Corballis, 1986). Task difficulty (or task load) was varied by 
changing the angle between the rotated and the upright position.  
Task content was varied by having to rotate the stimuli clockwise (CW) or 
counter clockwise (CCW) to upright position, in variable combinations for T1 and T2. 
This manipulation does not influence task difficulty: the amount of cognitive effort to 
mentally turn a stimulus 120 degrees CW or CCW is assumed to be equal. The task 
content does differ, however, between rotating two stimuli in the same versus opposite 
directions, where the compatibility of rotations is an emergent property of the 
combination of tasks. Structural-limitation models, which explain dual-task costs by 
capacity limitations, do not predict an effect of task content whereas functional-
limitation models would predict that compatible rotations facilitate parallel processing. 
 
The most important measure in this study is the size of the category-match effect 
on RT1. First of all, it is predicted that subjects respond faster to a tilted stimulus if the 
relevant stimulus category, that is normal- versus mirror-image, is equal for S1 and S2. 
Because judgment of the image is contingent upon mental rotation (see Corballis, 
1986), the observation of a category-match effect would imply that mental rotation, 
response selection, or both take place in parallel for both tasks. Because both mental 
rotation and response selection are demanding processes that have been associated 
with the central bottleneck (Ruthruff et al., 1995; Van Selst & Jolicœur, 1994), a 
significant category-match effect would be evidence against an all-or-none bottleneck 
and in favour of parallel processing. Next step would be to differentiate which 
processing steps (i.e. mental rotation, response selection or both) would be facilitated 
or impeded with different conditions of the match effect.  
Second, experimental modulation of the category-match effect would imply that 
parallel processing can be increased or decreased. Because we manipulate both task 
content and task load, it is possible to measure independently whether these factors 
affect processing limitations and to what extent.  
Response codes become available contingent on mental rotation and response 
activation, so if the match between R1 and R2 codes influences RT1, this implies that 
the R2 code becomes available before the R1 is determined. This implies that at least 
mental rotation and possibly also response activation is performed in parallel.  The 
match effect is defined as the difference in RT1 on normal/normal and mirror/mirror 
combinations versus RT1 on normal/mirror and mirror/normal combinations, that is 
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between trials with matching and mismatching response categories. Restrictions to 
parallel processing, for example due to the incompatibility of operations, can be 
expected to cause a reduction of the match effect.  
As discussed, some functional limitation models predict that compatibility 
between features involved in concurrent tasks contribute to the ability to process two 
tasks in parallel. Whether this also applies to the compatibility between operations is 
an empirical question that is addressed in this study. 
It is important to note that rotation compatibility as such is not responsible for 
yielding preliminary information about R1 or R2. It should not be confused with the 
category-match effect. When two stimuli require mental rotation in the same direction, 








Thirty students (six male) of Leiden University participated in this experiment 
that took three sessions of 1.5 hours. The mean age was 21 years (SD = 2). The 
experiment was conducted in accordance with relevant laws and institutional 
guidelines and was approved by the local ethics committee from the Faculty of Social 
Sciences. One student indicated to be left-handed, the remaining were right-handed. 
All students had normal or corrected to normal eye-sight. They received either thirty-six 
euros or course credits or a comparable combination of both. Data from two 




Participants were tested individually, in separate booths in the Cognitive 
Psychology Lab. The booth was dimly lit, and participants were sitting in front of a 17 
inch computer screen with a viewing distance of approximately 75 cm. Responses 
were made with key-presses on the bottom row keys of the computer keyboard; the left 
hand operating the z- and x-button and the right hand operating the n- and m-button of 







Figure 2.1. Sequence of events within one trial in Experiment 1: the rectangle serves as a fixation, in 




For the stimuli presented on the screen, the alphanumeric characters 2, 4, 5, 7, f, 
G, k, Q and R were used in both tasks. These stimuli were selected because their 
asymmetry allows the creation of unambiguous rotation and mirroring conditions. They 
were oriented either normally or mirror-imaged and their orientation was 0, 60 or 120 
degrees. CW and CCW tilted stimuli occurred equally often. The characters were 
presented in black on a white screen within a black-lined rectangle. Because this was a 
dual task, two characters were presented within the rectangle with a visual angle of 
5.8º × 3.6º (horizontal × vertical). Stimuli were presented well within the boundaries of 
this rectangle. The two presented stimuli were separated by a SOA of 50, 150, 350 and 
1000 ms. SOA, mirror/normal image of characters, response category 
match/mismatch, rotation direction, and angle of rotation were all varied randomly 
within blocks.  
S1 always appeared left from the middle and called for a left-hand response, S2 
always appeared right from the middle (see Figure 2.1) and called for a right-hand 
response. The mapping of normal/mirror image to index/middle fingers was balanced 
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outer finger of each hand (‘z’ or ‘m’ key). A mirror image required either the right finger 
(‘x’ or ‘m’ key) or the inner finger of each hand (‘x’ or ‘n’). Thus, a confound between 
the category match effect and the benefit of using homologous fingers was prevented. 
 
Procedure  
Before the start of the experiment, participants received a written instruction. 
They were asked to respond as quickly as possible, and not to be too cautious in their 
response. No reference was given as to which stimulus had to be responded to first. 
Then more explanation was presented on the computer followed by three practice 
blocks, after which the experimental blocks started. The first practice block was a 
single-task practice for the left hand, and the second one was a single-task practice 
block for the right hand. These two blocks contained 20 trials each. The third block was 
a dual-task block session that consisted of 40 trials.  
Experimental trials were presented in 14 blocks of 90 trials. Pauses separated 
the blocks and participants were encouraged to use them. Within the experimental 
blocks, the trial started with the presentation of a black rectangle for 250 ms in the 
middle of the screen (see Figure 2.1). Then, two stimuli appeared on either side of the 
middle of the rectangle, separated by a variable SOA. As soon as the stimuli appeared, 
participants had 8000 ms to respond before the screen automatically turned white. 
Responding to S2 caused the screen to turn into white immediately. Two correct 
responses resulted in a ‘+’ feedback response, while any other combinations of 
responses elicited a ‘-’ feedback response that was in both cases shown for 500 ms at 
the end of every trial. After a Response-Stimulus Interval (RSI) of 1000 ms the empty 
rectangle appeared to announce the beginning of the next trial. At the end of each 
block, an average reaction time (RT) in ms and a percentage correct (PC) over that 
block was presented to give participants insight on their progress, and to motivate 





RTs longer than 5000 ms or shorter than 150 ms and trials in which R2 preceded 
R1 were excluded from the analysis of RT and PC. The latter was the case in 0.35% of 
the trials. Mean RTs were based on trials with a correct response to both stimuli. Data 
were analyzed with repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) using a 2 × 2 × 
2 × 2 × 4 design with the within-subjects factors rotation compatibility, category match, 
angle 1, angle 2 and SOA. Alpha was set at 0.05. The Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon 




2.2 show the mean performance data. The ANOVA results are summarized in Table 
2.3 and Table 2.4. 
 




Table 2.2. Mean percentages correct for Task 1 and Task 2 in Experiment 1 
 
 
 RT1 RT2 
SOA (ms) 50 150 350 1000 50 150 350 1000 
Angle1 - Angle 2         
  60°-60°  1032 1027 976 865 1262 1160 970 709 
 60°-120° 1098 1076 981 894 1414 1289 1071 858 
  120°-60° 1222 1206 1172 1048 1472 1358 1156 789 
 120°-120° 1264 1258 1048 1064 1577 1471 1233 905 
Rotation compatible 1137 1127 1070 974 1407 1299 1093 807 
 Category match 1116 1104 1058 973 1377 1261 1071 796 
 Category mismatch 1157 1150 1082 975 1437 1338 1114 819 
Rotation incompatible 1172 1157 1090 962 1456 1340 1123 823 
 Category match 1174 1160 1094 966 1458 1343 1130 836 
 Category mismatch 1169 1153 1086 958 1454 1336 1115 810 
 PC1 PC2 
SOA (ms) 50 150 350 1000 50 150 350 1000 
Angle1 - Angle 2         
  60°-60°  95.5 96.5 96.7 96.5 93.7 94.8 94.9 95.1 
 60°-120° 96.3 96.5 96.5 96.0 90.0 89.8 90.1 90.6 
  120°-60° 91.8 92.4 93.3 92.6 93.8 93.1 93.5 93.6 
 120°-120° 92.6 92.7 93.8 93.0 90.1 89.9 90.3 90.1 
Rotation compatible 93.9 94.7 95.0 94.7 91.6 91.5 91.7 92.3 
 Category match 94.1 95.1 95.1 95.0 91.2 91.6 91.9 92.2 
 Category mismatch 93.8 94.3 95.0 94.4 91.9 91.5 91.6 92.4 
Rotation incompatible 94.2 94.4 95.1 94.4 92.1 92.2 92.6 92.4 
 Category match 94.2 94.9 95.2 94.4 91.2 91.2 91.4 90.7 
 Category mismatch 94.3 93.9 95.0 94.4 92.9 93.2 93.9 94.1 
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Table 2.3. Summaries for Analyses of Variance for reaction times and percentages correct for Task 1 
in Experiment 1 for all effects up to second order effects plus the significant higher order effects 
 
 RT1 PC1 
Effect df MSE F p part. 
η² 




1,27 8083 18.2 <.001 .402 10 .19 .669 .007 
Category match 
(C) 
1,27 10186 5.0 .035 .155 22 2.7 .113 .091 
R × C 1,27 9717 14.1 .001 .342 15 .23 .638 .008 
SOA (S) 3,81 129689 59.8 <.001 .689 93 3.3 .023 .110 
R × S 3,81 6655 8.6 <.001 .242 13 .69 .561 .025 
C × S 3,81 5572 2.2 .103 .074 17 1.0 .388 .036 
Angle 1 (A1) 1,27 58140 262.6 <.001 .907 59 94.5 <.001 .778 
R × A1 1,27 10362 3.9 .059 .126 12 .006 .940 .000 
C × A1 1,27 10923 .43 .518 .016 17 1.4 .250 .049 
R × C × A1 1,27 9810 3.0 .095 .100 9 5.9 .022 .180 
S × A1 3,81 9420 2.2 .107 .074 22 .98 .393 .035 
Angle 2 (A2) 1,27 25998 20.6 <.001 .433 11 3.4 .076 .112 
R × A2 1,27 7309 6.2 0.19 .186 13 .76 .391 .027 
C × A2 1,27 7936 .94 .341 .034 11 .018 .893 .001 
R × C × A2 1,27 4358 3.2 .085 .106 14 2.1 .162 .071 
S × A2 3,81 7209 7.3 <.001 .212 17 1.4 .242 .051 
R × S × A2 3,81 6385 .86 .449 .031 16 .71 .543 .026 
A1 × A2 1,27 5546 .55 .466 .020 17 1.3 .260 .047 
C × A1 × A2 1,27 6421 10.2 .004 .273 20 <.001 .996 <.000 
R × C × A1 × A2 1,27 7384 12.8 .001 .322 7 .44 .515 .016 






Table 2.4. Summaries for Analyses of Variance for reaction times and percentages correct for Task 2 
in Experiment 1 for all effects up to second order effects plus the significant higher order effects 
 
 RT2 PC2 
Effect df MSE F p part. 
η² 




1,27 10667 48.1 <.001 .641 42 3.0 .096 .099 
Category match 
(C) 
1,27 30684 5.2 .031 .160 53 13.3 .001 .330 
R × C 1,27 8826 51.5 <.001 .656 24 23.1 <.001 .461 
SOA (S) 3,81 101057 710.3 <.001 .963 25 1.2 .306 .043 
R × S 3,81 7013 3.6 .020 .119 28 .59 .601 .021 
C × S 3,81 6495 5.4 .003 .167 27 .75 .505 .027 
Angle 1 (A1) 1,27 47059 224.0 <.001 .892 27 4.9 .036 .153 
R × A1 1,27 5809 7.8 .009 .224 13 .82 .374 .029 
C × A1 1,27 9566 1.6 .220 .055 31 17.2 <.001 .389 
R × C × A1 1,27 12433 2.0 .173 .068 23 1.9 .664 .007 
S × A1 3,81 9491 44.3 <.001 .622 15 .2.2 .097 .077 
Angle 2 (A2) 1,27 34110 182.2 <.001 .871 102 70.5 <.001 .723 
R × A2 1,27 9555 3.0 .096 .100 34 28.7 <.001 .515 
C × A2 1,27 8932 2.7 .114 .090 21 11.7 .002 .303 
R × C × A2 1,27 5646 7.9 .009 .227 14 10.8 .003 .286 
S × A2 3,81 9168 6.6 .002 .197 26 .059 .974 .002 
R × S × A2 3,81 6604 2.4 .080 .083 19 .94 .417 .034 
A1 × A2 1,27 6311 15.8 <.001 .370 18 9.2 .005 .253 
C × A1 × A2 1,27 7227 18.0 <.001 .400 23 24.7 <.001 .477 
R × C × A1 × A2 1,27 7908 21.9 <.001 .447 16 3.8 .063 .123 




All the five main effects on RT1 were significant. A main effect of SOA reflected a 
monotonic decrease of RT1 with increasing SOA (1154, 1142, 1080 and 967 ms). The 
difference between 60 and 120° was 185 ms for angle 1 and 35 ms for angle 2 in 
favour of the smallest angle. Participants responded 10 ms faster to matching than to 
mismatching categories, and 18 ms faster to compatible than to incompatible rotation 
pairs. 
Increasing SOA led to reducing effects of rotation compatibility (from 35 to -12 
ms) and angle 2 (from 54 to 22 ms, as shown in Figure 2.2). The often reported 
reduction of the category-match effect with increasing SOA was only marginally 
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significant (a reduction from 18 to -3 ms). The effect of angle 1 did not vary 
systematically with SOA.  
The pivotal interaction of rotation compatibility × category match was significant 
(see Figure 2.3). Follow-up analyses showed that the category-match effect was 
substantial for compatible rotations (29 ms; F (1,27) = 12.4, p < .01), but not significant 
for incompatible rotations (6 ms; F (1,27) = 1.9, p = .182). The effects of rotation 
compatibility and rotation compatibility × category match were marginally larger if angle 
1 was 120 relative to 60°, but significantly smaller if angle 2 was 120 relative to 60°. 
Furthermore, the category-match effect and the interaction of rotation compatibility × 





















Figure 2.2. The interaction of angle 1, angle 2 and SOA on reaction time 1 of Experiment 1. In this 
figure, angle 1 and angle 2 are presented in the different combinations that they can occur: both can 

























Only the main effects of SOA and angle 1 were significant. The main effect of 
SOA was not monotonic, with all levels of PC1 between 94.1% and 95.1%. The main 
effect of angle 1 was caused by a 3.5% decrease of PC1 going from S1=60° to 
S1=120°. Interactions of rotation compatibility × category match × angle 1 and of 
category match × SOA × angle 2 showed no systematic pattern. 
 
RT2  
All main effects were significant and in the same direction as for RT1. There was 
a typical PRP effect; an effect of SOA on RT2, with a monotonic decrease from SOA-
50 to SOA-1000 (1431 ms, 1320 ms, 1108 ms, and 815 ms respectively). Effects on 
RT2 for rotation compatibility (34 ms) and category match (19 ms) were only slightly 
larger than for RT1. RT2 was 153 ms faster to angle 1 = 60° than to angle 1 = 120°, 
and the effect of angle 2 was 117 ms in the same direction.  
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An increasing SOA led to a decrease of the effects of angle 1 (from 187 to 63 
ms) and a nonmonotonic changes in the effect of angle 2 (129, 120, 89 and 133 ms, as 
shown in Figure 2.4). At long, relative to short SOAs, there was a decrease of the 
effects of rotation compatibility (from 49 to 16 ms) and category match (from 28 to -1 
ms). 
Rotation compatibility interacted with category match, as is illustrated in Figure 
2.5. The category-match effect was larger for compatible rotations (51 ms) than for 
incompatible rotations (-12 ms). The rotation compatibility effect was larger if angle 
1=120° vs. 60° (44 vs. 24 ms) and marginally smaller if angle 2=120° vs. 60° (26 vs. 42 
ms). An interaction of rotation compatibility × category match × angle 2 signified that 
the category-match effect was reversed if S2 had to be rotated in 120° in the opposite 
direction of S1, whereas all other comparisons showed faster responses to matching 
response categories. 
There was an underadditive interaction of angle 1 × angle 2. This was most of all 
the case on compatible rotations and with matching response categories, as indicated 
by the interactions of rotation compatibility × category match × angle 1 × angle 2 and 
category match × angle 1 × angle 2. 
 
PC2  
There were main effects of angle 1 and angle 2 in the expected direction and an 
interaction of angle 1 × angle 2, showing underadditive costs of rotating both S1 and 
S2 120°. The category-match effect (1.3%) and the marginal effect of rotation 
compatibility (0.6%) were both in the reversed direction. An interaction of rotation 
compatibility × category match was caused by remarkably high accuracy with 
incompatible rotation and nonmatching response categories.  
An interaction of effects of category match × angle 1 × angle 2 was caused by 
deviating high costs if there was a category match between stimuli with angle 1=60° 
and angle 2=120°. This pattern also explains the interactions of category match × 





In the experiment, we manipulated central processing load of two mental rotation 
tasks in a PRP paradigm and investigated the category-match effect as a measure of 
parallel processing. To distinguish between the two classes of limitation models we 
independently varied angle as a task load manipulation, and rotation compatibility as a 
manipulation of operation compatibility. Several results suggest that the high task load 
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of mental rotation as such limited parallel processing. One example is the finding that 
RT1 was affected by angle 2. This is a result that suggests that an increased T2 load 
imposed by mental rotation over a larger angle left less capacity available for T1. 
Apparently, T1 did not receive full priority over T2, as S2 rotation must have taken 
place before T1 was finished. This suggests that rather than through an all-or-none 
bottleneck, capacity was allocated to tasks in a graded manner. 
 More evidence against all-or-none bottlenecks comes from the category-match 
effect, which implies that the correct response category (mirror vs. normal) for T2 was 
activated before R1 was selected (Hommel, 1998). The match effect as such might be 
explained by capacity-sharing models (Navon & Miller, 2002; Tombu & Jolicœur, 
2003), but only under the assumption of crosstalk between T1 and T2. One might want 
to argue that this crosstalk took place without mental rotation and response selection. 
However, this is hard to account for, given the data: at least some mental rotation took 
place before R1 was selected, as the occurrence of a category-match effect is 
contingent on the activation of the R2 category, and decisions about the R2 category 
are contingent on mental rotation. This implies that mental rotation of S2 started before 
R1 was selected and affected R1 speed and accuracy. 
 
Modulation of the category-match effect 
To test whether task load modulates parallel processing, the difficulty of mental 
rotation was manipulated. Subjects rotated S2 over 60° or 120°, and the question was 
whether this affected the category-match effect. The category-match effect was 
somewhat larger if T1 competed with a S2 rotation of 60° (26 ms) than with a rotation 
of 120° (12 ms), but not significantly. Furthermore, the interaction of category match 
and rotation compatibility became somewhat smaller if S1 was tilted 60° compared to 
120°; this effect did not reach significance either. These inconclusive findings do not 
support a modulation of parallel processing by task load as manipulated by the rotation 
angle. There was a substantial effect of angle 2 on RT1 (53 ms on short SOAs) 
however, which clearly validates that task load was higher during 120° than during 60° 
rotation. Thus, while task load affected the efficiency of RT1, it did not modulate the 
crosstalk from T2 to T1.   
Independent of task load, we manipulated operation compatibility. Stimuli could 
require mental rotation in the same or opposite direction, and the question was 
whether the compatibility affected the category-match effect. Contrary to the 
predictions of structural capacity-limitation models, subjects were better able to 
perform two tasks simultaneously if they involved compatible as compared to 
incompatible operations. That is, the category match effect was modulated by the 




effect of the T2 response code was present only if T1 and T2 involved mental rotation 
in the same direction, and not in case of opposite direction.  
To our knowledge, this is the first illustration of modulation of parallel processing 
by the compatibility between two competing tasks. This result can not be explained by 
any dual-task model that explains interference by the relationship between the 
available processing capacity and task load, as the task load was identical for 
compatible and incompatible rotations. Instead the results argue for functional 
limitations to dual-task performance: the extent to which two tasks can be combined 
depends on the combination of tasks to be performed.  
The modulation of the match effect by operation compatibility is reminiscent of 
the relationship between the match effect and task switching. There are illustrations of 
a match effect on trials that involve a task switch (Hommel, 1998; Lien, Schweickert, & 
Proctor, 2003), but Logan and Schulkind (2000) have shown a substantial reduction of 
the category match effect on switch relative to repetition trials.  
Although modulation of the match effect by a task switch in itself underlines the 
importance of functional-capacity limitations in explaining the amount of parallel 
processing, it may not have the same origin as the asymmetry of match effects 
observed with compatible as compared to incompatible rotation. In the current study 
there was no need to switch the task set. Furthermore, rotating two stimuli in the same 
direction but over different angles did not remove the category match effect. Therefore, 
the tentative conclusion is that the absence of a match effect on incompatible trials can 
not be attributed to task set reconfiguration as it is commonly understood (Allport, 
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), and should instead be attributed to 
the mere inability to simultaneously make a mental representation of two opposite 
directions of rotation.   
As for our current experiment, the conclusions support the hypothesis that task 
content is a crucial factor to be considered when evaluating dual-task models. 
However, this first experiment is not yet conclusive in distinguishing between 
functional-limitation models, like the AEC model, the ECTVA model and the TEC 
model. In Experiment 2, S2 does not require mental rotation – it is only displayed in 
irrelevant circular motion. If we still observe modulation of the category match effect by 
the correspondence of rotation directions, it can not be attributed to the presence 
versus absence of a rotation reversal, as ECTVA would predict. Also, it can not be 
attributed to deferment of an error-prone mental rotation process, as AEC would 
predict. Hommel et al.’s (2001) TEC model, however, assumes that irrelevant and 
relevant features, both perceptual and mental share a common feature coding space, 
and predicts that the direction of irrelevant rotation of S2 will modulate parallel 
processing, as reflected in the match effect.  
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Experiment 2 
 
While Experiment 1 required subjects to engage in mental rotation of S2 as a 
way to induce a rotation compatibility relation, Experiment 2 presents physical rotation 
as an irrelevant feature of S2. If the contribution of rotation compatibility to dual-task 
performance is limited to the compatibility of demanding operations, as predicted by 
structural capacity-limitation models, ECTVA or AEC models, Experiment 2 should not 
show a modulation of the category-match effect by the compatibility of rotations. If in 
contrast there are functional limitations, induced by conflict at the level of representing 
task features, Experiment 2 should show a larger category-match effect if the physical 
rotation of S2 is compatible with the mental rotation of S1.  
To be able to distinguish between the different limitation-models, we adapted the 
first experiment as follows. We presented a tilted S1 in the centre of the screen, 
comparable to the first experiment. Participants were to judge whether it was 
presented in normal or mirror image. S2 however was an upright character, moving in 
circles around S1, either CW or CCW. Participants had to respond to the mirror/normal 
status of S1 and S2. Because S2 was presented in upright position, mental rotation 
was not necessary. In a category match, stimuli were either both mirror or both normal 
images, and mismatches were combinations of a mirror and a normal image stimulus. 
Rotation compatibility has a slightly different meaning in Experiment 2 than in 
Experiment 1. Rotations were compatible if the mental rotation required for bringing S1 
to the upright position was in the same direction as the physical motion of S2 (i.e. both 









Twenty students (four male) of Leiden University participated in this experiment 
that took ninety minutes. None of them had participated in Experiment 1. Three 
students indicated to be left-handed, the remaining were right-handed. All students had 
normal or corrected to normal eyesight. They received either twelve euros or course 
credits or a combination of these. One participant could not finish the experiment due 




excluded from the experiment, because the number of replications per cell was 
insufficient. Mean age of the participants was 22 years (SD = 3). 
 
Stimuli 
Two characters were presented within the rectangle, with a SOA separating them in 
time. S1 was always presented in the centre with S2 continuously moving in a circular 
course around S1. It took 1450 ms to complete one rotation of S2 and the movement 
was either CW or CCW. This made the speed of the movement 248°/sec, while the 
speed of the mental rotation for S1 was 337°/sec (as calculated by the difference in 
time between 120° and 60° rotation; this would calculate back to 1070 ms for one 
rotation). The movement of S2 was irrelevant for the response. The whole view within 




Figure 2.6. Sequence of events within one trial in Experiment 2: the rectangle serves as a fixation, in 
which S1 appears, and, after a short interval, S2. The arrows indicate circular motion and were not 




Stimuli were presented in 50 blocks of 26 trials. S1 rotation angle, S1 tilting 
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all randomized. Because S2 was not tilted combinations of the angle combinations 
were 60°- 0° and 120°- 0° (0° was not presented for S1).  
 
Procedure 
Before the start of the experiment, participants received a written and a spoken 
instruction. Then more explanation was presented on the computer followed by a 
practice block containing 30 trials, after which the experimenter started the 
experimental blocks. In the trials, an RSI of 500 ms was used. For a sequence of 





All RT and PC results were analyzed in ANOVAs using a 2 × 2 × 2 × 4 design 
with the within-subjects factors rotation compatibility, category match, angle 1 and 
SOA, unless stated otherwise below. Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show the mean 
performance and the ANOVA results are summarized in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8.  
 
 












 RT1 PC1 
SOA (ms) 50 150 350 1000 50 150 350 1000 
Angle 1         
  60°  1364 1313 1294 1216 90.4 91.4 93.7 94.2 
 120° 1160 1132 1111 1074 94.8 95.2 94.7 95.5 
Rotation compatible 1259 1224 1190 1145 92.7 92.9 94.7 95.6 
 Category match 1190 1138 1127 1133 94.6 94.1 95.0 95.7 
 Category mismatch 1329 1310 1253 1157 90.7 91.7 94.5 95.6 
Rotation incompatible 1265 1221 1214 1144 92.5 93.6 93.7 94.0 
 Category match 1227 1178 1186 1144 93.4 95.0 92.8 94.3 








Table 2.7. Summaries for Analyses of Variance for performance on Experiment 2 
 
 RT2 PC2 
Effect df MSE F p part. 
η² 




1,16 8721 .60 .449 .036 36 .982 .337 .058 
Category match 
(C) 
1,16 101246 9.7 .007 .378 31 7.0 .018 .304 
R × C 1,16 8348 15.2 <.001 .488 14 1.8 .196 .102 
SOA (S) 3,48 111099 6.3 .013 .282 30 5.6 .005 .258 
R × S 3,48 10409 .53 .665 .032 20 2.0 .141 .109 
C × S 3,48 26692 6.1 .010 .277 28 4.0 .018 .200 
R × C × S 3,48 10784 .68 .546 .040 29 .92 .420 .054 
Angle 1 (A1) 1,16 12328 347.9 <.001 .956 65 14.4 .002 .473 
R × A1 1,16 17505 .003 .956 .000 17 .47 .505 .028 
C × A1 1,16 7240 4.1 .059 .206 30 1.8 .204 .099 
R × C × A1 1,16 5280 .37 .550 .023 10 .043 .838 .003 
S × A1 3,48 11417 2.7 .078 .144 26 4.6 .010 .223 
R × S × A1 3,48 10819 .96 .406 .057 19 .44 .685 .027 
C × S × A1 3,48 12584 3.1 .049 .160 24 .63 .565 .038 
R × C × S × A1 3,48 8308 0.20 .877 .012 30 .61 .580 .037 
 
 
 RT1 PC1 
SOA (ms) 50 150 350 1000 50 150 350 1000 
Angle 1         
  60°  1622 1482 1291 878 96.2 97.1 97.2 98.5 
 120° 1425 1302 1118 811 96.6 96.8 97.7 98.5 
Rotation compatible 1519 1394 1190 844 96.8 96.8 97.4 98.4 
 Category match 1414 1286 1099 816 97.5 96.7 96.7 98.8 
 Category mismatch 1623 1501 1281 873 96.2 97.0 98.2 97.9 
Rotation incompatible 1529 1391 1219 845 95.9 97.1 97.5 98.7 
 Category match 1456 1321 1164 826 96.6 97.2 97.0 98.3 
 Category mismatch 1594 1460 1273 864 95.2 97.0 97.9 99.0 
Operation Compatibility and Dual-Task Costs 
   53
Table 2.8. Summaries for Analyses of Variance for performance on Experiment 2 
 
 RT2 PC2 
Effect df MSE F p part. 
η² 




1,16 11926 .942 .347 .059 12 .11 .742 .007 
Category match 
(C) 
1,16 221047 10.5 .005 .412 18 .031 .863 .002 
R × C 1,16 12885 9.5 .008 .387 7 .045 .835 .003 
SOA (S) 3,48 65924 345.6 <.001 .958 12 10.4 <.001 .394 
R × S 3,48 10159 .71 .530 .045 9 1.6 .226 .088 
C × S 3,48 35850 6.0 .012 .287 11 4.4 .016 .215 
R × C × S 3,48 12905 .71 .509 .045 15 .93 .411 .055 
Angle 1 (A1) 1,16 13598 224.1 <.001 .937 9 .18 .678 .011 
R × A1 1,16 17679 .50 .488 .033 12 .43 .520 .026 
C × A1 1,16 6653 4.6 .048 .236 9 .27 .612 .016 
R × C × A1 1,16 4708 .12 .730 .008 14 1.1 .320 .062 
S × A1 3,48 12330 13.1 <.001 .466 8 .74 .505 .044 
R × S × A1 3,48 11622 1.2 .308 .076 10 .52 .640 .032 
C × S × A1 3,48 13553 4.2 .017 .217 12 .74 .493 .044 




 Subjects were 85 ms faster on a category match relative to a mismatch, and 178 
ms faster to 60° than to 120° tilted S1s. There was a gradual decline in RT1 as the 
SOA increased (1262, 1222, 1202, and 1145 ms respectively), but no main effect of 
rotation compatibility.  
The most important interaction of rotation compatibility and category match was 
significant. The category-match effect was larger for compatible than for the 
incompatible rotation directions (116 ms vs. 54 ms, see Figure 2.7). Furthermore, the 
category-match effect was larger for short than for longer SOAs (111, 130, 91, 12 ms), 
and marginally larger for small than for larger angles (101 vs. 71 ms). A tendency for 
an interaction of angle 1 × SOA reflected that the effect of angle 1 decreased from 203 
on short to 142 ms on long SOAs. 
 
PC1  
Subjects were 1.3% more accurate if categories matched as compared to 
mismatched, and 2.6% more accurate to 60° than to 120° tilted S1s. Accuracy 




increasing SOAs, there was a decrease of the benefit of a category match from 2.8 to -





















Figure 2.7. The interaction of rotation compatibility and category match on reaction time 1 in 




The PRP effect was observed; RT2 decreased with increasing SOAs (1524, 
1392, 1205, and 845 ms respectively). Subjects were 135 ms faster on a category 
match relative to a mismatch, and 154 ms faster to 60° than to 120° tilted S1s.  
The category-match effect was modulated by rotation compatibility (165 ms for 
compatible and 104 ms incompatible rotations); by angle 1 (150 ms for small and 119 
for larger angles) and by SOA (a decrease from 169 to 48). There was also a three-
way interaction of category match × angle 1 × SOA, reflecting that the effect of angle 1 
largely maintained its size on longer SOAs if categories mismatched, but decreased 
with SOA when they matched. 
 
PC2 
SOA showed the only significant main effect, with performance increasing with 
increasing SOA (96.4%, 97.0%, 97.5%, and 98.5% respectively). There was an 
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interaction of category match × SOA, showing that the category-match effect was 
positive only on the shortest SOA. A four-way interaction of rotation compatibility × 





In this second experiment, we investigated the influence of a non-demanding 
and irrelevant process representation of S2 features on RT1, as reflected in the 
category-match effect. To that end, we varied the circular movement of S2, which itself 
was presented in normal or mirror image, but always in an upright position.  
RT1 and RT2 both decreased with SOA, indicating mutual limiting effects 
between T1 and T2 processes. The decrease of the angle 1 effect from RT1 to RT2 
suggests that T2 processes were not entirely deferred until rotation of S1 had finished. 
The extent to which T2 processes continued is reflected in the category-match effect.  
Just as in Experiment 1, RT1 was relatively fast if the response categories for T1 
and T2 matched, suggesting that R2 activation started before R1 was selected. It also 
shows that there is crosstalk between T1 and T2 processes that causes a relative 
benefit for matching response categories: parallel processing is facilitated and the 
dual-task interference is reduced.  
As predicted by some functional-limitation models (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001), 
rotation compatibility modulated the size of the category-match effect. When the 
rotation directions were compatible as compared to incompatible, the category-match 
effect was more than twice as large. Because the rotation of S2 was irrelevant and did 
not contribute to the complexity of the task, it can not have been involved in a 
demanding process of T2. Because of the random presentation of the trials, it was also 
not possible and of no use to predict the mental rotation direction of T1 from the 
rotating direction of T2. The fact that compatibility nonetheless modulated the 
category-match effect means that incompatible rotations either slowed down S1 
rotation, or led to suppression of T2 processes, or both. Because rotation compatibility 
did not interact with angle 1 on RT1, there did not seem to be a modulation of S1 
rotation. Therefore, the compatibility effect must be attributed to changes in T2 







Summary of the results 
In two experiments we have shown that while subjects perform on a primary 
mental rotation task, they can already determine and activate the correct response 
category for a second task. In both experiments T1 was to determine the mirror/normal 
status of a tilted character. In Experiment 1, T2 required mental rotation like T1, while 
in Experiment 2, S2 was always upright and therefore required no mental rotation, but 
the upright stimulus was moving along a task-irrelevant circular path. In both 
experiments, the match between the response categories of both tasks affected RT1. 
As explained by Logan and Schulkind (2000), this category-match effect is a sign that 
two tasks were performed in parallel.  
Moreover, the amount of parallel processing in both experiments was modulated 
by the compatibility of mental rotation with concurrent events. In Experiment 1, the 
compatibility between the directions in which stimuli required mental rotation affected 
the category-match effect. In Experiment 2 the match effect varied as a function of the 
compatibility between the required mental rotation for S1 and the irrelevant rotation of 
S2. These results point out that dual-task limitations can not be explained exclusively 
in terms of structural capacity limitations, but that also the relationship between tasks 
influences the amount of parallel processing. Importantly, these limitations are not 
exclusively evoked by demanding processes, but can also arise if irrelevant activity is 
in conflict with a mental operation. These inferences will now be discussed stepwise. 
 
Is mental rotation a bottleneck process? 
Previous studies have shown that the task to decide whether a tilted stimulus is 
presented in normal or mirror image first requires mental rotation of the stimulus to its 
upright position (Corballis, 1986). Mental rotation imposes a strong burden on the 
cognitive system and thereby limits concurrent processes of the same (Band & Miller, 
1997) or other tasks (Ruthruff et al., 1995). Some researchers assert that mental 
rotation has bottleneck properties in the sense that no other central processes can take 
place simultaneously with mental rotation (Pashler, 2000). Consistent with this 
assertion, the angle 1 effect in Experiment 1 was equally large on RT1 and RT2, which 
implies that at least some T2 processes waited for mental rotation of S1 to finish. In 
Experiment 2, the effect size of angle 1 was smaller on RT2 than on RT1. The 
combination of the two experiments might be taken to suggest that during the delay 
imposed by mental rotation of S1, RT2 could not benefit from starting mental rotation of 
S2, whereas other processes such as the mirror/normal judgment of an upright 
stimulus could make progress. Then, at first glance mental rotation seems to have 
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bottleneck properties. However, locus of slack studies have shown that angle effects of 
T2 are sometimes attenuated on short SOAs (Van Selst & Jolicœur, 1994). In our 
experiment, the effect of angle 2 on RT2 was hardly modified at longer SOAs. This 
suggests that during the phase of temporal overlap between tasks, mental rotation of 
S2 did not continue before critical processes of T1 had been completed. Actually, this 
effect can be explained both in structural and in functional terms.  
 
Parallel mental rotation 
In both experiments RT1 decreased with increasing SOA. Moreover, the current 
study strengthens the support in favour of parallel execution of demanding processes 
such as mental rotation by showing that R1 was faster for matching than for 
mismatching response categories of T1 and T2. This effect at the least implies that T2 
processes lead to a preliminary preference for the correct response category before 
the response category of T1 has been selected.  
How certain is it that mental rotation, rather than another pair of processes was 
time sharing? Given that mental rotation is a process of long duration (up to 350 ms for 
120° angles) it is a priori difficult to find an alternative explanation. The category-match 
effect can only arise if mental rotation has at least produced preliminary support for R2 
before R1 is selected. First, one might argue that subjects were able to categorize S2 
without mental rotation, and that the category-match effect relied entirely on such direct 
translation without mental rotation. However, this explanation can easily be refuted 
because the occurrence of the category-match effect in Experiment 1 was modulated 
by rotation compatibility and thus clearly depends on rotation.  
Three other alternatives need to be excluded. Mental rotation of S1 and S2 might 
have been performed serially, yet before R1 selection. Apart from the fact that this 
would result in very long RT1s, it would be consistent with the occurrence of the 
category-match effect. If subjects interrupted T1 processes in favor of T2 processes, 
the category-match effect would not be a sign of parallel processing. Instead, it would 
be a forward priming effect from processing S2 to subsequent processing of S1. 
Furthermore, subjects may have switched back and forth between mental rotation 
processes. Although switching introduces new problems such as switch costs and 
higher requirements for keeping task performance separated, it would be a way to 
complete both tasks without sharing capacity. Finally, on a subset of trials, subjects 
might reverse the order of tasks. Given that only trials with responses in the correct 
order were analyzed, only the reversal of initial processes would go unnoticed and not 
the actual reversal of responses. The problem with these three explanations is that 




found. In conclusion, there is strong evidence in favour of parallel mental rotation for 
two tasks.  
 
Modulation of the category-match effect  
To explain category-match effects in a dual task, Hommel (1998) distinguished 
between two phases of response selection. An initial phase can activate one or more 
responses associated with the stimulus, but this activation does not necessarily result 
in an overt response. In a later phase, a rule-based response decision is made. 
Hommel argued that R2 activation can start before the R1 decision is made, although 
the R2 decision may need to wait until the R1 decision is finished. The current 
category-match effects are only partially consistent with this distinction. As the 
determination of response categories (mirror/normal) was contingent on mental 
rotation for both tasks of Experiment 1, the category-match effect implies that it was 
mental rotation that produced preliminary activation. In other words, R2 activation 
entailed more than a direct S-R association, it involved a process that is generally 
agreed to be a heavy burden operation. 
The modulation of category-match effects by rotation compatibility suggests that 
parallel rotation is limited by the synchrony of the directions of rotation. On 
incompatible mental rotations, there was no significant category-match effect. It is clear 
that these limitations can not be attributed to task load, as even Experiment 2 showed 
a reduction of the category-match effect with incompatible rotation when S2 rotation 
was irrelevant. Thus, the reduction is not caused by an inherent limitation to performing 
incompatible heavy-burden operations. Instead, the incompatibility of representations 
seems to be the key issue. 
Meyer and Kieras’ (1997a; 1997b; 1999) AEC models could be designed to defer 
processing S2 if its rotation poses a risk for reaching the goal to respond to S1, but this 
deferment would be done in anticipation of a task, not in response to the risk of errors 
encountered from trial to trial. Other models do assume that executive control can be 
applied to adjust the processing strategy immediately upon the detection of conflicting 
response tendencies (e.g., Miller & Cohen, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986; 
Ridderinkhof, 2002), but we are not aware of a model that would explicitly predict a 
shift from parallel to serial processing. The model that comes closest is that of Luria 
and Meiran (2005), who have argued that if control requirements increase in a PRP 
task, subjects may switch from parallel to serial processing. However, this idea applied 
to task switches versus repetitions. To what extent could this idea be extended to 
switches in rotation direction? Before we can answer this, we need to have a model of 
how task switches modulate the category-match effect. 
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Logan and Gordon’s (2001) ECTVA model suggests that crosstalk can be 
modulated by the overlap between task sets. Priming of S2 onto S1 could occur if 
mental rotation in the direction of T1 activated meaningful response categories, which 
was only the case if mental rotation in the direction of T1 brought S2 to the upright 
position. While ECTVA can explain the modulation of the category-match effect in 
Experiment 1, the same explanation does not hold for Experiment 2, since the mirror-
normal discrimination of S2 did not require mental rotation. The modulation of the 
category-match effect by an irrelevant stimulus feature can therefore not be attributed 
to the involvement of task switching.  
The conjecture that we believe is best capable of explaining the pivotal 
interaction of rotation compatibility and category match is in terms of the effects of 
crosstalk in a unified encoding environment. Both relevant and irrelevant features 
involved in the two tasks were activated, and in line with TEC (Hommel et al., 2001), 
stimulus features (the irrelevant rotation of S2 in Experiment 2) interfered with the 
representations involved in the mental rotation process of T1. The performance costs 
of conflict caused by the activation of opposite directions of rotation may be attributed 
to mechanisms such as reciprocal inhibition (cf. Coles, Gratton, Bashore, Eriksen, & 
Donchin, 1985), slower accumulation of support for a response (Ratcliff, 1988), or even 
active inhibitory control (Ridderinkhof, 2002). A distinction between these mechanisms, 
however, is beyond the scope of this article.  
 
Task content versus Task load 
In this study we have distinguished between structural-limitation models and 
functional-limitation models of dual-task performance. We have demonstrated the 
importance of task content (independent of task load) in causing dual-task interference 
and limiting parallel processing. Yet, this study should not be interpreted as a plea 
against the contribution of task load. Many results in the literature can not be explained 
without referring to task load, and the effect of S2 angle on RT1 in Experiment 1, for 
example, shows that an increased task load in a task indeed slows down the 
competing task. The message of the current study, however, is that task load can not 
explain all dual-task processing limitations. 
One of the most counterintuitive findings was the fact that a non-demanding 
perceptual event, irrelevant rotation of S2, interfered with mental rotation. This clearly 
validates the use of task content as an indispensable part of the explanation of when 
dual-task processing is facilitated or impeded. Moreover, it exposes a blind spot in 
current models of dual-task performance. Thus far, capacity models were all focused 
on the contribution of demanding processes to the possibility to perform on two tasks 




observing a rotating character can affect dual-task performance calls for more attention 
to interactions between operations and representations in working memory.   
We acknowledge that some authors have investigated interactions between 
operations, between operations and working memory representations (e.g., Oberauer 
& Göthe, 2006). However, these accounts apply to the effect that one process has on 
the other, not on the modulating effect of compatibility between concurrent processes 
on parallel processing. It is this contribution that we find too important to dismiss, as we 
have demonstrated by both experiments.  
Whether parallel processing stands a better chance when tasks do or when they 
do not overlap in perceptual-motor requirements is still a matter of debate. Pashler 
(1994) recommended for PRP experiments to combine tasks that shared no 
requirements except for the need to make SR-translations. This has led to a tradition in 
which combinations such as a visual-manual and an auditory-vocal task are used. 
Indeed, Meyer and Kieras (1999; see also Schumacher et al., 2001) argued that the 
absence of perceptual and motor overlap between tasks is one of the preconditions for 
obtaining perfect time sharing. In contrast, Logan and Gordon’s (2001) ECTVA model 
assumes that dual-task interference increases as a function of the number of 
adjustments to the task set that need to be made. This would predict more parallel 
processing if tasks show less overlap. Consistent with this assertion, studies that have 
demonstrated parallel processing with the category match effect all (by definition) 
made use of task overlap, and the category match effect is reduced by the need to 
switch between tasks. 
 
Relation to other dual-task compatibility studies 
The current study demonstrated the importance of between-task compatibility for 
the ability to combine tasks. Previous dual-task studies have emphasized other 
aspects of task combinations that deserve to be mentioned here. In particular, several 
models assume that processing capacity is modality-specific (Wickens, 1984). For 
example, it is better possible to combine a visuo-spatial with an auditory-vocal task 
than to combine two visuo-spatial tasks (Baddeley, 1986). Likewise, Wickens (1984) 
argued for separate resources for perceptual channels and effector channels that limit 
the ability to combine similar tasks.  
It is important to emphasize that modality-specific limitations to dual-task 
performance are imposed by the task load rather than the content of the constituent 
processes. While two tasks that share modality-specific resources are resource 
incompatible (the two tasks can not be combined due to resource limitations), they may 
well be content compatible (the two tasks can be combined without operations or 
representations affecting each other negatively). Conversely, the current Experiment 2 
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showed that tasks that do not both impose a heavy task load may be resource 
compatible, but content incompatible.  
The compatibility between concurrent task operations can be approached with 
the same theoretical framework that is also used in explaining compatibility effects in 
single tasks (cf., Kornblum, et al., 1990; Kornblum & Lee, 1995), under the assumption 
that concurrent processes produce crosstalk. The important addition made in the 
current study is that these compatibility relations are not restricted to feature 
representations of stimuli and responses, but also apply to mental operations such as 
mental rotation.  
 We argue that capacity limitations alone, whether in single or in multiple 
modules, are insufficient to explain the current results and that the relevance of task 
content in this regard is neglected in the literature on dual-task performance. Two 
studies have previously shown a compatibility effect of perceived rotation on sequential 
mental rotation. Corballis and McLaren (1982) have shown that after the presentation 
of a rotating disc, the rotation after-effect influenced the direction in which subjects 
performed mental rotation of stimuli that were almost upside down. Heil, Bajrić, Rosler 
and Hennighausen (1997) showed that this perceptual after-effect also affected the 
speed of mental rotation. Recently, a third study showed after-effects that transfer 
between operations. Graf, Kaping and Bulthoff (2005) demonstrated a beneficial effect 
on the accuracy of naming a tilted object that was masked after a brief presentation if it 
immediately followed a prime stimulus that required mental rotation in the same 
direction. Nonetheless, these studies give no hint about the effect that the compatibility 
of rotation would have on concurrent processing. An interesting exception in the 
current context is a study by Wohlschläger (2001; see also Wohlschläger & 
Wohlschläger, 1998), who instructed subjects to plan a hand movement, but to execute 
it only after a mental rotation task was completed. Mental rotation was faster if the 
concurrent tasks involved movement in the same relative to opposite direction. The 
author concluded that the representation of the intention for a hand movement 
interfered with rotation. This is consistent with our assertion that dual-task interference 
arises as a result of competition between task content; not only between operations, 
but also between a non-demanding mental representation and a cognitive operation.  
 
Closing remarks 
It is an interesting question for future research whether the rotation compatibility 
effects on parallel processing that we demonstrated can be generalized to operations 
other than mental rotation and events other than perceived rotation. There are several 
interesting ways to follow up on the current study. There is a rich tradition of 




be implemented in a dual-task setting. Also, combinations of mathematic and 
mnemonic tasks can be designed to use the same instruction and task set, but 
operations that are either compatible or incompatible between concurrent tasks. We 
predict that, just as in the current study, it is easier to perform tasks in parallel if they 
make use of compatible as compared to incompatible operations. As the current study 
has shown, the use of the category match effect can be a powerful tool for 
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The Attentional Blink (AB) paradigm and Psychological Refractory Period 
(PRP) paradigm are both dual task paradigms in which performance on the second 
task is impaired by processing limitations. We investigated the relationship between 
individual AB and PRP effect sizes and tested whether the two effects share 
predictors. AB effect sizes were positively correlated with PRP effect sizes, suggesting 
a common functional basis. Consistent with previous research, we found that AB effect 
magnitudes are predicted by working memory (WM) operation span size (as measured 
by OSPAN) but not by fluid intelligence (as measured by Raven’s SPM) and were able 
to extend this finding to PRP effects. However, the connection between PRP and WM 
operation span was weaker than that between AB and WM, suggesting that PRP tasks 
are less dependent on WM. 
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Introduction 
 
There are two frequently used paradigms that measure how multiple stimuli 
are processed when presented in short succession: the Attentional Blink (AB) 
paradigm and the Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm. In the AB 
(Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), there is a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) 
of around twenty distractors, mixed with two or more targets that require unspeeded 
report at the end of each trial. The temporal difference between the two targets is 
varied by the number of distractors in between, and is indicated by the so-called lag, 
i.e., the serial position of the second target (T2) relative to the first (T1). Whereas T1 
accuracy is generally high, report on T2 depends on the lag: long lags show highly 
accurate report, while short lags (typically 100-500 ms post-T1) show decreased 
accuracy.  
In the PRP paradigm (e.g., Pashler, 1994; Welford, 1952), two stimuli are 
presented in close temporal succession. The variable time between the onset of the 
first stimulus (S1) and of the second (S2) is called the stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA). Typically, when the temporal overlap increases (i.e., SOA decreases) the 
reaction time to S2 (RT2) increases. This RT2 effect reflects a delay that S1 
processing imposes on S2 processing. If SOA is long enough, however, RT2 
decreases and reaches an asymptotic level. 
Thus, in both paradigms, participants show impaired performance on the 
second task resulting from the requirement to process two relevant stimuli in short 
succession. The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether the sources of 
the effects observed in these paradigms overlap.  
 
Shared vs. unique mechanisms 
Jolicœur (1999) has investigated the relation between AB and PRP and 
presented a Central Interference Theory to explain the results of both paradigms (see 
also Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1999; Pashler, 1994). This theory is built on the 
assumption that both short-term consolidation and response selection make use of a 
capacity-limited central mechanism. In non-speeded AB tasks, consolidation for T2 can 
only be deferred by consolidation for T1, because response selection can be 
postponed until after the end of the trial. However, in an AB task with speeded R1, 
response selection for T1 defers consolidation for T2. This in turn would make it harder 
to report T2 accurately over time, because the appearance of the mask would impair 
ongoing bottom-up stimulation, which would result in decay of the target (Coltheart, 
1980) or interference by the mask (Chun & Potter, 1995; Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998; 





by a variable number of response alternatives enhanced the AB in the speeded, but 
not in the nonspeeded version.  
In the PRP task, response selection processes of T2 are deferred by 
consolidation of T1, as demonstrated by Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1999), or by 
response selection for T1 (Pashler, 1994). Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua also demonstrated 
that trials with a long RT1, presumably involving prolonged response selection, 
interfered more with T2 consolidation, as demonstrated by a reduced accuracy of 
reporting a masked T2. In sum, these studies suggest AB and PRP have a shared 
locus of interference. 
Other research however, suggested that AB and PRP have a different locus of 
interference. Wong (2002) conducted an AB to compare dual-task delays in both the 
PRP and the AB. First, he added a speeded response for T2 in the AB to obtain RTs. 
Additionally, T2 intensity was varied to investigate whether the impairment in the AB 
was caused by a similar bottleneck mechanism that causes the PRP effect. Previous 
PRP research showed an underadditive effect of perceptual processes like processing 
intensity and SOA on RT (e.g., Jentzsch, Leuthold, & Ulrich, 2007; McCann & 
Johnston, 1992). Results for the AB with speeded R2 showed an underadditive 
interaction between T2 intensity and lag on RT and an overadditive effect for the same 
interaction on accuracy.  The RT interaction effect suggests that AB-limitations come 
from central capacity limitations because perceptual processing precedes central 
capacity-limited processing. The accuracy effect, however, suggests that AB-limitations 
come from a limitation in visual processing. The dissociation between RT and accuracy 
results suggests that there are two different sources of interference in the AB, of which 
the RT effect resembles the interference shared with the PRP.      
Additionally, some studies have investigated the relation between the AB and 
PRP electrophysiologically (e.g., Vogel & Luck, 2002; Arnell, Helion, Hurdelbrink, & 
Pasieka, 2004). One event-related potential component, the P3, reflects completion of 
stimulus identification or categorization (Donchin, 1981). Arnell et al. (2004) used P3 
latency in two experiments, of which the first experiment entailed an AB with a masked, 
unspeeded R1 and a speeded R2. The second experiment was a PRP paradigm, 
similar to the first experiment except that T1 was not masked and a speeded response 
was required. Arnell et al. (2004) measured the P3 latency in both paradigms to 
investigate whether the delay occurred at the same stage or at a different stage. If the 
P3 latency was proportional to the SOA and RT delay then the dual-task delay 
occurred before stimulus identification. Alternatively, when the delay of the P3 was not 
related to the size of the SOA then the dual-task delay occurred after stimulus 
identification. Results showed a significant relation between P3 latency and response 
slowing in the AB, but not in the PRP. This is an indication that the main delay of the 
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second response arose before stimulus categorization for the AB but after stimulus 
categorization for the PRP, which in turn suggests a different cause of interference for 
the two paradigms. To conclude, the available research provides evidence for both 
shared and unique sources of dual-task interference in the PRP and AB paradigm.  
 
Modality specific vs. modality independent 
Arnell and Duncan (2002) investigated whether the source of interference is 
shared between paradigms by comparing the interference in bimodal and unimodal 
dual tasks. Bimodal tasks use two different sensory processing routes (e.g., visual – 
auditory) while unimodal tasks use one single processing route (e.g., visual-visual). 
Arnell and Duncan (2002) assumed a single bottleneck when the interference effects 
were limited to the unimodal condition, while an additional interference effect for 
bimodal tasks would imply the existence of multiple bottlenecks. In their first dual-task 
experiment, they randomly presented unimodal and bimodal trials in an unspeeded 
task. For both tasks, modality (auditory or visual) and SOA were varied. Results 
showed T2 performance impairments on unimodal trials as well as in bimodal trials. 
The interference was larger in the unimodal trials, which is a result that is in line with a 
unimodal bottleneck. Experiment 2 was similar to the first experiment, but now a 
speeded dual task was used. Task load was varied in the auditory task by having 
participants make either a pitch or identity judgment (easy) or both (difficult).  Again, 
results showed T2 impairment in the unimodal as well as in the bimodal tasks, with the 
largest impairment for the unimodal condition. The use of a higher task load in the 
second experiment for the auditory task caused increased T2 impairment. Arnell and 
Duncan (2002) concluded that the existence of interference on both bimodal and 
unimodal trials excludes the possibility of a sole bottleneck. A model with two forms of 
capacity limitation seems most probable: an early limitation at stimulus encoding and a 
later limitation at response selection (Pashler, 1989) or consolidation (Jolicœur, 1999). 
  
Current experiment 
In our experiment we set out to examine the relative contributions of unique 
and shared sources of interference by considering individual differences in the sizes of 
AB and PRP effects. If, and to the degree that these effects are functionally related, 
they should not only show similar performance characteristics and be affected by the 
same variables, but they should also covary in size across participants. In other words, 
people who show large PRP effects should also show large AB effects. Accordingly, 
we acquired PRP- and AB-measures from the same population and tested whether 
and to which degree these measures would be related to each other. Additionally, we 





explained) by WM operation span (as measured in the OSPAN task) and/or 
intelligence (as measured by the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices; SPM). The 
selection of these predictors was inspired by a recent study of Colzato and colleagues 
(Colzato, Spapé, Pannebakker, & Hommel, 2007), who demonstrated that the AB 
magnitude could be predicted from WM operation span but not IQ: Participants with 
higher WM operation span showed a smaller impairment for the AB, independently of 
IQ. Note that it is important to dissociate the effects of IQ and WM operation span as 
these two represent overlapping but non-identical constructs (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 
2003; Süβ, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002).  
The findings of Colzato et al (2007) were confirmed by Arnell, Stokes, 
MacClean, and Gicante (in press). They extended the Colzato et al. study by adding 
two more WM tasks to verify that it is solely the executive control component of WM 
(as measured by the OSPAN) but not the storage component of WM that predicts the 
AB magnitude: a forward digit span to measure the storage component and a 
backward digit span to measure the combined effects of storage and executive control. 
Results showed that AB magnitude and WM operation span (as a measure of high 
executive control) were significantly correlated with SPM, even when forward digit span 
and backward digit span were partialled out. Arnell et al. (in press) argue that it is the 
greater executive control in people with a high WM operation span that makes it easier 
for them to block out distractors in the RSVP stream of the AB.      
The replication of Colzato et al.’s (2007) findings by Arnell et al. (in press) is 
particularly important in the face of Martens and Johnson’s (2009) failure to find a 
correlation between AB magnitude and WM operation span. Instead of the OSPAN 
used by Colzato et al., Martens and Johnson used a symmetry span task, a reading 
span task, a matrix span task and a letter span task to measure WM operation span. 
These tasks all tap into the same WM construct (Kane et al., 2004), but given its lower 
storage requirements the OSPAN is likely to provide a purer measure of WM’s 
executive control component. Indeed, Arnell et al., found that a task that requires 
storage but little executive control (i.e., backward digit span) does not correlate with AB 
magnitude while the OSPAN does.  
In sum, we were interested to see whether performance in PRP and AB tasks 
would correlate across participants, and whether it would be modulated by the same 
types of individual capacity measures. In particular, we considered three hypotheses 
that a common-mechanism approach would suggest. First, there should be a positive 
correlation between AB magnitude and PRP effect (H1): If these two effects reflect the 
same mechanism, people with a pronounced PRP effect should also show a strong AB 
magnitude. Second, there should not only be a correlation between AB magnitude and 
WM operation span (a prediction that was rather trivial, given that our subjects partially 
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overlapped with those of Colzato et al., 2007) but also a correlation between PRP 
effect and WM operation span (H2). Third, AB effect, PRP effect and their possible 
modulation by WM operation span should be related to intelligence in comparable 






Twenty-nine students (3 men) between 18 and 30 years old participated in this 
experiment for course credit or monetary compensation. Twenty-two of these students 
were already tested on IQ, OSPAN and AB in the Colzato et al. (2007) study. The 
OSPAN varied between 34 and 56 (maximum points: 60; median: 45) and the IQ 
ranged from 100 to 140 (median: 115). All students had normal or corrected to normal 
eyesight, and were not familiar with the purpose of this experiment. 
 
Apparatus 
 The PRP task was conducted on an ACPI uniprocessor computer with a 19’’ 
CRT screen refreshing at 120 Hz using E-Prime for stimulus control. The remaining 
tasks were conducted on a Pentium III computer with a 17’’ CRT screen refreshing at 
100 Hz running under E-Prime with a viewing distance of approximately 50 cm. The 
resolution of the monitor in the AB task was 800 by 600 pixels in 16 bit color.  
 
Procedure and design  
Four tasks were conducted: the AB paradigm to measure the attentional 
impairment in reporting the second of two targets in terms of AB magnitude; the PRP 
paradigm to measure the dual-task delay in terms of the PRP effect; the operation 
span task (OSPAN) to measure WM capacity, and the Raven test (Raven, Court, & 
Raven, 1988) to measure fluid intelligence. Participants always started with the RSVP 
task followed by the OSPAN and Raven sessions counterbalanced between subjects. 
For the 22 participants tested in the Colzato et al. (2007) study, the PRP paradigm was 
conducted in a separate, later session which was taken with an approximate six 
months delay from the first session. Note that, if anything, this delay between the PRP 
task and the other tasks makes the test more conservative. The remaining seven 
participants were tested in two sessions with an approximate delay of a month. All 









Figure 3.1. Events in the RSVP trial. A new display appeared every 80 ms. The two targets (T1, T2) –
digits amongst letters–were separated by either zero, two, four or seven nontarget displays, defining 
the lag. The first digit was either presented between position 7, 8 and 9 of the visual stream. The 
possible positions of T1 and T2 are indicated in the figure. 
 
 
In the AB task, two targets, T1 and T2, were presented in an RSVP (rapid 
serial visual presentation) stream of distractor letters. The two targets were digits that 
randomly varied between 1 and 9. The distractor letters were selected randomly 
without replacement from the alphabet. The targets required unspeeded report at the 
end of each trial; order was not considered in calculating accuracy. Figure 3.1 shows 
the sequence of events in a trial. The fixation mark (‘+’), the distractor, and the targets 
always appeared in the centre of the screen in black on a grey background. 
Participants first received written instructions, after which they practiced for 24 trials. 
Only when participants obtained a percentage correct of more than 50%, they were 
allowed to continue. Otherwise they had to perform another practice session. The trial 
started with a fixation point shown for 2000 ms, followed by a blank interval of 250 ms. 
Then, the RSVP started, consisting of 20 items and alternating a 40 ms item 
presentation with a 40 ms inter-stimulus interval.  
The experiment contained one block of 360 trials (3 locations of T1 x 4 lags x 











Correlation PRP and AB 
 
   71
was presented randomly at the 7th, 8th, or 9th position in the RSVP. T2 followed 




Figure 3.2. Sequence of events within one trial in the PRP trial: the 4 ‘-‘ markers serve as a fixation, in 
which S1 appears above the centre of the screen, and after a variable SOA S2 appears below the 
centre of the screen. The possible positions of S1 and S2 are indicated in the figure. 
 
 
In the PRP task, two stimuli were presented with an SOA of 0, 100, 300 and 
900 ms (see Figure 3.2). Both stimuli were digits (1-9) that were to be judged as odd or 
even. S1 appeared above the centre of the screen and called for a response with the 
index or middle finger of the left hand. S2 appeared below the centre of the screen and 
called for a response with the index or middle finger of the right hand. The mapping of 
odd/even responses onto the index/middle fingers was balanced across participants. 
Participants received instructions after which they practiced for 24 trials during which 
feedback was given after each trial. Then, participants conducted the experiment in 
four blocks of 80 trials which took approximately 20 min. A trial started with a fixation 
for 500 ms followed by the presentation of S1 above the centre of the screen. After the 
variable SOA, S2 appeared below the centre of the screen for 1000 ms: then both S1 















had passed. At the end of each block, participants were given feedback on their 
performance by presenting their average RT and accuracy for the two tasks. We 
excluded all trials in which R2 preceded R1 (SOA + RT2) – RT1 > 0).  
The OSPAN (operation word span) task (adapted from Turner and Engle, 
1989) was used to measure individual WM capacity. In this task, a series of 2-6 
calculation-word pairs is presented in the centre of the screen, e.g., “is ( 8 / 2 ) + 5 = 9 
? train”. Participants were to read the sum out loud, give the answer to the calculation 
and then read the word out loud while remembering it for recall (in correct order) at the 
end of the trial. There were three practice trials after which 15 experimental trials were 
presented: 3 trials of each combination of calculation-word combinations (2-6). The 
OSPAN took approximately 15 min to conduct. Trial order, calculation and words were 
completely randomized. In total, there were 60 words to be remembered correctly 
which gave a maximum of 60 points; one point per correctly remembered word. The 
OSPAN task measures a combination of storage and executive-control capacity 
(Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999), with an emphasis on the latter.   
The Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) test was used to measure 
the individual IQs. The SPM takes about 30 min and is a reasoning-based intelligence 
test. In this test, the participants were shown 60 items. Each item of the test consisted 
of a pattern or sequence of a diagrammatic puzzle with one piece missing, and 
participants had to complete the pattern or sequence by choosing the correct missing 
piece from a list of options. The items become increasingly difficult as the participant 
proceeds through the test. The SPM is used to assess Spearman's g factor and fluid 
intelligence in particular (Raven et al., 1988). Additionally, it measures to what extent 
participants are able to create perceptual relations and to reason by analogy 






Data from the AB show a typical effect for T1 and T2. If tested in a repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with lag as a within-subjects factor, T1 
performance yielded a significant effect, F (3,84) = 90.3,  p < .001. Figure 3.3 shows 
that this effect is largely due to a decreased performance on lag 1 compared to the 
other lags. This decreased performance on lag 1 has been shown before in AB 
paradigms with similar targets; it is likely to reflect competition between T1 and T2 
(Akyürek & Hommel, 2005; Potter, Staub, & O’Conner, 2002). T2 performance (T2|T1; 
T2 performance for correct T1s) also showed a significant effect of lag, F (3,84) =  
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40.4, p < .001. The paired samples t-test for T2 investigating the decrease in 
performance from lag 1 to lag 3 was significant, t(28) = 7.7, p < .001. The recovery 
from lag 3 to lag 8, although not complete, was also significant, t(28) = 2.9, p = .007. 
This traditional AB pattern has been  reported before by many others (e.g., Chun & 
Potter, 1995; Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 1994).   
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Figure 3.4. RT1 and RT2 results for the PRP paradigm over the different SOAs 
 
 
Data from the PRP paradigm were analyzed in a repeated measures ANOVA 
with SOA as within-subjects factor. Results showed a significant main effect of SOA on 
RT1, F(3,84) = 7.4, p = .005: RT1 increased as SOA decreased (see Figure 3.4). 
Contrasts showed that the only significant difference is between SOA = 100 ms and 
SOA = 300 ms: this difference is 44 ms. For RT2, we also found a significant main 
effect of SOA, F (3,84) = 395.4, p < .001: RT2 increased on shorter SOAs. This 
difference is pronounced (effect size: 104 ms, 173 ms, and 150 ms respectively) and 
significant between all levels, F(1,28) = 179.6, p < .001; F(1,28) = 344.1, p < .001; 
F(1,28) = 105.6, p < .001 respectively. The typical, descending slope of RT2 over time 
showed the decreasing interference between the two tasks with decreasing task 
overlap. In short, a standard PRP effect was obtained. 
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PRP effect and AB magnitude were significantly correlated, r² = .644, p < .001: 
Increased slowing of RT2 with more task-overlap in the PRP paradigm correlated 
positively with an increased difficulty to report T2 at short lags in the AB paradigm (see 
Figure 3.5). Partialling out the constructs IQ and WM operation span kept the 
correlation between the PRP effect and the AB significant, r² = .558, p < .01.  
As expected, we found a significant correlation between WM operation span 
and IQ, r² = .377, p = .0441. This is consistent with earlier research showing that these 




                                                
1 This correlation is not as strong as is normally found between WM operation span and IQ, mainly 
due to the small IQ range used in this study. Because we used a student population only, IQ was 






There was a significant correlation between the AB magnitude (measured as 
T2|T1 at lag 8 minus T2|T1 at lag 3) and WM operation span, r² = -.520, p = .0041, but 
not between AB magnitude and IQ, r² = -.215, p = .263 (see Figure 3.6). Partialling out 
the effect of IQ did not remove the correlation of AB magnitude and WM operation 
span, r² = -.485, p = .009. When we partialled out WM operation span, the correlation 
between AB magnitude and IQ remained non-significant, r² = -.024, p = .903. These 
results confirm the contribution of WM operation span in AB performance as found by 
Colzato et al. (2007): participants with a higher WM operation span showed a smaller 
AB magnitude, i.e. their performance on lag 3 for T2 is less impaired than the 
performance of participants with a low WM operation span. 
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Figure 3.6. Correlation between PRP effect and WM operation span and IQ, and the correlation 
between the AB and WM operation span and IQ 
                                                
1 For this experiment, AB effect size was calculated by subtracting conditional T2 performance at lag 8 
from conditional T2 performance at lag 3; but taking the AB size as the difference between 
performance at lag 8 and the minimal performance at lags 3 and 5 gives similar results (for a further 
discussion see Colzato et al., 2007). 
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The PRP effect (measured as the absolute difference between RT2 at SOA = 
900 ms and RT2 at SOA = 100 ms)1 also correlated significantly with WM operation 
span, r² = -.398, p = .033 (see Figure 3.6). This result shows that participants with a 
higher WM operation span show a smaller PRP effect. The PRP effect did not correlate 
with IQ, r² = -.199, p = .301. Partialling out the effect of IQ reduced the correlation 
between PRP effect and WM operation span to a tendency, r² = -.356, p = .063, but 
note that the IQ-related reduction in explained variance was comparable to the 
reduction observed for the correlation between AB and WM. After partialling out the 
contribution of WM operation span, the correlation between PRP effect and IQ 
remained non-significant, r² = -.058, p = .77.  
Apparently, the process-pure, IQ-controlled impact of WM operation span is 
more important and reliable in predicting the AB magnitude than in predicting the PRP 
effect. This might be taken to suggest that the part of WM operation span that predicts 
the PRP effect shares variance with IQ, whereas the part of WM operation span that 
predicts the AB magnitude does not. However, IQ affected the correlation between AB 
and WM on the one hand and that between PRP and WM on the other in similar ways, 
resulting in mild, comparable reductions of explained variance. Moreover, it may be 
that the AB task was more difficult or demanding than the PRP, so that WM resources 
were taxed less in the PRP task—which may explain why WM measures predicted AB 
performance better than they predicted PRP performance. 
 
Regression 
We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with individual AB magnitude 
as dependent variable and individual IQ score as predictor and found no significant 
contribution for IQ (ß = -.215, t = -1.144, p = .263, R² = .046). Adding individual WM 
operation span scores (ß = -.512, t =-2.830, p = .009, R² = .271) improved the 
prediction, F (2,26) = 4.8, p = .016, ΔR² = .225, showing the importance of WM 
operation span in modulating the AB magnitude.  
                                                
1 This effect is a measure of the delay on RT2 that is caused by prior S1 presentation (e.g., at SOA = 
900 ms, the response to S1 has already been given and the interference of S1 on RT2 is minimal).  At 
SOA = 0 ms this interference is maximal. By calculating the so-called PRP effect as the difference in 
RT2 when SOA is 900 ms and the RT2 when SOA is 100 ms we obtained a measure of the 
interference that was caused by S1 on RT2. Using an SOA of 0 ms instead of an SOA of 100 ms 
would give similar results but, because of additional problems of presenting two stimuli simultaneously 







Next, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with individual PRP 
effect as dependent variable and individual IQ score as predictor and found no 
significant contribution of IQ (ß = .199, t = 1.056, p = .301, R² = .040). Adding individual  
WM operation span scores tended to improve the prediction (ß = .376, t =1.940,          
p = .063, R² = .161), which however did not account for a substantial amount of the 
variance, F (2,26) = 2.5, p = .102, ΔR² = .121.  
Taken together, the regression analyses show, similar to the correlations, that 
WM operation span is a reliable predictor of AB magnitude but a weaker predictor of 





The main purpose of the present study was to see whether, and to what 
degree individual differences in the performance on two types of dual tasks—the AB 
and the PRP task—would covary. If they would, so the idea, this would suggest that 
the mechanisms or capacity limitations underlying them are related, as suggested by 
Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1999) and others. Consistent with our first hypothesis, we 
indeed observed a strong correlation between the individual sizes of the AB - and PRP 
effect: Participants who were less capable of detecting flashing targets that rapidly 
followed others also showed a longer delay of responding to the second stimulus that 
rapidly followed another.  
Our second hypothesis was related to the way the AB magnitude and the PRP 
effect are modulated by individual differences in WM capacity. The individual 
magnitude of the AB has been shown to depend on operation span, a measure of 
mainly the executive-control component of WM (Arnell et al., in press; Colzato et al., 
2007). We found the same relationship but, more importantly, were able to obtain a 
similar relationship between the individual magnitude of the PRP effect and operation 
span. That is, both AB magnitude and PRP effect seem to be related to the executive-
control component of WM, another sign that these two effects are functionally related.  
Our third hypothesis was related to the impact of IQ on AB magnitude and 
PRP effect, and on the relationship between these effects and WM capacity. On the 
one hand, IQ as measured by the Raven’s SPM (Raven et al., 1988) affected the two 
measures and their relationship with WM in very similar ways. Neither PRP-effect nor 
AB–magnitude effect sizes were directly predicted by IQ, and partialling out IQ reduced 
AB magnitude - OSPAN and PRP effect - OSPAN only mildly and to the same degree. 
On the other hand, however, controlling for IQ did render the correlation between PRP 
effect and OSPAN as a measure for WM operation span unreliable while leaving the 
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correlation between AB magnitude and OSPAN significant. Clearly, this was due to 
that the latter correlation was stronger than the former in the first place, so that the IQ-
induced reduction of the explained variance “hit” the weaker correlation harder. 
This raises the question why OSPAN correlated more strongly with AB 
magnitude than with PRP effect. One possibility is that both effects reflect WM capacity 
limitations but these limitations have more severe consequences for the AB task than 
they have for the PRP task. A major role of WM in the AB task might consist in the 
suppression of the distractors or of preventing them from access to memory buffers. 
Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa (2005) used a visual memory task in which they 
presented targets and distractors while obtaining electrophysiological measures of how 
much WM capacity was allocated. Results showed that people with a high WM 
operation span size were better able to prevent distractors from entering into WM. In 
the AB paradigm with the RSVP of many distractors, the blocking out of those 
distractors will be more important than in the PRP paradigm, where distractors do not 
play a role and where selecting appropriate responses and keeping the two tasks 
separate may pose the bigger problem. In other words, AB tasks may be more taxing 
with respect to WM capacity than PRP tasks in general, or at least with the particular 
task versions we used in the present study.     
Taken altogether, our findings provide strong support of a common functional 
basis underlying the AB magnitude and the PRP effect, as suggested by Jolicœur 
(1999) and Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1999). This does not exclude the possibility that 
there are components that are not shared by the two tasks, as some authors have 
considered (Arnell et al., 2004; Arnell & Duncan, 2002; Wong, 2002). Indeed, even 
though the correlations between AB- and PRP effects, and between these effects and 
WM operation span, were reliable, they were far from explaining all of the variance, 
and there was even evidence for different degrees of sharing with WM-related 
variance. Further research is thus needed to identify such possible sources of non-
shared variance, and the present study suggests that considering individual differences 
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Dual tasks and their associated delays have often been used to examine the 
boundaries of processing in the brain. We combined the dual-task method with the 
event-related potential (ERP) method to investigate how mental rotation of a first 
stimulus (S1) influences the shifting of visual-spatial attention to a second stimulus 
(S2). Visual-spatial attention was monitored by using the N2pc component of the ERP. 
In addition, we examined the sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN) 
believed to index the retention of information in visual short-term memory. We found 
modulations of both the N2pc and the SPCN, suggesting that engaging mechanisms of 
mental rotation impairs the deployment of visual-spatial attention and delays the 
passage of a representation of S2 into visual short-term memory. Both results suggest 
interactions between mental rotation and visual-spatial attention in capacity-limited 
processing mechanisms indicating that response selection is not pivotal in dual-task 
delays and all three processes are likely to share a common resource like executive 
control. 




Performing two tasks at the same time can overload the capacity of the brain 
in such a way that performance is delayed or impaired. And yet, some combinations of 
tasks seem to be easier to perform than others, suggesting that the costs of 
multitasking depend on the types of cognitive processes that overlap in time. A 
particularly helpful tool in telling apart processes that do and do not produce dual-task 
costs is the so-called Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm (Telford, 1931). 
This paradigm commonly involves a dual task (Task 1 and Task 2, or T1 and T2) in 
which two stimuli (S1, S2) are presented that each require a speeded response (R1, 
R2). The two stimuli are separated in time by a Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA), so 
to manipulate the temporal overlap of the two tasks. Results typically show an 
increased reaction time (RT) to S2 (RT2) with decreasing SOA, suggesting that some 
process necessary to carry out the second response needs to wait until some other 
process in the first task has been completed—this is called the PRP effect (Welford, 
1967).  
Under the assumption of a single capacity limitation, the combined effect on 
RT2 of SOA and a T2 variable can clarify which processes are deferred in the PRP 
paradigm. If the effect of a T2 variable onto RT2 is equal for short and long SOAs (i.e., 
additive with the SOA effect), this implies that the T2 effect is related to a capacity-
limited T2 process or some other process following this capacity-limited process. If 
instead the effect of the T2 variable is smaller for short than for long SOAs (i.e., 
combines underadditively with the SOA effect), this implies that the T2 effect arises 
before capacity-limited processes. Underadditive effects are thought to occur because 
at short SOAs capacity-limited processes are deferred, and this causes a state of slack 
for T2 processes. This slack in a sense “swallows” at least part of the T2 effect, so that 
a T2 variable that affects processes preceding the capacity limitation in T2 delays RT2 
for a shorter while with short than with long SOAs (Pashler & Johnston, 1989). 
Assume, for instance, decreasing the visibility of S2 would delay RT2, but this effect 
would impact a process that precedes the true dual-task bottleneck. With a short SOA, 
T2 is likely to have to wait longer than the visibility effect would delay RT2, so that 
during that slack time any possible visibility problem can be resolved before T2 
continues. With a long SOA, there is no waiting time and thus no slack, so that the 
visibility effect would fully contribute to RT2. Additional clues about which processes 
are capacity limited can come from the effect of T1 variables onto RT2. Effects of T1 
variables on capacity-limited processes or earlier will defer T2 processes and affect 
RT2, whereas T1 variables that take effect after capacity-limited processes will not 





A number of studies have applied this reasoning with considerable success to 
the PRP paradigm (e.g., Carrier & Pashler, 1995; Pashler & Johnston, 1989; Ruthruff, 
Miller, & Lachman, 1995). Pashler and Johnston (1989) conducted a dual task with two 
choice RT tasks. T1 was a tone identification task and T2 involved a choice response 
to one of the letters A, B, and C. S2 perceptual difficulty and stimulus repetition were 
varied to affect the duration of perceptual processes and response selection, 
respectively. The effects of SOA on RT2 were underadditive with the effect of 
perceptual difficulty, and additive with that of stimulus repetition. These results are in 
line with a response-selection bottleneck model (Pashler, 1994; Smith, 1967; Welford, 
1952; 1980), which assumes that response selection is the major bottleneck in 
multitasking, in the sense that only one response can be selected at a time.  
Even though the response-selection bottleneck model has been very 
successful in explaining a wide variety of observations (see Pashler, 1994, for an 
overview), there is increasing evidence that response selection is not the only cognitive 
process with bottleneck characteristics. In the present study, we focused on two 
processes that based on previous observations can be suspected to have such 
characteristics: mental rotation and the shifting of visual-spatial attention. In contrast to 
previous studies that investigated the interaction between these processes and 
response selection, we were interested in the direct interaction between mental 
rotation and attentional shifting. Before we describe the rationale of our study in more 
detail, we first review the available evidence suggesting that mental rotation and 
attentional shifting might indeed possess bottleneck characteristics. 
 
Mental rotation 
In a mental-rotation task, participants categorize asymmetric visual stimuli, 
such as (most) letters, as normally oriented versus mirror-reversed. Importantly, the 
stimuli are rotated to some angle from their usual upright orientation, which makes the 
task more difficult. Results show that RT increases more or less linearly with increasing 
angle from normal orientation (Cooper, 1975, 1976; Cooper & Shepard, 1973; Shepard 
& Metzler, 1971). Although the mechanisms underlying this observation are still largely 
unknown, the empirical findings are very robust and replicable (see Shepard & Cooper, 
1982, for a review). As suggested by the study of Corballis (1986), the mirror/normal 
discrimination can only be made if participants have actually carried out something like 
a mental rotation of the stimulus representation into its normal upright position. This 
process is assumed to have analog characteristics, so that stimuli that deviate more 
strongly from their normal position have to be “mentally rotated” for a longer time—
which is taken to explain the linear relationship between RT and rotation angle. 
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From a response-selection bottleneck model, one would not expect that mental 
rotation as indexed in such a comparison task shares resources with response 
selection. And yet, there is evidence suggesting this possibility. A number of studies 
have looked into the interactions between mental rotation and response selection in a 
PRP paradigm. With a mental-rotation task as T2, Ruthruff et al. (1995) observed that 
a large proportion of the T2 orientation effect was still present at very short SOAs and 
concluded that mental rotation shares limited capacity with response selection in T1. 
Comparable findings were reported by Van Selst and Jolicœur (1994), Heil, Wahl, and 
Herbst (1999), and others, and Band and Miller (1997) observed that mental rotation 
interferes with concurrent response preparation. Taken together, these studies provide 
strong evidence that mental rotation has bottleneck properties similar to response 
selection. 
 
Visual-spatial attention shifting 
Considering their different computational functions the observed similarities 
between mental rotation and response selection may seem rather surprising. Probably 
less surprising are commonalities between visual attention shifting and response 
selection. The main function of a response-selection process should be the 
identification and activation of the cognitive representation of an action that meets the 
current situational requirements and task goals. Visual attention often serves 
comparable purposes by identifying and activating the cognitive representation of a 
relevant stimulus or target, and by optimizing the collection of information about this 
stimulus by directing attention to its location in space. Accordingly, if response 
selection draws on cognitive resources to a degree that renders it an effective 
processing bottleneck, it makes sense to assume that stimulus selection does the 
same. Investigations of the possible bottleneck characteristics of visual attention 
shifting turned out to be rather varied however.  
A first study addressing this issue was reported by Pashler (1991), who 
investigated the potential bottleneck properties of visual-spatial attention in a dual task. 
In his PRP study, T1 was a tone identification task and T2 was an unspeeded masked-
letter identification task. If spatial attention would have bottleneck properties, so the 
idea, accuracy on T2 would be impaired at short SOAs, that is, if response selection in 
T1 would temporally overlap with directing attention in T2. In view of an actually 
significant but small interaction of T2 performance and SOA, Pashler concluded that 
visual-spatial attention does not have bottleneck properties. 
Along the same lines, Johnston, McCann, and Remington (1995) asked 
whether attention is one unitary process comprising of both input selection and output 





conducted a spatial-cuing experiment and a PRP experiment, which both included a 
letter-identification task with undistorted and distorted stimuli. In the spatial-cuing 
experiment, only the letter-identification task was used and the location of the letter 
was pre-cued validly in 80% of the trials. In the PRP paradigm, the letter-identification 
task served as T2 that was combined with a tone-discrimination task as T1. The 
rationale was that the cuing effect would tap into input selection, whereas the PRP 
effect (because of its known relation to response selection) would tap into output 
selection. If input and output selection would draw on common resources, so the 
authors argued, effects related to both types of selection should interact with the same 
variables, such as that of letter distortion. However, the spatial-cuing task showed 
additive effects of letter distortion and cue validity, whereas the PRP task showed 
underadditive effects of letter distortion and SOA. Accordingly, Johnston et al. (1995) 
argued that input and output attention can be seen as a set of related but separate 
selection processes, in which response selection—conceived of as “central”, capacity-
limited process—prevents the simultaneous execution of other capacity-limited 
processes, whereas the deployment of visual-spatial attention can overlap other 
capacity-limited or unlimited processes. But note that this conclusion was drawn from a 
comparison across two separate experiments, without directly looking into the 
interaction between response selection and attentional shifting. 
Even though these first studies did not seem to provide strong evidence for the 
idea that shifting visual attention might possess bottleneck properties, more recent 
studies that used event-related brain potentials (ERP) have changed the picture 
considerably. Brisson and Jolicœur (2007a, 2007b) showed how the N2pc component 
(a negative posterior contralateral component that peaks usually after 200-300 ms) can 
be used to monitor visual-spatial attentional processes on a moment-to-moment basis 
(Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a; 2007b; Eimer, 1996; Luck & Hillyard, 1994; Woodman & 
Luck, 2003). The N2pc is calculated by subtracting ERPs over ipsilateral from ERPs 
over contralateral electrode positions, relative to the visual hemifield of the target. The 
difference waves for targets in the left and right hemifield are then averaged. The N2pc 
is generally observed on the lateral posterior sides of the head, usually with a 
maximum amplitude at electrode-pair PO7 / PO8. Other nearby electrode-pairs are 
sometimes also measured and included in pooled waveforms, together with the 
waveforms observed at PO7 / PO8 (e.g., Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a; Eimer, 1996; 
Woodman & Luck, 2003). The neural generators of the N2pc are likely in extrastriate 
visual cortex (Hopf et al., 2000; Hopf & Mangun, 2000).  
Brisson and Jolicœur (2007a) used a PRP paradigm in which they presented a 
tone discrimination task for the first task that was either easy (the highest or the lowest 
tone) or difficult (the middle two tones) to distinguish. In the second task, subjects had 
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to shift covert attention to a specified colored square presented in the left or right visual 
field and the N2pc was measured. S2 was presented at different SOAs (300, 650 or 
1000 ms), or in different conditions of central load, in different variants of the PRP 
paradigm.  The general finding was that the amplitude of the N2pc was reduced when 
central load at the time of presentation of S2 was increased (e.g., by decreasing SOA). 
Such results suggest that the deployment of visual-spatial attention is impaired by PRP 
interference, which in turn suggests that shifting visual-spatial attention does require 
capacity-limited processing mechanisms that overlap with those that lead to the PRP 
effect—such as response selection.  
Following the N2pc, the contralateral minus ipsilateral waveform often has a 
sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN). A growing body of work provides 
strong arguments for a functional interpretation of the SPCN as a reflection of stimulus 
encoding in visual short-term memory (VSTM; Jolicœur, Brisson, & Robitaille, 2008; 
McCollough, Machaziwa, & Vogel, 2006; Perron et al., 2008; Predovan et al., 2008; 
Robitaille & Jolicœur, 2006; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004). Like the N2pc, the SPCN is a 
greater negativity at posterior electrodes contralateral to the side from which visual 
information was encoded.  The onset latency of the SPCN is around 300 ms and the 
component often has a lengthy sustained period.  Interestingly, the amplitude of the 
SPCN increases as the amount of information held in VSTM increases (Jolicœur et al., 
2008; McCollough et al., 2006; Perron et al., 2008; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004) with a 
plateau reached when the number of stored items equals the capacity of VSTM (Vogel 
& Machizawa, 2004). In Brisson and Jolicœur’s (2007a) PRP experiment with an easy 
versus difficult response selection for T1 and a covert visual-spatial attention shifting 
task for T2, SPCN onset was delayed when T1 response selection was more difficult. 
Brisson and Jolicœur (2007a) argued that the encoding of information into VSTM was 
delayed and that T2 early sensory specific visual-spatial attention was postponed by 
T1 response selection. These results are in line with the results obtained for the N2pc.   
To summarize, electrophysiological evidence suggests that shifting visual-
spatial attention has bottleneck properties, in the sense that performance is impaired if 
attention needs to be shifted concurrently with other capacity-demanding processes. 
Process overlap has at least two separable consequences: the delay of the N2pc, 
which is associated with, and presumably represents the attentional shift itself, and the 
delay of SPCN, which is associated with, and presumably represents the encoding of 
selected items into VSTM. In other words, temporal overlap impairs both the shifting 






The present experiment  
The increasing evidence that processes other than response selection 
processes contain bottleneck characteristics challenges the traditional response-
selection bottleneck model. Apparently, it is not just rather “late” operations that draw 
heavily on sparse cognitive resources, but also operations that select stimulus 
information and/or reprocess and prepare it for further processing. However, previous 
studies providing such evidence have always tried to validate their conclusions by 
demonstrating interactions with response selection or at least with PRP effects related 
to response selection. Accordingly, the available findings are still consistent with the 
possibility that response selection plays a pivotal role—so that one may argue that the 
response-selection bottleneck model could simply be extended by assuming that some 
capacity can be shared between response selection proper and other (still to be 
defined) processes. To rule out this possibility we aimed at demonstrating that PRP-
type interference can be observed between processes that do not involve response 
selection at all. 
Given the strong evidence that both mental rotation and the shifting of visual-
spatial attention interact with response selection, we sought to pit these two processes 
against each other directly. We thereby took advantage from the fact that mental 
rotation is a rather well-defined process and that its duration can be systematically 
manipulated by varying the orientation of the target stimulus to normal upright. In 
particular, we carried out a PRP experiment, in which T1 was a mental-rotation task 
and T2 required a covert shift of the focus of visual-spatial attention. In the mental-
rotation task stimuli were presented either in their upright position or rotated from this 
position by 140°. The latter condition can be estimated to keep the mental-rotation 
operation active for approximately 250 ms, so that dual-task interference from mental 
rotation on attention can be reliably measured. The SOA variation across the levels of 
300 and 650 ms provided a different way to diagnose dual-task interference, because 
this manipulation affects the timing of response selection independent of mental 
rotation. In T2, participants responded to a colored square in a set of four visual stimuli, 
two on either side of the screen center. Just as in recent studies by Brisson and 
Jolicœur (2007a, 2007b), the N2pc and SPCN were measured as indicators of the 
deployment of visual-spatial attention to, and VSTM storage of stimuli in T2. 
According to the traditional response-selection bottleneck model the 
deployment of attention does not have bottleneck properties (Pashler, 1991), 
suggesting that neither N2pc nor SPCN would be affected by either SOA or the 
concurrent mental rotation required in the rotation condition. If instead the deployment 
of attention is subject to the same capacity limitations as response selection, as argued 
by Brisson and Jolicœur (2007a, 2007b), an SOA effect is predicted on the N2pc 
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amplitude and the SPCN onset latency. Moreover, if response selection, mental 
rotation, and the deployment of attention are all subject to the same capacity 







Thirty right-handed students of Leiden University aged between 18 and 30 
participated in this experiment. The experiment was conducted in accordance with 
relevant laws and institutional guidelines and was approved by the local ethics 
committee from the Faculty of Social Sciences. All students had normal or corrected to 
normal eye-sight. They received either fourteen euros or course credits or a 
comparable combination of both. Data from 10 participants did not comply with the 
electrophysiological criteria (described below) and were therefore discarded from 
analysis. Data from another four participants were excluded from analysis because 
behavioural performance was below a 74% threshold. This left 16 participants (four 
male) in the sample (mean age: 22.05 years).  
 
 Apparatus 
Participants were tested individually, in a dimly-lit shielded room. Participants sat 
in front of a 17 inch computer screen at a viewing distance of approximately 75 cm. 
Responses were made with key-presses with the left and right foot for T1 responses 
and the left and right index finger for T2 responses. The pedals (Psychological 
Software Tools, Inc.) were embedded in a sloping footboard that was put in front of the 
participants in such a way that in rest, the participants’ feet were relaxed. The pedals 
needed light pressing to give a response and an adequate response was marked by 
the click-sound of the pedal. Of the two response boxes for the fingers (one for each 
hand) with four keys (no key for the thumb) only the keys for the index fingers were 
used (situated closest to the middle).   
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli used in T1 were presented on the screen and were the alphanumeric 
characters 2, 4, 5, 7, f, G, k, Q, R and t. These stimuli were selected because their 
asymmetry allowed the creation of unambiguous rotation and mirroring conditions 
(hence the mixture of uppercase and lowercase letters). They were oriented either 





and counter-clockwise (CCW) tilted stimuli occurred equally often in case of the 140° 
condition. The characters were presented at the centre of the screen, in black on a 
grey screen, at a visual angle of approximately 3° in height. Because S1 was always 
presented in the middle of the screen, spatial capture was similar for both the 
conditions. Participants had to make a mirror/normal classification of the rotated 
stimulus. 
 For T2, four squares were presented in the bottom half of the screen, two on 
each side of the centre. The squares had two gaps, always on opposite sides. This 
way, an imaginary line could be drawn through the gaps, either vertically or 
horizontally. All squares in the visual display subtended a visual angle of 1° × 1° and 
the gaps were 0.33°. The centre of the squares nearest to fixation was 1.5° below and 
3.5° to the left or right of fixation. The centre of the far squares was 3° below and 5° to 
the left or right of fixation (see also: Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a).  To prevent a pop-out 
effect of the target square on one side, there was always a blue colored square on 
each side of the centre, while of the two remaining squares one was green and one red 
(one on each side). The colors were isoluminant. Any bilateral electrophysiological 
activation due to low-level factors, other than attention, would cancel out when the 
N2pc and SPCN difference waves were calculated. The task was to indicate the 
orientation of the imaginary line (vertical versus horizontal) that could be drawn through 
the gaps of the green or the red square, and the color of the target square was 
constant for a given participant and counterbalanced across participants. 
The two presented stimuli were separated by a SOA of 300 ms or 650 ms. SOA, 
mirror/normal presentation, rotation direction (CW/CCW), target orientation (0° or 
140°), position of the squares and horizontal/vertical orientation of the gaps in the 
squares were all varied randomly within each block (See Figure 4.1 for an example of 
a trial).  
Left foot and right foot presses were used for T1 responses and their meaning — 
either normally presented or in mirror image — was counterbalanced across 
participants. Left and right index finger presses were used for T2 responses and their 
meaning — horizontal or vertical line through the gaps in the target square — was also 
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Figure 4.1. Sequence of events within one trial in the PRP paradigm: the ‘+’ serves as a fixation, the 
S1 appears in the centre of the screen, and after a SOA of 300 ms or 650 ms, T2 and distractors 
appears on both sides below the centre of the screen. Feedback is presented at the end of each trial. 
The actual colors of the squares were blue (one on each side), red and green. The size of the letters, 




Before the start of the experiment, participants received written instructions. 
They were asked to respond as quickly as possible, and not to be too cautious in their 
response. To avoid response grouping, participants were told not to withhold the 
response to S1 until S2 was presented, but rather to initiate a response as soon as 
possible. Lastly, they were told to keep their eyes fixated in the centre of the screen 
(and not to make an eye movement to the sides) and to limit eye blinks to the time 
between the trials.  
Next, the computer experiment was started. First, eye movements were 
measured using a calibration test in which participants needed to follow a target that 
moved from the centre to the left or the right side of the screen to measure horizontal 
eye movements. Second, the first task was practiced by itself, as a single-task (16 
trials). Two dual-task blocks followed to practice the eventual task (32 trials per block).  
Experimental trials were presented in 12 blocks of 74 trials. Pauses separated 
the blocks and participants were encouraged to use them. Within the experimental 
blocks, the trial started with the presentation of a fixation point in the centre of the 
screen replaced after 500 ms by S1. After a variable SOA S2 appeared while S1 
remained in view. As soon as S2 appeared, participants had 3000 ms to respond 
before feedback appeared. Alternatively, responding to S2 also caused feedback to 
appear. Feedback consisted of a ‘+’ or ‘-’ sign left of the middle for S1 and right of the 
middle for S2 shown for 800 ms marking the end of the trial. After a jittered intertrial 
interval of 900–1100 ms the fixation point appeared in the centre of the screen to 





time (RT) and a percentage correct (PC) for each task up to then was presented to 
give participants insight in their progress, and to motivate them to keep trying to 
respond faster on every block. 
 
Electrophysiological measurements 
Electrophysiological measures for the N2pc and the SPCN were recorded with 
29 Ag/AgCl electrodes: Fz, F3, F4, FC3, FC4, C5, C3, C1, Cz, C2, C4, C6, T7, T8, 
CP3, CP4, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, PO7, PO3, POz, PO4, PO8, O1, Oz, and O2 in the 
extended international 10/20 system (Sharbrough et al., 1991). The signal was 
digitized at 256 Hz. Eye movements and blinks were recorded by electro-oculogram 
(EOG). Horizontal EOG (HEOG) was the bipolar signal of the left versus right outer 
canthus and vertical EOG (VEOG) was the bipolar signal of above versus below the 
left eye. The signals for both the N2pc and the SPCN were high-pass filtered at 0.01 
Hz (24 dB / octave) and low-pass filtered at 40 Hz (24 dB / octave).  
Electrodes of interest were P7 / P8, PO7 / PO8, P3 / P4, PO3 / PO4, and O1 / 
O2 for the N2pc and SPCN. Artifacts at any of these electrode sites led to the 
exclusion of that particular trial as did eye blinks (VEOG > 100 µV). For the N2pc it was 
important to keep the eyes fixated at the centre of the screen: any trials containing 
large eye movement (HEOG > 35 µV) were therefore excluded. Comparable to 
Woodman and Luck (2003) and Brisson and Jolicœur (2007a), after ocular artifact 
rejection a 3.2 µV cut off was used for residual eye movements towards the targets 
(squares) in the average HEOG waveforms computed for trials with a target in the left 
visual field and for trials with a target in the right visual field. The ten participants 
exceeding this boundary in any of the conditions were excluded from further analysis.  
For N2pc, segments of 200 ms prior to S2 presentation to 600 ms after S2 
presentation were used, baseline corrected on the period from 200-0 ms before S2 
presentation. We quantified the N2pc as the mean amplitude of the pooled difference 
(mean contralateral minus mean ipsilateral) waveform for the five posterior lateralized 
electrode pairs in our montage, in the time window of 190–260 ms from S2 onset. This 
time window best captures the outer limits of the negative N2pc-peak of all electrode-
pairs across the four conditions.  
The SPCN waves in the four main experimental conditions (SOA X S1 
orientation) seemed to not yet have reached a plateau 600 ms after S2 onset. 
Especially at the short SOA - 140° S1 orientation condition, the SPCN wave was 
delayed. In order to determine whether the SPCN actually did reach a plateau, but only 
later, we extended the analysis window from 600 ms to 900 ms, and again, baseline 
corrected it on the period from 200-0 ms before S2 presentation. Using this longer 
analysis window, however, required that we removed the data of four participants, 
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because the longer measurement window included many more trials with ocular 
artifacts and their elimination left too few trials for their data to be reliable. Thus, further 
analyses were based on a subsample of twelve participants. 
The SPCN amplitude was analyzed to test for interference of S1 orientation 
and SOA with the normal continuation of processes underlying SPCN. The mean 
amplitude was calculated in the pooled response over posterior lateralized electrodes 
of the contralateral minus ipsilateral difference waveform where the SPCN was 
maximal: 380–500 ms relative to the onset of S2.  
Onset latency was analyzed to test for deferment of the processes underlying 
SPCN by S1 orientation and SOA. This was done using the jackknife analysis (Kiesel, 
Miller, Jolicœur, & Brisson, 2008; Miller, Patterson, & Ulrich, 1998; Ulrich & Miller, 
2001). With the jackknife method, N grand average waveforms are computed, each 
one with N-1 participants (a different participant is removed for each waveform). Onset-
latency measures are obtained for each of these N grand average waveforms, and the 
values are submitted to a conventional analysis of variance (ANOVA).  In order to 
compensate for the smaller variance of the jackknife waveforms, the F value in the 
ANOVA is adjusted using the following formula (Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a; 2007b; 
Ulrich & Miller, 2001): Fadjusted = F / (N-1)
2. 
Before the SPCN onset was determined, waves were low-pass filtered at 3 Hz 
(24 dB / octave). The onset latency of the SPCN was defined as the latency at which 
the filtered pooled difference wave became more negative than -0.4µV, starting 300 ms 






 RTs longer than 3000 ms or shorter than 150 ms and trials in which R2 
preceded R1 were excluded from the analysis of RT and PC. The percentages of trials 
eliminated based on these restrictions were 0.94% for the S1 upright orientation/short 
SOA condition, 1.29% for the S1 rotated orientation/short SOA condition, 0.74% for the 
S1 upright orientation/long SOA condition and 1.06% for the S1 rotated orientation/long 
SOA condition. Mean RTs were based on trials with a correct response to both stimuli. 
We excluded all trials from the data in which R2 preceded R1, which happened in a 
total of 2.5% of the trials. ANOVAs were conducted using a 2 × 2 design with the 
within-subjects factors S1 orientation and SOA and an alpha of 0.05. We used the 





where appropriate (but original df’s are reported). Table 4.1 shows the mean 
behavioural performance data.  
 
 
Table 4.1. Mean reaction times and percentages correct for Task 1 and Task 2, in each condition, with 
SEM (standard error of the mean) in parenthesis   
 
 RT1 PC1 RT2 PC2 







































Mean S1 accuracy did not change over SOA, F < 1, and mean RT1 did not vary 
significantly over SOA, F(1, 15) = 2.6, MSE = 2179.2,  p > .10. S1 orientation did affect 
the accuracy of responses to S1: the percentage correct was higher with an upright 
(easy condition) than a rotated S1 (difficult condition; 94.4% versus 85.7%), F(1, 15) = 
60.4, MSE = 20.1, p < .001, and RT1 was also shorter in the upright condition (857 
versus 1107 ms), F(1, 15) = 264.9, MSE = 3757.7, p < .001. There was no interaction 
effect between SOA and orientation for S1 accuracy or RT, Fs < 1.  
RT2 for the rotated and upright orientation are shown in Figure 4.2. For T2, 
there was no significant difference in percentage correct as a function of S1 
orientation, F < 1. RT2 was shorter at 0° than at 140° (823 versus 1016 ms), F(1, 15) = 
195.0, MSE = 3060.1, p < .001. We found a significant effect of SOA, F(1, 15) = 7.2, 
MSE = 5.0,  p < .05, for T2 accuracy. Responses were 1.5% more accurate at a SOA 
of 300 as compared to 650 ms (92.8% versus 91.3%). Mean RT2 increased by 253 ms 
with decreasing SOA (from 793 ms to 1046 ms), F(1, 15) = 394.2, MSE = 2615.0, p < 
.001, showing the expected PRP effect. Additionally, the interaction effect of S1 
orientation and SOA on RT2 indicated that the orientation effect was larger at short 
than at longer SOAs, F(1, 15) = 112.2, MSE = 393.4, p < .001. There was a marginally 
significant interaction effect for the percentage correct of T2, F(1, 15) = 3.1, MSE = 5.2, 
p < .10. 
 
 



















The mean N2pc amplitudes were submitted to an ANOVA with S1 orientation, 
SOA and electrode position as within-subjects factors. The contralateral minus 
ipsilateral waveforms are shown in Figure 4.3. The effect for S1 orientation was 
significant, F(1, 15) = 5.4, MSE = 1.0, p < .05, due to less negative amplitude of the 
N2pc if S1 was rotated. There was also a significant main effect of SOA, F(1, 15) = 
14.4, MSE = 1.3, p < .01, indicating that the amplitude of the N2pc was attenuated at 
short SOA relative to long SOA. No other effect was reliable. 
For an independent test of dual-task interference onto the N2pc due to 
response selection, we examined the effect of SOA for trials with an upright S1, if thus 
no mental rotation was required. There was a significant attenuation for the short 
relative to the long SOA, F(1, 15) = 12.9, MSE = 1.3, p < .01. This contrast confirms 
that response selection in itself delays visual-spatial attention in a following task, as 
observed by Brisson & Jolicœur (2007a, 2007b).   
Similarly, for an independent test of dual-task interference onto the N2pc due 
to mental rotation, we examined the effect of S1 orientation for the long SOA level; 
when the PRP effect is typically at its minimum.  At SOA = 650 ms, a S1 in 140° 





= 4.9, MSE = 1.6, p < .05. At SOA = 300 ms, the effect of orientation was not 
significant, F < 1, presumably because the N2pc of the upright position condition was 
already attenuated because of the short SOA. This result shows that indeed mental 
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Figure 4.3. N2pc and SPCN stimulus locked to T2, for the four different conditions: S1 0º / 300 ms 
SOA; S1 0º / 650 ms SOA; S1 140º / 300 ms SOA; S1 140º / 650 ms SOA for the subtracted signals 
PO7 / PO8, P7 / P8, O1 / O2, PO3 / PO4, P3 / P4 and their pooled waveform. A 15 Hz filter was used 
on a waveform that started 200 ms before stimulus onset and ended 600 ms after stimulus onset. Thin 
lines represent S1 0º orientation, bold lines represent S1 140º orientation, straight lines represent 




The mean amplitude of SPCN in the sample that met our inclusion criteria for 
the longer window was submitted to an ANOVA with the factors orientation (2), SOA 
(2) and electrode (5). The lateralization waveforms are shown in Figure 4.4. The main 
effect of S1 orientation was significant, F(1, 11) = 6.6, MSE = 3.4, p < .05. The mean 
SPCN amplitude was less negative when S1 was at a 140° orientation than for upright 
S1. There was also an effect of SOA, F(1, 11) = 8.8, MSE = 1.7, p < .05: reflecting a 
smaller SPCN on short than on long SOAs. The main effect of electrode position was 
also significant with a maximum effect over electrode pairs O1 / O2 and P3 / P4 and 
decreasing activity with further distance from those electrode pairs, F(4, 44) = 4.8, 
MSE = 1.6, p < .01. S1 orientation and SOA did not interact, F < 1, nor did S1 
orientation and electrode position, F(4, 44) = 1.3, MSE = 0.740, p > .10. The interaction 
       T1 upright / SOA 300 ms  
       T1 upright / SOA 650 ms 
     T1 orientation / SOA 300 ms 
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of SOA and electrode position did reach significance, F(4, 44) =3.7, MSE = 0.645, p < 
.05. The effect of SOA was maximal over electrode pairs O1 / O2 and P3 / P4 with 
decreasing activity with further distance from those electrode pairs, and overall more 
activity at the long SOA than at the short SOA.  
As a test for comparability, the SPCN amplitude in the full sample of 
participants was also analyzed again in the 350-500 ms time window in the smaller 
measurement window and showed the same results. Similarly, the N2pc amplitude in 
the reduced sample was analyzed again in the 190–260 ms time window. This led to 
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Figure 4.4. N2pc and SPCN stimulus locked to T2, for the four different conditions: S1 0º / 300 ms 
SOA; S1 0º / 650 ms SOA; S1 140º / 300 ms SOA; S1 140º / 650 ms SOA for the subtracted signals 
PO7 / PO8, P7 / P8, O1 / O2, PO3 / PO4, P3 / P4 and their pooled waveform. A 15 Hz filter was used 
on a waveform that started 200 ms before stimulus onset and ended 900 ms after stimulus onset. Thin 
lines represent S1 0º orientation, bold lines represent S1 140º orientation, straight lines represent 
short SOA and dotted lines represent long SOA.  
 
 
SPCN onset latency 
To test whether the SPCN onset latency was sensitive to S1 orientation and 
SOA we used a jackknife analysis (Kiesel et al., 2008; Miller et al., 1998; Ulrich & 
Miller, 2001). The onset latencies were submitted to an ANOVA with SOA and S1 
orientation as within-subjects factors.  The jackknife analysis confirmed what can be 
seen in Figure 4.4, namely that the SPCN onset was earliest for the S1 0°/650 ms SOA 
condition, then the S1 0°/300 ms SOA condition, then the S1 140°/650 ms SOA 
condition, followed later by the most centrally taxing condition, the S1 140°/300 ms 
SOA condition. This was reflected in the ANOVA by significant effects of S1 
orientation, Fadjusted(1, 11) = 6.4, MSEadjusted = 53022.2, p < .05, and SOA, Fadjusted(1, 11) 
= 7.5, MSEadjusted = 30286.3, p < .05.  There was no interaction between S1 orientation 
and SOA, Fadjusted < 1. This same pattern of statistical results was obtained when a 
lower threshold of -0.6 µV was used, suggesting that the results did not depend on a 
specific choice of analysis parameters. 
       T1 upright / SOA 300 ms  
       T1 upright / SOA 650 ms 
     T1 orientation / SOA 300 ms 

















A visual inspection of the waveforms shown in Figure 4.4 suggested that the 
SPCN component approached a similar amplitude for all conditions near the end of the 
analysis window, showing that by that time, information from all four conditions had 
been encoded into VSTM (Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a). To examine this statistically, we 
computed the mean amplitude of the SPCN in a time window of 800–900 ms. There 
were no significant effects of S1 orientation, SOA, and electrode position F’s < 2.9, p’s 
> .10, except for a marginally significant interaction between SOA and electrode 
position, F(4, 44) = 2.6, MSE = 1.4, p < .10, with activation over the electrode pairs 
quite similar at the short SOA and more widespread at the long SOA, with a maximum 





The present PRP study investigated whether mental rotation affects the 
progress of deploying visual-spatial attention in a concurrent task. Because mental 
rotation involves a variable duration of the same process it is capable of causing 
different degrees of dual-task interference with manipulation of other processes. 
Decisions about the position of gaps in S2 were strongly delayed if S1 required a 
mental rotation. This could be interpreted as showing that mental rotation occupied 
central processing capacity (Ruthruff et al., 1995; van Selst & Jolicœur, 1994), the 
same capacity that is used by response selection. However, an alternative 
interpretation to consider is that the dual-task interference was not caused by mental 
rotation but by response selection itself, which is contingent on rotation and is already 
known to produce a PRP effect. Likewise, the PRP effect on performance need not be 
attributed to interference with attentional processes, because T2 also involved 
response selection, which would be delayed as long as limited-capacity processes of 
T1 would be in progress. 
More direct evidence for the bottleneck properties of mental rotation and 
attentional processes was obtained by an analysis of the ERPs. The N2pc was 
calculated to monitor enhanced processing contralateral relative to ipsilateral to the 
visual field containing a target. The N2pc has been validated as a real-time measure of 
the deployment of visual-spatial attention (Luck & Hillyard, 1994) and has successfully 
been applied to investigate attention in a PRP setting (Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a; 
2007b). The SPCN component, following the N2pc, is believed to index the storage of 
information in VSTM (Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a; 2007b; Jolicœur et al., 2008; Vogel & 
Machizawa, 2004). Because attention and VSTM storage necessarily precede 
response selection, attenuation of the N2pc or a delay of the SPCN can not be 
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attributed to dual-task interference on selection of R2. Instead, it has to be attributed to 
the attention processes as such. 
The N2pc was attenuated when T2 was presented while subjects performed 
concurrent mental rotation, and the SPCN was significantly delayed. The attenuated 
N2pc showed that spatial attention could not be deployed efficiently to the lateralized 
target in the T2 display as long as limited-capacity processes engaged in T1 had not 
run to completion. Thus, the data replicate previous studies of Brisson and Jolicœur 
(2007a, 2007b) in showing that the process of attention shifting has bottleneck 
properties.  
The role of mental rotation in dual-task interference is demonstrated most 
clearly by the near complete elimination of the N2pc at short SOA if S1 was tilted, and 
thus called for a mental rotation, as compared to a normally oriented S1 (Figures 4.3, 
4.4). The main difference between these two types of trials is the duration of mental 
rotation, all else remaining constant – including deciding whether a character is in 
normal or mirrored version, and including response selection. The attenuation of the 
N2pc was observed 190-260 ms after T2, that is 490-560 ms after S1 on short SOAs. 
Given a mean RT of 857 ms to an upright and 1107 ms to a tilted S1, it is clear that the 
attenuation of the N2pc can only be attributed to response selection if the implausible 
assumption is made that response selection starts at least 547 ms before the 
response. The only remaining explanation is that there was direct interference of 
mental rotation onto the deployment of attention. To our knowledge this is the first 
demonstration of PRP interference in which response selection is neither the delaying, 
nor the delayed process. This demonstration shows that response selection is not a 
necessary ingredient of dual-task cost, which undermines the traditional response-
selection bottleneck model (Pashler, 1994). 
In contrast to the amplitude effects we observed for the N2pc, the effects on 
the SPCN can be interpreted as principally due to latency shifts. The convergence of 
the SPCN waveforms near the end of the measurement window for all four conditions 
is broadly consistent with the similar accuracy in T2 achieved in all conditions (between 
89% and 92%). Most important, however, was the observation that the SPCN wave 
had different onset latencies in the different conditions (Figure 4.4), and in particular 
that the onset of the SPCN was the most delayed in the condition associated with the 
greatest PRP interference in the mean RT2s, namely the condition in which the SOA 
was short and S1 was rotated to 140°. There were also effects of orientation and SOA 
on SPCN amplitude in the fixed window of 380-500 ms, but these were a consequence 
of the latency shift. 
Although these effects were quite substantial, and clearly statistically 





mean response times in T2. For the delay of T2 with increased task overlap (reduced 
SOA) we found a behavioural effect of 197 ms when S1 was upright and an effect of 
292 ms when S1 was tilted. The found SPCN effect for SOA 300 ms versus SOA 650 
ms was 98 ms when S1 was upright and 90 ms when S1 was in orientation. For the 
two SOAs, the SPCN latency effect was 49.5% and 30.8% of the behavioural effect 
respectively. It is likely, therefore, that additional delays of processing took place 
following entry into VSTM, likely at the response-selection stage. 
Could our interpretation of the present results be compromised by issues of 
component overlap, given that our paradigm required the presentation of two stimuli in 
close temporal proximity?  Two lines of argument allow us to exclude component 
overlap as a significant concern in this work. First, the main electrophysiological results 
of interest were derived from contralateral minus ipsilateral difference waves (N2pc, 
SPCN), that cancel out any electrical brain activity that is not lateralized systematically 
with respect to the side of presentation of T2 (see Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a; Luck & 
Hillyard, 1994). Given that S1 was presented at the center of the screen and that the 
independent variables were manipulated orthogonally to the position of T2 in the visual 
field, S1-related electrical activity was equivalent in the contralateral and ipsilateral 
waveforms defined relative to the spatial position of T2, and thus this activity was 
entirely canceled out in the contralateral minus ipsilateral difference waves. Second, 
the N2pc was attenuated by mental rotation if considering only the trials at the long 
SOA. The fact that effects of orientation on the N2pc were observed even when SOA 
was held constant showed that mental rotation itself was capacity limited or shared 
capacity-limited processes with other processes. The observed differences cannot be 
due to differential component overlap but are purely due to differences in mental 
rotation.  
The question remains what underlying cause can explain the interference 
between processes that do not seem to be related in terms of function or 
computational logic, and why these processes also interact with response selection. 
Our data are showing only that such interference occurs but not why, so we can only 
speculate. Let us first consider what might be the commonality among these three 
different processes that makes them sensitive to interference. One way to look at such 
processes is to consider them as computational routines that take parameters from 
control processes, as envisioned by ECTVA (Logan & Gordon, 2001), or other 
processes that provide the necessary control signals. Response selection processes 
identify and select an appropriate response given particular stimulus information; 
mental rotation processes modify the spatial characteristics of a particular stimulus 
representation given a particular rotation direction; and attentional processes facilitate 
the processing of stimulus information from a particular location given that this is where 
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the target has been located. In other words, all three processes operate conditionally 
on particular input parameters. Whereas the processes themselves can be prepared in 
advance of the eventual presentation of stimuli, thus rendering them a kind of 
“prepared reflex” (cf., Hommel, 2000), their online parameterization may require 
capacity-demanding executive supervision (Logan & Gordon, 2001) or at least be 
typically accompanied by such supervision to avoid errors (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 
1997b).  
This poses the obvious next question of why the parameterization process 
may create a processing bottleneck. A possible answer is perhaps more obvious if one 
considers the way the parameterization process might be realized in the human brain. 
Conditioning the behavior of a computational routine to particular parameters is 
equivalent to creating a number of if-then-type associations between the neural 
representations of the parameters or conditions and the neural representations of the 
processes being launched as a function of these parameters or conditions. These 
associations may be hardwired, as in the case of highly overlearnt stimulus-response 
relations or habits, but often they will be soft-coded and implemented for present 
purposes only (cf., Monsell, 1996). Given that the to-be-related neural representations 
are likely to be active in different areas of the brain, linking them poses a kind of 
binding problem (Hommel, 1998), which calls for integration processes that span large 
distances in the brain. Even though we are far from understanding how neural 
integration works (for some considerations, see Engel & Singer, 2001; Raffone & 
Wolters, 2001; Von der Malsburg, 1999), it is clear that relating stimulus 
representations to response representations (as in the case of response selection), 
rotation operations to directional representations (as in the case of mental rotation), 
and stimulus features to locations (as in the case of shifting attention) are global 
operations connecting distant cortical maps.  
Global operations are particularly sensitive to interference and noise from the 
activation of other, currently irrelevant neural codes, suggesting that potentially 
interfering neural activation is suppressed until the operation is completed. This is 
indeed suggested by the study of Gross et al. (2004), who used 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) to study the attentional blink (Raymond, Shapiro, & 
Arnell, 1992) — an effect that has also been suspected to have bottleneck 
characteristics (Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 2000). Gross and colleagues computed a 
measure of the amount of global communication in the brain that could be tracked over 
time. As it turned out, successful performance in the demanding attentional task was 
characterized by the increase of communication during the processing of a target and 
the sub-baseline decreases of communication in response to distractor stimuli. This 





function may effectively prevent or inhibit global communication with respect to any 
other process or function (Hommel et al., 2006). This kind of functional bottleneck may 
not be restricted to response selection, mental rotation, and attention shifting but may 
be present with any cognitive operation that relies on global communication between 
cortically distributed neural codes. Accordingly, we suspect that mental rotation and 
attention shifting are only a few of many processes that exhibit bottleneck properties, if 
only sufficiently sensitive methods are employed to detect them. 
Before closing we would like to note that it is remarkable that the N2pc 
variation was predominantly expressed in an amplitude effect rather than a latency 
effect, although latency effects have been observed in a number of previous studies 
(Brisson & Jolicœur, 2007a; 2007b; Dell'Acqua, Sessa, Jolicœur, & Robitaille, 2006; 
Jolicœur, Sessa, Dell'Acqua, & Robitaille, 2006a; 2006b; Robitaille, Jolicœur, 
Dell'Acqua, & Sessa, 2007). One could hypothesize that the relatively early cortical 
modulation of the visual input reflected in the N2pc requires a top-down signal within a 
critical time window. Brisson, Robitaille and Jolicœur (2007) investigated whether the 
N2pc was regulated top–down only or whether it was regulated top-down in 
combination with bottom-up processes. They varied stimulus intensity and measured 
the P1 as a measure of bottom-up perceptual processes and the N2pc. Results 
showed an expected amplitude increase for P1 with increasing intensity, but no 
amplitude effects for N2pc. The latency of the N2pc however, was affected with a later 
N2pc onset when the stimulus intensity was low. These results suggested that N2pc-
amplitude effects are caused by top-down modulation and latency effects occurred as 
a result of delayed deployment of visual-spatial attention. More work will be required to 
understand, fully, why the N2pc is systematically attenuated by dual-task interference 
rather than simply delayed. 
In conclusion, the present experiment shows that mental rotation and attention 
shifting to not only interact and interfere with response selection (e.g., Brisson & 
Jolicœur, 2007a), but that they also interfere with each other in a way that reveals their 
bottleneck properties. Mental rotation can influence the deployment of visual-spatial 
attention as well as delay the entrance of information into VSTM. Because the 
capacity-limited process of mental rotation - in contrast to response selection – varies 
linearly (with increasing angle to upright), we were able to systematically manipulate its 
duration. There is thus strong evidence that dual-task costs are not only created by 
response selection but by other, in this case earlier processes as well. It is possible 
that the same applies to any cognitive operation that requires the global integration of 

























































Several models of dual-task performance attribute dual-task costs to a bottleneck in 
response selection. However, increasing evidence suggests that other processes can 
also have bottleneck characteristics. This led us to perform a more detailed process 
analysis. We combined a Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm including 
two mental rotation tasks with a working memory (WM) load task. Experiment 1 
replicated earlier findings that performance on the first rotation task was facilitated if 
the response categories in the two rotation tasks matched, but only if the two tasks 
called for mental rotations going into the same direction—i.e., if the same directional 
parameter could be used for the two mental rotations. Interestingly, this interaction was 
not modulated by WM load, while the category-match effect was. Experiment 2 
provided the opportunity to prepare for mental rotations in advance of stimulus 
presentation. Valid cues improved performance, suggesting that rotation parameters 
can be prepared in advance, but only if the two tasks required rotations into the same 
direction. Findings point to the parameterization of cognitive operations as one major 
bottleneck process in multitasking and to working memory as another, with the latter 
providing limited capacity for the storage of intermediate results of cognitive 
operations. 




Dual-tasking taxes a brain to such an extent that the tasks involved take longer 
than if they were conducted separately (e.g., Pashler, 1994). Research sought to 
account for this delay by disentangling processes that have distinct capacity-limited 
properties from those that can presumably be conducted in parallel without substantial 
costs. The Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) paradigm (Telford, 1931) turned out 
to be a helpful tool in this endeavor. It typically entails two stimuli (S1 and S2), which 
are presented shortly after each other and require speeded response (R1 and R2). S2 
can be presented after a short or long delay, the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), 
thus causing a more or less pronounced overlap of the two tasks. A typical result is an 
increase in reaction time to S2 (RT2), and thus increased dual-task costs, with 
decreasing SOA (Pashler, 1994; Welford, 1967). A long research tradition that 
considered several steps of information processing converged on response selection 
as the main culprit in dualtasking, that is, as the bottleneck stage (see Pashler, 1994, 
for a review).  
More recent studies provide a more complex picture, however. For one, stages 
preceding response selection proper have been demonstrated to possess bottleneck 
characteristics, such as mental rotation (Ruthruff, Miller, & Lachman, 1995; Van Selst 
& Jolicœur, 1994), short-term memory consolidation (Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998), 
and memory retrieval (Carrier & Pashler, 1995). For another, response selection itself 
seems to fall into several subprocesses with some but not all functioning as a 
bottleneck. For instance, while the checking of activations of response representations 
and the selection of one for execution seems to have bottleneck properties, the 
translation of stimulus evidence into the activation of response representations does 
not (Hommel, 1998; Logan & Gordon, 2001). These observations suggest that the real 
understanding of the limits of dualtasking requires analyses at a finer-grained level 
than suggested by the traditional distinction between perceptual processing, response 
selection, and response execution. As we will argue, it is possible that any cognitive 
operation can exhibit bottleneck characteristics if the tasks involved require these 
operations to be run in different modes or with different parameters. 
In the present study, we aimed at analyzing the processing characteristics of 
cognitive operations involved in stimulus-response translation (in Experiment 2) and in 
what has come to be known as mental rotation (Band & Miller, 1997; Van Selst & 
Jolicœur, 1994; Shepard & Metzler, 1971; Experiment 1). In a mental rotation task, 
people judge stimuli that are rotated away from their normal upright position, such as 
letters tilted to different degrees. While identification is often unaffected, judging 





long RTs (Van Selst & Jolicœur, 1994). Interestingly, the RT needed to make such 
judgments varies with the degree of tilting, suggesting that people may “mentally 
rotate” the internal stimulus representation to its normal upright position, taking more 
time the more the stimulus deviates from that position (Corballis, 1986; Cooper, 1976).  
The hypothetical rotation process has been found to delay other tasks, and the 
response-selection processes of these tasks in particular, just like response selection 
does (Pashler, 2000). This raises the question why it does so and what the 
commonality with response selection may be. One possibility is that mental rotation 
and response selection may both involve cognitive operations that need to be 
conditionalized or parameterized (much like attentional operation mechanisms in the 
model of Logan & Gordon, 2001) in one way or another, so that they can accept only 
one parameter at a time. With respect to response selection, Logan and Schulkind 
(2000) found evidence for parallel stimulus-response translation if the same task rules 
could be applied to S1 and S2 but not if different rules were necessary—an 
observation we will get back to in Experiment 2. With respect to mental rotation, one 
may argue that the rotation operation needs to be parameterized differently for 
clockwise and counterclockwise rotations, which would suggest that multiple stimuli 
can share the same operation (i.e., be treated according to the same rule) if this 
implies the same rotation direction but not if different directions are needed.  
Indeed, Pannebakker, Band, and Ridderinkhof (2009) obtained findings 
supporting this idea. In a PRP design, they presented tilted stimuli as S1 and S2 and 
manipulated the direction of the tilting. There is evidence that people mentally rotate 
stimuli along the shortest path, so that stimuli tilted up to 180° counterclockwise from 
their normal upright position are mentally rotated clockwise whereas clockwise tilted 
stimuli are mentally rotated counterclockwise (Cooper, 1976). Pannebakker et al. 
(2009) observed that the reaction time on the first task (RT1) was shorter if S1 and S2 
fell into the same category, that is, if they were both normally oriented or both mirror 
reversed (the category-match effect). However, this effect was only present if the two 
stimuli differed from normal upright in the same way, that is, if S1 and S2 were both 
tilted clockwise or both tilted counterclockwise.  
This suggests the following scenario: If two stimulus representations are in 
need of the same kind of “mental correction” by either a clockwise- or 
counterclockwise-parameterized cognitive rotation operation, they can perform this 
operation in parallel. Once they are rotated back to the normal upright they are 
categorized as normally oriented or mirror reversed in parallel and activate 
corresponding category representations. If these representations are incompatible (i.e., 
if one stimulus is normally oriented and the other is reversed) conflict arises and 
performance suffers in comparison with compatible representations. However, if two 
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stimulus representations need to be mentally rotated in opposing directions, implying 
different parameters for the rotation operation, only one stimulus can be further 
processed at the time. As this is likely to be the earlier presented S1, S2 will need to 
wait until the mental rotation of S1 is completed; so that it will be too late for S2 and the 
category representation it will activate to affect S1 processing. Hence, no category-
match effect occurs with incompatible mental rotations.  
Match effects due to crosstalk are reflected not only in RT1, but also in RT2. 
However, RT1 match effects form a more reliable measure of crosstalk than RT2 
match effects. RT2 match effects are confounded with response repetition effects, 
which can occur even in the absence of parallel rotation and crosstalk. Therefore, RT2 
match effects can only serve as converging evidence for crosstalk, whereas RT1 





In the first experiment of the present study, we attempted to further investigate 
and characterize the possible capacity limitations of cognitive operations involved in 
mental rotation. The evidence of Pannebakker et al. (2009) that operations can be 
used for more than one cognitive code at a time rules out the most severe limitations 
one may consider but it by no means shows that capacity limitations do not exist. In 
many tasks and real-life dual-tasking situations working memory (WM) is more heavily 
taxed than in studies like those of Pannebakker et al. (2009), so that we were 
interested to see how WM load may affect the mental rotation process.  
As indicated in Figure 5.1, we considered two types of effects. According to 
our hypothesis, the rotation process can take only one direction parameter at one time, 
thus programming either a clockwise or a counterclockwise rotation. Mutually inhibitory 
links between rotation processes allow for only one operation to be active at any one 
time. With low load, more than one stimulus code has access to the rotation process, 
so that multiple codes can be rotated in the same direction at the same time.  
Once the rotation is completed the orientation of the stimulus can be 
determined and the appropriate response-category code (belonging to either normally 
oriented or mirror reversed) be activated. For one, a higher load may reduce the 
number of stimulus codes that can be “mentally rotated” at a time. This would suggest 
that low load would yield the same outcome as obtained by Pannebakker et al. (2009), 
showing that performance on the first task is facilitated by matching categories, but 
only with compatible rotations. With high load, however, even compatible rotations may 





interaction between rotation compatibility and category match would break down. In 
other words, load would be expected to interact with rotation compatibility and category 





Figure 5.1. Schematic representation of the different subprocesses (i.e. rotation, category code 
activation) and their relation with working memory (WM). Two stimuli are entered into the model and 
subsequently need clockwise or counterclockwise rotation (represented by the rotating arrows inside 
the first box) before they can be distinguished as mirror and normal oriented and be maintained in WM 
accordingly. The line linking the two rotation boxes in the first and second main box represents the 
mutually inhibitory links that allows for only one operation to be executed at the time. HC and HD refer 
to the hypotheses that place the mutually inhibitory links either in the first main box that represents the 
rotation-implementation phase or in the second main box that represents the rotation-execution phase. 
We investigated whether WM (represented by the large arrows above both the two boxed processes) 
is involved during rotation (implementation and execution; HA) and / or activation and maintenance 
(HB).   
 
 
Another possibility is that load does not affect the rotation process proper. As 
observed by Hommel (1998), multiple stimuli seem to activate response codes in 
parallel, consistent with our assumption that cognitive operations are not (tightly) 
limited in capacity. Interestingly, WM did not affect the indication of parallel processing 
in the study of Hommel and Eglau (2002), where participants carried out a PRP task 
while holding sets of items in memory that varied in size.  
Ellenbogen and Meiran (2008) provided evidence that increasing set sizes 
beyond the four items used by Hommel and Eglau (2002) does reduce indications for 
parallel processing. However, capacity limitations demonstrated by Ellenbogen and 
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Meiran (2008) may apply to the maintenance of the results of cognitive operations but 
not the operations themselves. This implication can be explained by the following logic. 
Operations produce outcomes, that is, they activate a code other than the stimulus, a 
code that represents the result of the operation. In the case of mental rotation, they 
produce a visual code representing the rotated-to-upright stimulus and a related code 
corresponding to the orientation of the stimulus, which we call the orientation-category 
code. If these codes are not maintained for some minimal time but decay right away, 
they are unlikely to impact processing, which would eliminate the category-match 
effect. It is not unreasonable to assume that higher WM load impaired maintenance, 
which after all may be considered a function of WM, so that the category-match effect 
is reduced or disappears with higher WM load (hypothesis B; see also HB Figure 5.1).  
In Experiment 1, we combined the design of Pannebakker et al. (2009) with a 
WM task adopted from De Fockert, Rees, Frith, and Lavie (2001). With low memory 
load, we expected to replicate the findings of Pannebakker et al. (2009) and in 
particular the interaction between rotation compatibility and category match. The 
interesting question was whether the same pattern (rotation compatibility × category 
match) would be obtained under high load, which would suggest that WM does not 
(strongly) affect the rotation operation. This would reject hypothesis A (HA in Figure 
5.1) in which is suggested that WM does have an effect on the rotation process. In 
addition to that, we were interested to see whether the category-match effect would be 
reduced or eliminated under the high-load condition, which would suggest that the 
activation and/or maintenance of codes representing the orientation of the stimuli 





Twenty-one students (3 male; 3 left-handed) of Leiden University aged 
between 18 and 30 (mean age: 19.6 years) participated in this experiment that took 
two sessions of one hour each. The experiment was conducted in accordance with 
relevant laws and institutional guidelines and was approved by the local ethics 
committee from the Faculty of Social Sciences. All students had normal or corrected to 
normal eye-sight. They received either 10 Euro or course credits or a comparable 
combination of both.  
 
Apparatus 
Participants were tested individually, in separate booths in the Cognitive 





inch computer screen with a viewing distance of approximately 75 cm. Responses 
were made with key-presses on the bottom row keys of the computer keyboard; the left 
hand operating the z- and x-button and the right hand operating the n- and m-button of 
a QWERTY keyboard.  
 
Stimuli 
In the PRP task the letters f, G, k, Q and R served as S1 and S2. These stimuli 
were selected because their asymmetry allows the creation of unambiguous rotation 
and mirroring conditions. They were oriented either normally or mirror-imaged and their 
orientation was 120 degrees. Clockwise and counterclockwise tilted stimuli occurred 
equally often. The characters were presented in black on a white screen within a black-
lined rectangle. As this was a dual task, two characters were presented within the 
rectangle with a visual angle of 5.8º × 3.6º (horizontal × vertical). Stimuli were 
presented well within the boundaries of this rectangle. The two presented stimuli were 
separated by a SOA of 100 or 800 ms. SOA, mirror/normal image of letters, response 
category match/mismatch and rotation direction were all varied randomly within blocks.  
S1 always appeared left from the middle and called for a left-hand response, S2 
always appeared right from the middle and called for a right-hand response. The 
mapping of normal/mirror image to index/middle fingers was balanced between 
subjects. A normal image required either the left finger (‘z’ or ‘n’ key) or the outer finger 
of each hand (‘z’ or ‘m’ key). A mirror image required either the right finger (‘x’ or ‘m’ 
key) or the inner finger of each hand (‘x’ or ‘n’). Thus, the category-match effect was 
not confounded with the benefit of using homologous fingers. For the WM task, the 
digits 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 were presented at the beginning of each trial. At the end of the 
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Figure 5.2. Sequence of events within one trial in Experiment 1: A PRP paradigm containing two 
rotated letters in the centre of the screen during which a WM load has to be maintained active 
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Procedure  
Before the start of the experiment, participants received a written instruction. 
They were asked to respond as quickly as possible, and not to be too cautious. No 
instruction was given as to which stimulus to respond first. Then more explanation was 
presented on the computer followed by four practice blocks, after which the 
experimental blocks started. The first practice block was a single-task practice for the 
left hand, and the second one was a single-task practice block for the right hand. 
These two blocks contained 20 trials each. The third block was a dual-task block 
session that consisted of 20 trials. In the last practice block containing another 20 
trials, the additional task was added. 
Experimental trials were presented in ten blocks of 64 trials. Pauses separated 
the blocks and participants were encouraged to use them. Within the experimental 
blocks, the trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross in the middle of the 
screen for 500 ms (see Figure 5.2). Then, the five digits of the WM task were 
presented for 1500ms, either in an easy (01234) or in a difficult (e.g. 03421, 02431) 
order. Note that the zero is always the first digit. Next, a rectangular fixation appeared 
on the screen again for 500 ms after which S1 appeared left of the middle of the 
screen. After a variable SOA S2 appeared next to S1 and stayed on the screen until 
response or 8000 ms, whichever came first. After R2 and a 1500 ms blank, one digit 
(1-4) and a question mark appeared on the screen for 3000 ms. Participants were 
required to press the key corresponding to the digit that had followed that same digit in 
the digit-line-up at the beginning of the trial. Feedback was then presented on the 
screen for 800 ms. A correct response resulted in a ‘+’ feedback response, while an 
incorrect response elicited a ‘-’ feedback response. The first and second stimulus of 
the main task were presented left and right from the middle respectively, while the WM 
task was presented below the middle. After a response-stimulus interval of 1000 ms a 
fixation cross appeared to announce the beginning of the next trial. At the end of each 
block, an average RT in ms and a percentage correct (PC) over that block was 
presented to give participants insight on their progress, and to motivate them to keep 





RTs longer than 5000 ms or shorter than 150 ms and trials in which R2 
preceded R1 were excluded from the analysis of RT and PC. Mean RTs were based 
on trials with a correct response to both stimuli. Data were analyzed with repeated 





subjects factors rotation compatibility, category match, SOA and WM-load. Alpha was 
set at 0.05.  
 
RT1 
Of the main effects, only the effect of SOA was significant, F(1,20) = 24.6, 
MSE = 58909,  p < .001. RT1 was 132 ms faster when the two stimuli in the PRP task 
were more temporally separated. The key interaction between rotation compatibility 
and category match was also significant, F(1,20) = 8.9, MSE = 4721, p < .01 (see 
Figure 5.3). Follow-up analyses showed that the category-match effect was substantial 
for compatible rotations (39 ms), t(20) = 2.3, SEM = 68, p < .05, but not significant for 
incompatible rotations (6 ms), t(20) = .37, SEM = 62, p = .713. The interaction of 
category match and SOA showed that the match effect decreased with increasing SOA 
from 35 ms to 2 ms, F(1,20) = 8.2, MSE = 3518, p < .01 (see Figure 5.4). The 
interaction effect of category match and WM load was significant, F(1,20) = 8.6, MSE = 
2869, p < .01 (see Figure 5.5). At low WM load, the category-match effect was 19 ms 
while in high WM load trials the category-match effect was virtually absent (3 ms). The 
pivotal three-way interaction between WM load, rotation compatibility, and category 
match was far from significant, F(1,20) = .43, MSE = 4745, p = .519, indicating that 
WM load did not influence the otherwise significant interaction between rotation 
compatibility and category match. 
 
















Figure 5.3. The interaction of rotation compatibility and category match on reaction time 1 of 
Experiment 1 
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Figure 5.4. The interaction of category match and SOA on reaction time 1 and 2 of Experiment 1  























Only the main effect of WM load was significant, F(1,20) = 7.0, MSE = 64, p < 




The main effects of rotation compatibility, F(1,20) = 8.2, MSE = 6057, p < .05, 
and SOA were significant F(1,20) = 174.9, MSE = 124128, p < .001. RT2 was 24 ms 
shorter to compatible than to incompatible rotations and 508 ms longer to short than to 
long SOA. The interaction of rotation compatibility and category match was significant, 
F(1,20) = 9.2, MSE = 8456, p < .01: the match effect was more pronounced when 
rotations were compatible (38 ms) than when they were incompatible (23 ms). The 
interaction of category match and SOA, F(1,20) = 8.3, MSE = 6316, p < .01, (see 
Figure 5.4) showed a reduction of the category-match effect from 32 to 17 ms with 
increasing SOA. The interaction of SOA and WM load was due to a larger effect of WM 
load with the short (31 ms) than with the long SOA (-14 ms), F(1,20) = 4.7, MSE = 
8731, p < .05. The three-way interaction effect of WM load, rotation compatibility, and 
category match was again not significant, F(1,20) = .58, MSE = 3512, p = .456. 
 
PC2 
Two main effects were significant: category match, F(1,20) = 8.5, MSE = 41, p 
< .01, and WM load, F(1,20) = 6.1, MSE = 69, p < .05. PC2 was slightly higher (2.1%) 
when the categories mismatched than when they matched, and PC2 decreased with 
increasing WM load (2.3%). No other effects were significant. 
 
WM task 
Performance in the WM task did not vary with the other tasks. The only 
significant effects were an increase of RT with an increased WM load by 306 ms, 
F(1,20) = 57.41, MSE = 137147, p < .001, and a decrease of PC by 2.6%, F(1,20) = 





The results show that we were able to replicate the observation of 
Pannebakker et al. (2009) that the category-match effect impacts the first task only if 
S1 and S2 are tilted into the same direction and thus call for the same kind of “mental 
rotation”. As we have argued, this suggests that more than one stimulus code can be 
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rotated at a time but only if the same rotation operation can be applied to all codes in 
question. If not, codes needing a different rotation have to wait until the ongoing 
rotation is completed, so that only one category code is activated at a time and conflict 
between category codes does not occur early enough to affect RT1.  
Importantly, there was not any evidence that the crucial interactions between 
rotation compatibility and category match might be mediated by WM load, suggesting 
that the number of stimulus codes undergoing mental rotation is not limited by WM 
capacity, rejecting hypothesis A (see also Figure 5.1). However, we did obtain an 
interaction between the category-match effect and WM load. This suggests that 
category codes are activated to a lesser degree, the higher the WM load, presumably 
because the activated codes of the memorized stimuli interfere with the category 
codes, confirming hypothesis B (see also Figure 5.1). This means that WM storage 
capacity is not shared or needed by a cognitive operation like mental rotation as such 
but is necessary to encode and maintain the intermediate results these operations 
produce. A similar conclusion is suggested by a recent study of Ellenbogen and Meiran 
(2008), who used a PRP task in which one stimulus, a letter, was presented in a 
particular color. The stimuli could be presented in six different colors that required 
response to their individual color (six categories) or to their hue (two categories). Task 
1 required a manual left-right response to the stimulus color and Task 2 required a 
vocal response (“red” or “green”; R2) to the stimulus color. R1 facilitation when 
responses matched color categories would suggest crosstalk. Results showed 
crosstalk if the six colors were mapped onto two responses but not if the six colors 
were responded to individually, suggesting that crosstalk occurs if the rule or category 
is activated. The number of activated rules is not limited, in line with the suggestion 





Experiment 1 helped to specify the processing and resource limitations of 
cognitive operations. The same operation can apparently be applied to multiple stimuli 
but two versions of the same operation cannot be run under different parameter 
settings, such as different rotation directions. However, even though this conclusion fits 
with the observations of Pannebakker et al. (2009), raises the next question, whether 
people are reluctant or unable to implement an operation that is incompatible with the 
one in action or whether they do not execute incompatible operations concurrently.  
The parameterization scenario suggests that there is only one “copy” of a given 





another parameter are completed. In other words, the same operation cannot be 
implemented with different parameters at the same time. Another possibility is that 
implementing the same operation with different parameters is possible but only one 
operation can be executed at a time. That is, the mutually inhibitory links between the 
two operations shown in Figure 5.1 may refer to the implementation – represented by 
the first main box – or the execution – represented by the second main box – of the 
same type of operation. 
In Experiment 2, we aimed at disentangling these two possibilities. The 
rationale was to dissociate the time point of implementing and of executing mental 
rotation processes. In Experiment 1, it was the stimuli that indicated whether a mental 
rotation would need to be rotated clockwise or counterclockwise. That is, the 
presentation of the stimulus was likely to be the trigger for both the implementation and 
the execution of the rotation operation. In Experiment 2, however, a cue indicated in 
which direction S2 should be rotated. The cue was presented prior to S1 and S2, in the 
same location as S2, and validly predicted the orientation of S2 in 75% of the cases. 
Thus, the design allowed for the implementation of mental rotation before the stimulus 
was presented, whereas execution of mental rotation would have to wait for the 
presentation of S2. The tasks were in other respects the same as in Experiment 1, 
except that no memory set was presented in Experiment 2.  
Given the early presentation and the high validity of the cue, we assumed that 
participants would use it to parameterize the cognitive operations required for 
processing S2—if that is possible. Hence, if the main limitation in the rotation task is 
that the same operation cannot be implemented with different parameters at the same 
time (hypothesis C; see also HC in Figure 5.1), we would expect an effect of cue 
validity on RT2: a valid cue would permit the advance implementation and 
parameterization of correct S2 operations, while the invalid cue would not. Additionally, 
the validity effect on RT2 would not be restricted to compatible rotations, given that 
implementation of the incompatible rotation for task 2 could take place before S1 was 
presented. We would further expect an interaction between rotation compatibility, 
category match, and cue validity on RT1: with a valid cue a category match would 
backward-prime responses not only in rotation-compatible situations (as in 
Pannebakker et al., 2009) but also in rotation-incompatible situations.  
If, on the other hand, there would be the limitation that only one operation can 
be executed at a time, then the cue-validity effect on RT2 should be absent  
(hypothesis D; see also HD in Figure 5.1). That is because, even if cues could be used 
for implementing the S2 rotation, this benefit would be lost due to inhibition by 
competing Task 1 processes. 
  




Methods were similar as in Experiment 1, unless stated otherwise. 
 
Participants 
Thirty-one students (11 male; all right-handed) of Leiden University aged 
between 18 and 29 (mean age: 20.5 years) participated in this experiment. They 
received either five euros or course credits or a comparable combination of both. Three 
people were omitted from data-analysis because there performance did not rise above 
chance (50%) in one or more of the conditions. 
 
Stimuli 
The same fixation, stimuli, SOAs and response mappings were used as in 
Experiment 1. Before S1 presentation, a cue was presented at the location of S2, and 
its orientation was a valid predictor of S2 orientation in 75% of the trials. The cue was a 
white rectangle with a black lining with the same length and overall approximately the 
same size as the stimuli. Rotation compatibility, category match, SOA and cue validity 
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Figure 5.6. Sequence of events within one trial in Experiment 2: The cue is a rectangle that makes a 




Before the start of the experiment, participants received a verbal instruction. 
They were asked to respond as quickly as possible, and not to be too cautious in their 
response. The predictive value of the cue for the second stimulus was explained. No 
reference was given as to which stimulus needed the first response. Subsequently, 
more explanation was presented on the computer followed by three practice blocks, 
after which the experimental blocks started. The first practice block was a single-task 





right hand. The third block was a dual-task block session. These three blocks 
contained 20 trials each.  
Experimental trials were presented in 12 blocks of 54 trials. Pauses separated 
the blocks and participants were encouraged to use them. Within the experimental 
blocks, the trial started with the presentation of a fixation rectangle for 500 ms in the 
middle of the screen (see Figure 5.6). Then, the cue appeared for 300 ms within the 
fixation rectangle at the S2 location, followed by a 400 ms fixation rectangle only. Next, 
S1 appeared left from the centre of the screen inside the fixation rectangle, and after a 
variable SOA, S2 appeared next to S1 right from the centre of the screen, also inside 
the fixation rectangle. After the responses, a response-stimulus interval of 200 ms was 
presented before the fixation rectangle appeared to announce the beginning of the 
next trial.  
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
ANOVAs were conducted using a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 design with the within-subjects 
factors rotation compatibility, category match, SOA, and cue validity.  
 
RT1 
Three of the four main effects were significant. Responses were 33 ms faster 
with compatible than with incompatible rotations, F(1,27) = 13.8, MSE = 9074, p < .01, 
33 ms faster with matching than with mismatching categories, F(1,27) = 5.1, MSE = 
24581, p < .05, and 153 ms faster with the longer than with the short SOA, F(1,27) = 
28.4, MSE = 91520, p < .001. The interaction between rotation compatibility and 
category match approached but did not reach significance, F(1,27) = 3.5, MSE = 7358, 
p = .071 (see Figure 5.7): RT1 was shorter when the category responses matched 
compared to when they mismatched, but only significantly so in the rotation compatible 
condition with a significant match-effect size of 51 ms, t(27) = 2.6, SEM = 18, p < .05. 
This is in line with the parameterization scenario that holds that it is the implementation 
that keeps people from processing two stimuli that require concurrent mental rotation. 
Two-tailed paired samples t-tests showed a significant difference of 49 ms between 
rotation compatible and rotation-incompatible trials when the categories match, t(27) = 
3.4, SEM = 14, p < .01, but only a marginally significant difference of 18 ms when the 




























The interaction between rotation compatibility and cue validity was also 
significant, F(1,27) = 8.7, MSE = 3343, p < .01: Rotation compatibility had a more 
pronounced effect with invalid than with valid cues (see Figure 5.8). Expressed 
differently, rotation-compatible trials showed shorter RT1 than rotation- incompatible 
trials for trials with an invalid cue (50 ms), t(27) = 4.1, SEM = 12, p < .001, and a 
marginally shorter RT1 (18 ms) for trials with a valid cue, t(27) = 2.0, SEM = 9, p = 
.054.  
Additionally, the cue-validity effect was significant for rotation-compatible trials, 
t(27) = 2.5, SEM = 9, p < .05, with a shorter RT1 (23 ms) for the invalid cue compared 
to the valid cue. This interaction suggests the following: Task 2 direction information 
primed S1 rotation on the basis of the cue (early) and S2 (late). For both valid and 
invalid conditions, late direction information was compatible with S1 rotation and 
primed RT1. However, because in the invalid cue condition late direction information 
deviated from early information, it entailed a stronger re-implementation, and in 
consequence more facilitation on RT1 than in the valid cue condition, where late 
direction information only confirmed what was already represented. The cue-validity 





RT1 for the invalid cue compared to the valid cue, but this effect was not significant, 
























Furthermore, the interaction between category match and SOA was significant, 
F(1,27) = 7.5, MSE = 5742, p < .05. As expected, the difference between category 
match and category mismatch was larger at a short SOA (53 ms) than for the long 
SOA (14 ms), t(27) = 3.1, SEM = 17, p < .01. A similar trend was found for rotation 
compatibility × SOA, which also showed a larger difference between category match 
and category mismatch at short SOA (50 ms) compared to long SOA (17 ms), F(1,27) 
= 3.5, MSE = 8956, p = .073. These two interactions are both evidence for crosstalk.  
One three-way interaction was found between rotation compatibility × category match 
× SOA, F(1,27) = 5.5, MSE = 4727, p < .05. At the short SOA, the category match × 
rotation compatibility interaction resembled the outcome of the two-way interaction 
effect: there was only a benefit of 83 ms for category match when the rotations were 
compatible as well, t(27) = 4.0, SEM = 21, p < .001. At the long SOA, however, there 
was no significant match effect on compatible trials, t(27) = 0.6, SEM = 22, p = .536. 
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PC1 
Results showed a significant main effect of cue validity, F(1,27) = 493.9, MSE 
= 21, p < .001. When the cue was valid, people were 10% faster than when the cue 
was invalid (91% versus 81%). 
The only other significant effect was category match × SOA × cue validity, 
F(1,27) = 5.2, MSE = 22, p < .05. Performance was marginally better (1.2%) for 
category match than for category mismatch trials at short SOA and valid cues, t(27) = 
1.8, SEM = 1, p = .082.  
 
RT2 
The main effect for SOA was significant, F(1,27) = 1014.2, MSE = 38485, p < 
.001. As expected, trials showed decreased RT2 (590 ms) with increasing SOA. RT2 
was decreased with 89 ms in rotation-compatible trials compared to rotation-
incompatible trials, F(1,27) = 76.5, MSE = 11531, p < .001. Similarly (but not 
significantly), RT2 was decreased with 26 ms in category-match trials compared to 
category-mismatch trials, F(1,27) = 2.1, MSE = 36631, p = .159. 
The interaction between rotation compatibility and category match was 
significant, F(1,27) = 20.6, MSE = 12231, p < .001 (see Figure 5.7). Two-sided paired 
samples t-test showed a significant difference of 136 ms between category match and 
category mismatch only when the rotations were compatible, t(27) = 3.6, SEM = 20, p 
< .01. This effect was similar to the effect found at RT1. 
The interaction between rotation compatibility and cue validity was also 
significant, F(1,27) = 5.1, MSE = 4353, p < .05 (see Figure 5.8). This interaction is 
similar to that measured at RT1, and requires a similar interpretation. RT2 was shorter 
when rotations were compatible. Valid cues differed significantly from invalid cues only 
at rotation-compatible trials, where RT2 was 23 ms longer for valid cues, t(27) = 2.7, 
SEM = 8, p < .05. 
The interaction between category match and SOA was significant, F(1,27) = 
20.4, MSE = 5947, p < .001. There was a match effect (59 ms) at the short SOA, t(27) 
= 2.8, SEM = 21, p < .05, but not significantly at the long SOA.  
One three-way interaction was found between rotation compatibility, category 
match, and SOA, F(1,27) = 4.7, MSE = 6519, p < .05. At the short SOA, but not at the 
long SOA, there was a match effect (123 ms) with compatible rotations, t(27) = 5.2, 
SEM = 24, p < .001. No significant match effects were found with incompatible 
rotations on the short SOA level, but at the long SOA when the rotations were 
incompatible, category match trials were with 38 ms marginally slower than category 







The percentage correct for the second task showed main effects of rotation 
compatibility, F(1,27) = 38.3, MSE = 29, p < .001 and category match, F(1,27) = 13.7, 
MSE = 74, p < .001. Performance increased by 3.1% in case of compatible rotations 
compared to incompatible rotations and decreased by 3.0% in case of matching 
categories compared to when the categories mismatched. Furthermore, trials with valid 
cues showed a 9.1% higher performance than trials with invalid cues, F(1,27) = 241.6, 
MSE = 38, p < .001. 
There was a marginally significant interaction between rotation compatibility 
and category match, F(1,27) = 4.1, MSE = 72, p = .053. Category mismatch showed a 
4.6% higher performance than category match for rotation-incompatible trials, t(27) = 
3.7, SEM = 1, p < .01.  
The interaction between category match and SOA was significant, F(1,27) = 
6.0, MSE = 25, p < .05. There was a regular match effect (4.2%) for the long SOA, 
t(27) = 4.1, SEM = 1, p < .001, but a reversed match effect (-1.8%) for the short SOA, 
t(27) = 2.2, SEM = 1, p < .05. These outcomes have the opposite pattern of the RT2 
effects and point to a speed-accuracy trade-off.  
 
The second experiment investigated whether pre-information about the 
rotation of S2 would allow for the advance implementation of S2-related rotation 
operations. If the cue was valid, the parameterization would already be in place long 
before S2 presentation. With the parameterization already installed, further processing 
of S2 could go straight through to the execution of the operation. This expectation – as 
put forward in hypothesis D (see also Figure 5.1) – was indeed confirmed by the 
interaction between cue validity and rotation compatibility. If the cue was invalid, the 
parameterization would need to be redone, at a moment when the parameterization of 
T1 was still ongoing. This required reactivation of the parameterization of T2. In that 
case, T2 codes were more active than when the cue was valid – in which case T2 
codes had time to decay – which explains why during rotation-compatible trials the 
invalid cue resulted in a faster response than the valid cue.       
Based on these observations, we would suggest that dual-task performance 
impairments related to rotation can be subdivided into implementation costs and 
execution costs. When a valid cue is presented early enough, implementation can take 
place already and thus does not contribute to performance costs. Although we found 
implementing the same operation with different parameters to be possible; only one 
operation could be executed at the time. Therefore, presenting cue 2 prior to S1 can 
facilitate RT only when the rotations are compatible, i.e., when only one operation is 
used. When the rotation directions differ, the mutually inhibitory links between the two 
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 In the current two experiments, we tried to specify the role of WM in dual-task 
processing and how it relates to the occurring delays. Thereto we investigated whether 
crosstalk was dependent on WM load (Experiment 1) and how it was related to 
implementation processes and execution processes (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, 
we used two mental rotation tasks in a PRP paradigm with an additional WM task to 
investigate whether an increased WM load would influence crosstalk. WM load 
affected the category-match effect but not the interaction between category match and 
rotation compatibility. These results suggest that the items maintained in WM and the 
outcomes of the rotation operations of the PRP task compete for limited WM capacity. 
One parameterization / rotation can be applied to more than one stimulus, and during 
these processes crosstalk can occur. The subsequent maintenance of category codes 
does involve WM and is affected by the items maintained for the memory task.   
In the second experiment, we further investigated the concept of crosstalk to 
see in which part of the processing crosstalk would occur. We divided the cognitive 
operation in a so-called implementation process and an execution process. We used a 
PRP paradigm with a mental rotation task for both tasks. The rotation direction of S2 
was pre-cued by a tilted cue – valid on 75% of the trials – presented at the start of 
each trial. Cue validity did not yield a main effect, suggesting that cue information 
cannot be kept active during S1 rotation. Additionally, responses in rotation-compatible 
trials were faster than in rotation-incompatible trials for valid trials and even more so for 
invalid trials. This difference between validly and invalidly cued trials disappeared when 
rotations were incompatible. This suggests that only one rotation can be executed at 
the time, but implementing different parameters of the two rotations is possible.  
Both experiments can be explained with a model depicted in Figure 5.1, in 
which the differentiation between rotation and category-code activation and their 
relation with WM are presented. WM operates on the activation and maintenance part 
and not on the category-code activation part where crosstalk takes place. This explains 
why in Experiment 1 we did not find a WM load effect by adding an additional task. The 
results in Experiment 2 confirm the separation between implementation and execution. 
Furthermore, they show that it is not the number of active parameters that is restricted, 
but the sort of operation that is being conducted. The mutually inhibitory links between 





The current experiments build on results presented by Hommel (1998) and 
Logan and Schulkind (2000). Contrary to earlier research (Pashler, 1984, 1994) that 
was focused primarily on response selection as the prime source of delays in dual 
tasks, they showed that it was necessary to separate response selection into more 
specific processes. Hommel (1998) showed that stimulus-response translation can be 
performed in parallel, but response decision making cannot. Logan and Schulkind 
compared crosstalk between similar and between different tasks, using the same 
stimuli (digits) in all tasks. They found evidence of crosstalk only when the tasks were 
similar. These results suggest that only when the same process was used for both 
tasks, a similar category-code activation (i.e., category match) could facilitate R1. Our 
research has shown that there is a difference between implementing (i.e., 
parameterization) and executing the rotation and that those processes have different 
restrictions. Earlier mental-rotation research showed the division of mental rotation into 
the mentally rotating the stimulus to upright and the following category decision 
(Corballis, 1986). But to our knowledge the distinction of implementation and execution 
of the mental rotation itself has not been empirically investigated before. WM load did 
not affect crosstalk in Experiment 1 of our current study, which is in line with a study by 
Hommel (1998) that showed that cognitive operations are not limited in capacity. We 
therefore argue that crosstalk occurs at the time of implementation of rotation 
parameters and other stimulus features. Later, process execution begins, and feature 
representations decay unless they are actively maintained in WM. WM maintenance is 
capacity-limited, and has to compete for WM space with other processes. As a result, 
implementation is capacity-limited in that only one process can be active at the same 
time with a possibility to apply this process to more than one stimulus, whereas 
execution is capacity-limited because it depends on WM maintenance.  
In order to find more support for our interpretation of the current results, we 
examined whether our ideas - as to how only outcomes of procedures and not the 
procedures itself are stored and take up memory storage in order to avoid decay - can 
be applied to the task-switching paradigm. In the task-switch paradigm, a task is 
presented, followed by either a task similar the first – a repetition – or a task different 
from the first – a switch. Responses to a switch are generally slower than responses to 
a repetition which is known as the switch cost (Allport, Styles, Hsieh, 1994; Jersild, 
1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Logan (2004) investigated whether WM was 
necessary for task switching. In his experiment participants memorized three types of 
tasks that could be applied to the same stimulus set. Subsequently, participants took 
part in a series of three different tasks. First, they participated in a memory task in 
which only storage and retrieval of the three types of tasks were measured. Second, 
Logan conducted a task span which included task switching and task execution in 
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addition to what was required in a memory span. If there was no difference in 
performance between the two tasks, then task switching and execution were 
considered not to take up any extra WM capacity. Third, participants performed a 
control span task in which only one task was presented. Results showed no difference 
in span between the memory span and task span and no difference in performance 
between a high or low number of task switches made, suggesting that task switching 
does not take up WM space. This is in line with the idea that not rule activation but its 
outcome is stored in WM; the dual-task delay is not caused by the task switch – which 
itself does not use WM – but by processes that follow.  
Liefooghe, Barrouillet, Vandierendonck, and Camos (2008) presented 
research that followed up on this, and was even closer related to our current 
experiments. They investigated whether an additional WM load influenced task 
switching, or that the task switch itself already takes up WM operation. Results showed 
that it was not the increase in WM task load that affected task-switching costs, but the 
number of switches made. Liefooghe et al. (2008) attributed the switching costs to 
serial attention-demanding control processes, in which it is not the task switching itself 
nor the specific task-set reconfiguration processes that determine the switching costs 
but the amount of time that attention is engaged during the specific task switch. That is 
why WM was not affected by the number of switches made and Liefooghe et al. (2008) 
suggested that WM and task switching are related through simple attention-demanding 
processes. These studies support our current results that WM seems to be related to 
certain processes like task switching and that WM is used to maintain codes that are 
activated by crosstalk but its capacity is not directly used for those processes. This 
shows that our processing abilities are not fixed, but dependent on the circumstances 
in which information is presented, in line with functional processing limitation theories. 
It also shows that our findings can be generalized to other paradigms and that it would 
be worthwhile to further investigate to what extent stimuli can be activated and 


























Dual-task experiments to investigate working memory and attention 
In this thesis, the effect of information-processing overload on working-memory 
(WM) dependent information processing was examined using dual-task paradigms. 
Dual-task limitations represent the inability to execute two tasks concurrently: The 
reaction time (RT) for both tasks is longer and accuracy is lower than when the two 
tasks would be presented and processed separately (e.g., Bertelson, 1967; 
Gottsdanker, Broadbent, & Van Sant, 1963). The origin of this delay, and the 
circumstances that elicit it, still remain unclear. What ís known is that these limitations 
are largely — if not entirely — determined by attention and WM.  
Attention is a multifaceted concept that refers to the way in which limited 
resources are put to work to process a subset of the available information for the task 
at hand, be it through spreading the resources (divided and sustained attention), 
recruiting extra resources (effort, arousal, or alertness), or through investing them 
selectively for a specific purpose (selective attention). Attention does not only reflect 
the way processing limitations are handled: controlling attention itself is also a limited-
capacity process. It is in the latter sense that the relation between attention and dual-
task performance was investigated. 
Although several WM models have been proposed, with considerable 
differences among them (e.g. Baddeley, 2000; Cowan, 1988), they all rely on three 
main functions: memory storage, cognitive operations on the content of memory, and 
control (see e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; 
Logie, 1995; D’Esposito, 2007; Oberauer, Demmrich, Mayr, & Kliegl, 2001 for these 
distinctions). Each of these functions could be responsible for processing limitations. 
The first function, storage, holds relevant information in WM entering from the outside 
world or from long-term memory. The second function, operations, processes the 
information that is stored in memory. The third function controls the operations that 
occur, for example by biasing one operation over the other so as to select one 
operation to be performed first. Together, these three functions form an active system 
in which information is processed.  
An example of a WM model was proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974; 
Baddeley, 1986) and was extended by Baddeley in 2000. The model contains the three 
functions of storage, operations and control and shows three systems that allow for 
storage and processing of information within a particular domain: the phonological 
loop, the visual-spatial sketchpad and the episodic buffer. The phonological loop deals 
with auditory information and is composed of a passive phonological store and an 
active rehearsal process (Baddeley & Logie, 1999). The visual-spatial sketchpad deals 
with visual-spatial information and is composed of a storage part called the visual 
cache, and an active processing system called the inner scribe (Logie, 1995). The 




episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000) provides WM with a short-term storage and 
processing module for information that allows for functions that do not fit the other 
systems, such as cross-modal integration. The episodic buffer also holds information 
that is bound with temporal codes in an episodic representation and is subsequently 
temporarily stored. These subsystems are controlled by the so-called central executive 
or control system that, for example, manages goal maintenance and updating, and that 
can focus and switch attention. The differentiation into three parts is theoretically 
interesting, but not all models accommodate this differentiation to explain WM; instead, 
some are limited to two of the three components.  
 
Structural and functional processing limitations 
The limitations that are present during dual-task processing can be structural 
or functional in nature, and they each relate in a different way to the three WM 
functions – storage, operations and control. Structural processing limitations occur 
when the processing hardware is overloaded by the load of the presented tasks. First, 
storage can be subject to capacity limitations (Kahneman, 1973; Norman & Bobrow, 
1975; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). However, which structural 
underpinnings cause this limited capacity remains unclear. This storage limitation is 
evident, for example, from the inability to memorize more than a certain number of 
random words without forgetting some of them. This suggests that information can be 
processed concurrently until the available WM capacity is exhausted. When more 
capacity is needed than is available, the encoding of information is either delayed, 
leading to a later arrival of the information in memory, or the surplus of information is 
forgotten, leading to a drop in performance.  
Second, WM operations can be subject to structural processing limitations 
when relevant information is translated into adequate actions. For example, Pashler 
(1994) suggested that only one stimulus-response translation process can be 
performed at a time, analogous to a road lane that passes not more than one car at a 
time.  
Third, structural limitations to executive control could lie, for example, in the 
restriction that in a transition from one task to another it is necessary to reconfigure the 
task set. Reconfiguring the task set (cf. tracks) causes switch costs which takes up 
time (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994), while in a task repetition there is no need for task-
set reconfiguration and therefore not for executive control, and hence no extra time 
costs are incurred (Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). By 
analogy, a railroad switch can be set to pass traffic in one direction, and after a switch 
to pass traffic in another direction, but never more than one direction at a time (Rogers 





Functional-limitation models, on the other hand, attribute the dual-task delay to 
conflict between simultaneously active task features or processes (Hommel, 1998), to 
the level of necessary control demands (Luria & Meiran, 2005) or to the strategic 
settings during a task (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b). First, the information that can 
be stored in WM depends on the combination of tasks. For example, storing 
information of two tasks with completely overlapping responses or features is easier to 
accomplish than storing information of two tasks with partially overlapping responses 
or features, arguably because in the latter case the binding of a stimulus feature to an 
event is preceded by the unbinding of that same stimulus feature from a previous event 
(Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Stoet & Hommel, 1999). The Stroop task is a distinct 
example of how the feature “word-meaning” interferes with the feature “colour-naming” 
in case the features don’t represent the same colour.  
Second, control processes can also be subject to impairment because of 
interference created by incompatible additional control processes. For example, Mayr 
and Keele (2000) systematically investigated the control process of backward 
inhibition, when in order to activate a new task set, the previous task set needs to be 
suppressed. They used an odd-item out task, in which participants had to indicate the 
deviant stimulus out of four stimuli, depending on dimension. The relevant dimension – 
color, orientation or movement – was indicated by a verbal cue at the start of each trial. 
Backward inhibition was measured by presenting the trials in sequences of three: the 
control condition had a CBA sequence of dimensions, and the inhibition condition had 
a ĀBA sequence of dimensions. Responses for the third trial (A) in the sequence were 
slower for the ĀBA trial than the CBA trial. Mayr and Keele argued that this delay was 
established when activation of the new task set in the B-trial instigated suppression of 
the task set used in the previous trial. In ĀBA compared to CBA sequences, 
reactivation of task A in the third task is more difficult in the face of residual 
suppression of task A. Another example of control processes presents itself when 
people switch from their first, native language to a second language, this is easier than 
when they switch from a second language to their first language (Costa & 
Santesteban, 2004; Meuter & Allport, 1999). A greater suppression of the first 
language is necessary when the second language is used, while less suppression is 
necessary for the second language when the first language is required. A switch from 
second language to first language would take longer because retrieval of the native 
language takes longer (because it was suppressed more strongly).  
Last, limitations also exist for operations, in which certain aspects of 
processing unrelated to load — the so-called content — can influence the dual-task 
delay. What role these processes play in dual-task slowing, however, has not been 
investigated before, and can help us understand the underlying mechanisms that 




cause this delay. One of the aims of this thesis was to clarify exactly this type of dual-
task limitations. The hypothesis tested in this thesis was that in a dual task, 
compatibility between processes of two tasks would decrease dual-task costs, while 
incompatibility between processes of two tasks would incur an increase in dual-task 
costs, similar to the way feature processing works.     
In sum, structural models on the one hand focus on a set capacity within which 
restrictions are caused by exceeding this capacity. Functional models on the other 
hand are more flexible in the sense that it is not only capacity itself, but also how it is 
used – e.g., the strategy or combination of tasks – that determines its limitations. 
 
Summary of the results 
In this thesis the functional role of WM in dual-task processing was 
investigated, to extend our knowledge on dual-task limitations and why they occur. 
Dual tasks overload WM and are therefore suited to investigate the origins of capacity 
limitations. Regarding dual-task limitations, previous research has focused on the 
structural impairment of dual-task processing, such as a restriction to the number of 
items stored in WM (e.g., Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). In the experiments presented in 
this thesis we aimed to clarify to what extent functional processing limitations affect 
dual-task processing. More specifically, the aim was to investigate whether process 
compatibility could facilitate the response to the first of two stimuli in a dual task. This 
compatibility was varied independent of response category to separate any effect of a 
category match from the effect of a process compatibility (Chapter 2). Additionally, it 
was investigated to what extent dual-task limitations observed in different paradigms 
could be attributed to similar mechanisms. In order to study this, individual WM 
operation span and IQ were measured and correlated with individual dual-task 
performance (Chapter 3). Next, the role of attention in dual-task processing was 
investigated and whether capacity-limited processes and attention might share 
capacity-limited resources. In order to do so, event-related potentials (ERPs) were 
used to measure deployment of visual-spatial attention and encoding into visual short-
term memory (Chapter 4). The last aim was to investigate whether the effect of 
response facilitation in case of compatible processes in a dual task was affected by an 
additional WM load and to determine more specifically the location of dual-task delay 
(Chapter 5). A summary of the results and their implications is presented below. 
 
Operation compatibility and dual-task costs 
 The aim in chapter 2 was to examine whether the ability to perform two stimuli 
concurrently was dependent on task difficulty only – as suggested in structural 





factors like compatibility between tasks would also play a role – as suggested in 
functional limitation models (e.g., Hommel, 1998; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Meyer & 
Kieras, 1997a; 1997b). We investigated the influence of process compatibility on 
response speed by presenting two stimuli quasi-simultaneously in a dual task. For both 
stimuli, a rotated character was presented that required mirror / normal discrimination 
in a classic mental rotation task (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Previous research 
(Corballis, 1986) showed that a stimulus is rotated to upright position before a mirror / 
normal distinction can be made. Consequently, a stimulus presented in a greater angle 
from upright will show a slower response (Corballis, 1986; Cooper, 1976). When both 
tasks required a mirror response or when both tasks required a normal response this 
was called a category response match. Similarly, rotations were considered compatible 
when both stimuli needed a clockwise rotation to upright position or both stimuli 
required a counter-clockwise rotation to upright. We measured the effect of stimulus 2 
(S2) processes on reaction time for stimulus 1 (S1), because this shows any facilitation 
due to simultaneous activation of mental rotation for the two stimuli, whereas an effect 
of S1 processes on the reaction time to S2 also reflects repetition. 
  The main result showed a facilitation of the response to S1 when the category 
responses matched but only when rotations were compatible. This outcome suggests 
that how fast a task can be processed is not only dependent on the difficulty of the 
task, but also on the combination of processes. Rotating a stimulus e.g., 60º clockwise 
or 60º counter-clockwise taxes WM exactly the same; the difference lies in the 
combination of tasks. This result is an argument against structural models in which 
dual-task delays are explained in WM-load differences only. The result supports 
functional processing limitation models in which combination of operations or features, 
or a strategy are an essential element in explaining dual-task processing.  
 The second experiment built on the first, and saw S2 moving in a circular path 
around S1. While S1 was still presented at a particular angle, S2 was presented in 
upright position. Rotation compatibility was defined as the compatibility between the 
angle to upright for S1 and the direction of the circular movement for S2.  
 The main result showed that even though S2 movement was not taxing WM - 
since not necessary for response - a compatibility between rotations still facilitated the 
response to S1 in case of a category match. This suggests functional limitations 
induced by conflict at the level of representing task properties between the direction of 
mental rotation (Task 1) and the direction of the physical rotation (Task 2).  
 
Similarities between refractory period and attentional blink  
The aim in chapter 3 was to investigate whether the delays found in different 
dual tasks would share a common functional basis (Jolicœur, 1999; Jolicœur & 




Dell’Acqua, 1999) or whether their basis would be different (Arnell, Helion, Hurdelbrink, 
& Pasieka, 2004; Duncan & Arnell, 2002; Wong, 2002). This would ultimately lead to a 
better understanding of the underlying mechanisms involved in dual-task processing. 
Thereto, we compared the measures of delay in the attentional blink (AB; Raymond, 
Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) and the psychological refractory period (PRP; Telford, 1931; 
Welford, 1952) and investigated whether they share limitations with respect to a similar 
mechanism and similar constructs. In the AB, two targets are presented in a string of 
distractors and require an unspeeded response at the end of the trial. Performance of 
target 1 and 2 is generally quite high, except for target 2 with intermediate time 
intervals (100-500 ms post target 1) which shows a marked drop in target-2 
performance. This is called the blink (Raymond et al., 1992) and it is the measure of 
dual-task delay we used for the AB. In the PRP, two targets are presented shortly after 
each other that need immediate, speeded response. Reaction time for S1 is generally 
independent of the time interval between S1 and S2 onset. For S2, however, there is 
an increase in reaction time to S2 as a function of decreasing interval duration between 
the S1 and S2. This is called the PRP effect (Pashler, 1994; Welford, 1952) and it is 
the measure of dual-task delay we used for the PRP.  
Additionally, we conducted two tasks to measure the constructs underlying 
WM operation span - which represents mainly the executive control component of WM 
(Arnell, Stokes, MacClean, & Gicante, in press) - and fluid intelligence (IQ). WM 
operation span was measured by the OSPAN task (Colzato, Spapé, Pannebakker, & 
Hommel, 2007; Engle, Kane, Tuholski, 1999; Turner & Engle, 1989) and IQ was 
measured by the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test (Raven, Court, & Raven, 
1988). Since WM and IQ are highly correlated but not identical (Conway, Kane, & 
Engle, 2003; Süβ, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002), it is important to 
control for IQ when a WM construct is correlated with another component. All the 
components were entered into correlation analysis to investigate the size of the 
correlation as an indicator of the communality between the two dual tasks.  
Results showed that a high blink in the AB correlated with a large PRP effect: 
people who performed well on the AB also showed proficient performance on the PRP. 
Additionally, the effects of both paradigms correlated with OSPAN. These two findings 
both point to a functional relation between AB and PRP. When these correlations 
between AB magnitude - OSPAN and PRP effect - OSPAN were controlled for IQ, the 
results showed a small reduction in the respective correlations. The former correlation 
was still significant; the latter correlation however, was reduced to non-significance, 
because its initial correlation was somewhat weaker. This suggests that in the AB, WM 
operation span is more engaged than in the PRP. This could be due to the higher 





distractors. In sum, on the one hand there is evidence for a common functional basis 
for the dual-task delay in AB and PRP. On the other hand, results showed that OSPAN 
correlates differently with PRP than with AB and there is still an amount of unexplained 
variance. 
 
The effect of mental rotation on deployment of visual-spatial attention 
In chapter 4, we further investigated dual-task processing and its limitations, 
this time with the use of electrophysiological measurements. While previous research 
established response selection as the main culprit for dual-task delay (e.g., Pashler, 
1994), we examined whether two processes other than response selection would delay 
each other. In order to do so, we presented a mental rotation task and a visual-spatial 
attention task in a PRP set-up to investigate whether shifting visual-spatial attentional 
processes and subsequent storage of stimuli into visual short-term memory is possible 
during mental rotation, or whether this is delayed. Earlier studies established mental 
rotation as capacity limited and preceding response selection (Band & Miller, 1997; 
Ruthruff, Lachman & Miller, 1995; Van Selst & Jolicœur, 1994). Whether visual-spatial 
attention causes capacity limitations is less clear, with some evidence showing no 
limitation (Johnston, McCann, & Remington, 1995; Pashler, 1991) and other evidence 
showing the opposite: Brisson & Jolicœur (2007a; 2007b) showed that response 
selection postpones attentional processes of a second task.  
Results in our current experiment showed that mental-rotation caused a delay 
for visual-spatial attention in the second task. The deployment of attention and the 
arrival of information into visual short-term memory were measured with two 
components of the ERP. First, the N2pc was used as a measure of deployment of 
attention. Second, the sustained posterior contralateral negativity (SPCN) was used as 
a measure of encoding information into visual short-term memory. These results 
suggest that processes preceding response selection (i.e. mental-rotation and visual-
spatial attention) could not be processed concurrently and response selection is not 
necessary for the dual-task delay to occur. Furthermore, the results indicated that 
response selection, mental rotation and visual-spatial attention are likely to share a 
common resource like executive control.  
 
Cognitive operations and working memory 
The aim in chapter 5 was twofold. First, we wanted to further explore the 
contribution of functional processing limitations to general dual-task limitations. 
Second, we wanted to make a further specification as to exactly which processes are 
capacity limited. Thereto, we conducted two experiments that were both a continuation 
of chapter 2. The same dual task as in experiment 1 of chapter 2 was presented with a 




mental rotation for both tasks. Again, we measured rotation compatibility and category 
response match. This time, we added an extra WM task aimed to take up considerable 
WM space during the course of the trial. We were interested to see the effect of this on 
compatibility independent of category response match.  
Results showed that even though a considerable part of WM was taken up by 
this background WM task, there was still a facilitation of the response to S1 when the 
category responses matched but only when rotations were compatible. While WM was 
significantly taxed, still one process could activate two stimuli and open the way for 
category match to facilitate the response. Specifically, this result suggests that 
crosstalk is not dependent on WM storage. Instead, it is probably the outcome of the 
processes that are stored in WM to avoid decay. In general, these results stress the 
necessity to incorporate a component that explains functional-processing limitations in 
any model that is used to describe dual-task limitations. 
In the second experiment, we focused on the finding that category match 
facilitates the response to S1, but only in case of a rotation compatibility. Which 
process constitutes the main limitation of this operation of mental rotation? Is it the 
implementation of the rotation, or the execution of the rotation? In order to investigate 
this we separated the onset of these two processes. We presented a cue at the start of 
each trial that validly predicted the stimulus angle in task 2 75% of the time. This cue 
gave participants the opportunity to implement the rotation before each trial, while S2 
presentation triggered the execution of the mental rotation.  
Results showed that implementing different parameters of the same operation 
is possible, but the execution of the operation is serial. This outcome suggests that 
implementation is not capacity limited, and does not take up WM space. The capacity 
limitation could be caused by the active use of WM space by execution processes.  
 
The current results fitted in relevant dual-task models 
The results (specifically Chapters 2 and 5) show that, in order to accommodate 
crucial aspects of the findings summarized in the preceding section, any model of dual-
task limitations, especially WM models, should include an explanation for functional 
processing limitations. Dual-task limitations that are caused by the way processes are 
combined cannot be explained sufficiently by structural-limitation models. Three 
models provide or imply a functional explanation of processing limitations: 1) the 
Executive-Process/Interactive Control model (EPIC; Meyer & Keiras, 1997a, 1997b), 2) 
the Executive Control Theory of Visual Attention (ECTVA; Logan & Gordon, 2001) and 






First, the EPIC model describes dual-task limitations as strategic, and suggests 
that under optimal circumstances, dual-task limitations will be decreased to none 
(Schumacher et al., 2001). A delay occurs when the strategy of the participants results 
in a more serial processing mode.  
Second, the ECTVA model (Logan & Gordon, 2001) is a hierarchical model in 
which the executive control coordinates which parameters are manipulated at any one 
time. It uses an extension of the parameters put forward in the Theory of Visual 
Attention (TVA; Bundesen, 1990). The TVA is run twice; once for each of the two tasks 
in a dual task. Set-switching costs, concurrence costs and crosstalk all affect the dual-
task delay. Set-switching costs depend on how many parameters need adjusting and 
how much adjusting they need. Costs involved in keeping two tasks active are called 
concurrence costs. However, there is always one task that is prioritized, and only when 
the set of one task can be applied to the stimulus from another task (i.e., when the 
stimulus or response sets of the two tasks overlap), crosstalk occurs.  
Third, the TEC is aimed to provide a functional framework for perception and 
action that stores them together in one module called the unified coding medium 
(Hommel et al., 2001). It includes relevant and irrelevant features of stimuli, operations 
and responses (actions). In the unified encoding medium different feature codes are 
bound together into an event file. For example, the feature codes ‘edible’, ‘red’, ‘grows-
on-trees’ and ‘round’ can be combined into an event file named ‘apple’. Because the 
TEC uses one module for stimulus features and response features, it allows for 
relevant and irrelevant features to be activated within the same medium which can 
cause interaction. This interaction can take place between stimulus features, response 
features, or between stimulus- and response features. This line of reasoning can 
explain the results in experiment 2 of chapter 2 of this thesis, in which a 
nondemanding, irrelevant movement of the S2 in a circular path around S1 facilitated 
the response to S1 when this movement was compatible with the rotation direction of 
S1. While this outcome was in line with the predictions of the TEC, the EPIC or ECTVA 
would only predict an effect when task load (or WM load) was manipulated. 
Additionally, the TEC differs from multi-modular models like the multi-component WM 
model by Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Baddeley, 2000). In their model, visual-spatial 
information, auditory information and episodic information is stored in separate 
modules that are controlled by a higher order central executive. Multi-component 
models cannot explain the cross-over effects of different elements in different event 
files because the information is not stored together, and action processes are not taken 
into consideration.   
 
 




Attention and capacity-limitations 
Brisson and Jolicœur (2007a; 2007b) showed that visual-spatial attention is 
delayed by response selection. Additionally, with the results presented in chapter 4 we 
showed that visual-spatial attention is delayed by mental rotation — a bottleneck 
process preceding response selection. Thus, response selection is not the only 
process responsible for the dual-task delay in the PRP paradigm and, moreover, is not 
necessary for the PRP effect to occur. During mental rotation visual-spatial attention is 
put (partly) on hold, either because visual-spatial attention in itself is capacity limited 
(like mental rotation), or because visual-spatial attention is regulated by a top-down 
process.  
We showed that when processes like mental rotation are active, visual-spatial 
attentional selection processes are postponed. This suggests that when WM is 
activated by mental rotation, visual-spatial attention cannot be active concurrently. This 
in turn suggests that instead of a unitary process, attention is a set of related but 
separate selection processes in which visual-spatial attention competes with mental 
rotation to be selected by central attention that prioritizes the different processes. A 
model that has incorporated attention in its WM framework is the embedded-process 
model of WM proposed by Cowan (1988; 1995). The model consists of a three-layered 
core, containing a long-term memory store, a short-term activated memory store and a 
focus of attention. Long-term memory has the least restricted capacity and the focus of 
attention has the most restricted capacity. The limited short-term activated memory 
store is part of the larger long-term memory store. Within the short-term activated 
memory store, the focus of attention selects one item at a time, just like a real spotlight 
singles out items in the dark (see also Oberauer, 2002). The focus of attention is 
directed top-down by a central executive on the one hand, and bottom-up by stimuli 
that are new or relevant on the other hand. Consequently, visual-spatial attention is 
considered a process that regulates the focus of attention bottom-up (by stimulus 
presentation), and then takes up the limited capacity available and in that way 
interferes with mental rotation and response selection. Alternatively, visual-spatial 
attention is regulated by a limited-capacity top-down process which in turn also causes 
interference.   
 
Future research 
The general aim of this thesis was to investigate the functional limitations of 
dual-task processing, to obtain a better understanding of the reason why they occur 
and to what extent they are limited, of the relation between different dual tasks, of the 





Although this thesis has done exactly that, this doesn’t mean that there are no 
remaining questions or for that matter new questions to be answered. 
Questions that still require an answer are mostly concerned with the 
circumstances in which dual-task delay occurs. In what way can the organisation of 
information influence the amount of information that can be stored or processed, and 
what are the core parameters that underlie or limit these processes? Is there a 
delaying effect of organization of demanding tasks, related to the exertion of executive 
control? In what way does the combination of e.g., task sets, stimuli, processes and 
responses influence the delay in the organization of executive control, without 
influencing the overall available capacity itself?  
The use of tools like EEG (electro-encephalogram), fMRI (functional magetic 
resonance imaging) or MEG (magneto-encephalogram) opens up an interesting 
approach, because it allows us to measure differences that cannot be distinguished 
behaviourally. For example, the ERP component N2pc (e.g., Eimer, 1996; Luck & 
Hillyard, 1994) can be used as a measure for deployment of attention in a way 
behavioural measures cannot. Similarly, the P3 (e.g., Donchin, 1981; Donchin & Coles, 
1988; Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998) – also an ERP component – can be used as a 
measure of activity associated with relevant representations in short-term memory or 
context updating (Donchin & Coles, 1988). More recently, Shapiro, Schmitz, Martens, 
Hommel, and Schnitzler (2006) used the size of the P3 as a measure of the amount of 
resources invested in processing a particular target. 
One paradigm in which performance differs between participants and between 
conditions is the AB paradigm, which depends for example on the individual’s WM 
operation span (e.g., Colzato et al., 2007; see also Chapter 3 of this thesis), or possibly 
on one’s mental state (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005). In the latter study, half of the 
participants conducted an AB task, and the other half conducted the same AB task 
while performing a background task, e.g., responding to a yell presented in a 
background beat. Results showed increased target 2 performance when the 
background beat was present. They gave a functional interpretation to the AB results 
and argued that a more diffused mental state would allow better AB performance.  
Shapiro et al. (2006) also investigated whether the bottleneck that causes the 
blink in the AB paradigm was structural or functional. They used 
magnetoencephalography to measure target 1 related P3 (M3) and found a correlation 
between target 1 peak amplitude and the size of the blink. Shapiro et al. (2006) argued 
that the division of capacity over two tasks in an AB paradigm can predict the 
performance on the two tasks. This suggests a functional division of resources and 
further research could be aimed at investigating how this balance of resources 
between the two targets can be manipulated.  




By using a background beat as between-subjects variable in an AB paradigm 
like Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005) and measuring the difference in amount of 
resources invested in target 1, the hypothesis could be tested whether subjects 
overinvest resources to the target 1 at blink trials, at the expense of the available 
resources for target 2, and whether this overinvestment is less likely to occur in a more 
diffused mental state. We investigated this in a pilot study using the P3 as a measure 
of investment of resources in target 1 and target 2 and found no distinct results. This 
could be attributed to the between-subjects set-up of our study, and further research 
could do a lot to clarify how the division of resources operates.   
 
In closing 
To conclude, the experiments described in this thesis contribute to the vast 
amount of dual-task research already available, strengthening the importance of a 
functional explanation for dual-task limitations. First, it showed evidence for a unified 
coding medium (as put forward in the TEC) in which features, operations and 
responses are available and can influence each other. Additionally, it was shown that 
the response to the first of two stimuli is facilitated in case the processes are 
compatible (Chapter 2). Furthermore, it showed that the PRP and the AB share 
limitations with respect to a common resource that originates in WM operation span 
and that the use of individual differences can aid in examining the relation between the 
PRP and the AB (Chapter 3). Additionally, it showed that it is plausible that visual-
spatial attention, mental rotation and response selection share limitations with respect 
to a common resource (Chapter 4). Finally, research in this thesis showed that 
processes that can facilitate a response can be simultaneously implemented but not 
simultaneously executed (Chapter 5). All in all, dual-task limitations can ultimately 
show us the boundaries of WM.  
On a more general note, some advice for anyone who keeps running out of 
time (and who doesn’t these days): Take at heart the words spoken by Lord 
Chesterfield (1694-1773; published in 1774) who said: “There is time enough for 
everything in the course of the day, if you do but one thing at once, but there is not 
time enough in the year, if you will do two things at a time.” and limit yourself to doing 
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Summary in Dutch 
(Samenvatting) 





In onze hersenen vinden verschillende processen plaats, zoals bijvoorbeeld het 
reguleren van autonome activiteiten als ademen, coördinatie van bewegingen, maar 
ook perceptie (zien, horen) en zogenaamde hogere hersenprocessen als taal, plannen, 
en geheugen. Het werkgeheugen is onderdeel van het geheugen en heeft als functie 
het onderhouden en het actief verwerken van informatie. Het wordt geactiveerd als 
informatie relevant is voor een bepaalde situatie of taak. Het wordt ook gebruikt bij 
processen als het ophalen, bewerken en het combineren van informatie. 
Werkgeheugen heeft een beperkte capaciteit, wat tot uiting komt bij overbelasting, 
bijvoorbeeld bij het onthouden van een lange boodschappenlijst, of bij het doen van 
meerdere taken tegelijkertijd (multitasken) waarbij we snel dingen vergeten. Bij de 
bestudering van het werkgeheugen maken we gebruik van een systematische 
overbelasting van het werkgeheugen om zo de invloed op prestatie te onderzoeken. In 
het onderzoek dat ten grondslag ligt aan dit proefschrift wordt het werkgeheugen 
overbelast door twee taken tegelijkertijd uit te voeren. 
 Het doen van twee dingen tegelijkertijd ofwel het uitvoeren van een 
dubbeltaak is iets wat we iedere dag doen, bijvoorbeeld wanneer we autorijden en 
tegelijkertijd ‘handsfree’ bellen. Dit is relatief makkelijk als het bellen gebeurt op een 
lege snelweg, maar een stuk moeilijker op een drukke rotonde. Een omgeving waar 
weinig gebeurt, zoals thuis op de bank, is de makkelijkste manier om iemand te bellen. 
Twee dingen tegelijkertijd doen kost altijd meer tijd dan één ding tegelijk doen (bv. 
Bertelson, 1967; Gottsdanker, Broadbent, & Van Sant, 1963) omdat het werkgeheugen 
beperkt is. De vertraging die optreedt wanneer je twee taken tegelijkertijd uitvoert 
hangt niet alleen af van de moeilijkheid van de taak, maar ook van de combinatie van 
verschillende taken (bv. Hommel, 1998; Logan & Schulkind, 2000). De oorzaak van 
deze vertraging, en omstandigheden waaronder de vertraging ontstaat, is nog 
onduidelijk. Wel is bekend dat deze beperkingen vooral afhangen van aandacht en 
werkgeheugen.  
Veelgebruikte dubbeltaken zijn de psychological refractory period (PRP) taak 
en de attentional blink (AB) taak. In de PRP taak worden twee stimuli kort na elkaar 
gepresenteerd; het tijdsinterval tussen beide stimuli wordt gevariëerd. De respons 
wordt direct gegeven en de reactiesnelheid is belangrijk. De reactiesnelheid op de 
eerste stimulus is over het algemeen onafhankelijk van het tijdsinterval tussen stimulus 
1 en stimulus 2. De reactietijd op stimulus 2 wordt echter langer als het tijdsinterval 
kleiner wordt. Dit effect wordt het PRP effect genoemd (Pashler, 1994; Welford, 1952) 
en wordt gebruikt als een maat voor dubbeltaakvertraging. In de AB taak worden twee 
stimuli gepresenteerd in een reeks van één voor één gepresenteerde distractoren: het 
aantal distractoren tussen beide stimuli wordt gevarieerd. De responses worden 





reactietijd is niet belangrijk op deze taak. De prestatie op beide stimuli is over het 
algemeen vrij goed, behalve als de tweede stimulus tussen de 100 ms en 500 ms na 
stimulus 1 wordt gepresenteerd met minimaal één distractor tussen beide stimuli: dan 
is prestatie slechter. Deze verminderde prestatie wordt de blink – ofwel knipper – 
genoemd (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) omdat het net is alsof de aandacht even 
weg is, net zoals wanneer het zicht even weg is als je met je ogen knippert.  
 Beperkingen die optreden tijdens het uitvoeren van twee paralelle taken 
kunnen veroorzaakt worden door beperkte capaciteit van het werkgeheugen of door 
beperkingen in de combinaties van stimuluskenmerken of –processen. Structurele 
verwerkingsbeperkingen worden veroorzaakt door de beperkte capaciteit, en het 
onderzoek daarnaar richt zich op de verhouding tussen taakmoeilijkheid (belasting) en 
de verwerkingscapaciteit. Wanneer meer capaciteit nodig is dan op dat moment 
beschikbaar, dan wordt bijvoorbeeld het encoderen van informatie vertraagd, wat leidt 
tot een verlaagde taakprestatie. Theorieën van functionele verwerkingsbeperkingen 
schrijven de beperking toe aan het conflict dat ontstaat tussen gelijktijdig geactiveerde 
kenmerken of processen (Hommel, 1998), aan de controle die nodig is (Luria & 
Meiran, 2005) of aan de strategische opzet tijdens een taak (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 
1997b). Het is bijvoorbeeld makkelijker om twee taken met helemaal overlappende 
responsen en kenmerken uit te voeren dan twee taken met gedeeltelijk overlappende 
responsen en kenmerken. De oorzaak hiervan kan erin liggen dat stimuluskenmerken 
pas in een nieuwe combinatie verbonden kunnen worden nadat eerder gevormde 
combinaties van die stimuli zijn ontbonden (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997; Stoet & 
Hommel, 1999). Eén van de doelen van dit proefschrift was om de bijdrage van deze 
functionele beperkingen op het verwerken van dubbeltaken te bestuderen.  
 
Doel van dit proefschrift 
Eerder onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat dubbeltaken gebruikt kunnen worden 
om beperkingen in het werkgeheugen te bestuderen. Verder heeft onderzoek laten 
zien dat de vertraging die optreedt wanneer twee taken tegelijkertijd worden 
uitgevoerd, wordt veroorzaakt door structurele verwerkingsbeperkingen. Naast 
structurele verwerkingsbeperkingen zijn ook enkele functionele verwerkings-
beperkingen vastgesteld. Dit betekent echter niet dat we precies weten waar deze 
beperkingen vandaan komen. Het algemene doel van dit proefschrift was om de rol 
van functionele beperkingen in dubbeltaken  te onderzoeken, om een beter idee te 
krijgen van de oorzaak van deze beperkingen en in hoeverre deze gelden. Meer 
specifiek omschreven is in een dubbeltaak de invloed van compatibiliteit tussen 
processen op taakprestatie gemeten. Deze compatibiliteit werd onafhankelijk van 
responscategorie gevarieerd om interferentie van een match in categorieën te 





onderscheiden van het effect van procescompatibiliteit (Hoofdstuk 2). Daarnaast is 
onderzocht in welke mate de beperkingen van verschillende dubbeltaken konden 
worden toegeschreven aan vergelijkbare mechanismen. Hierbij zijn de individuele 
werkgeheugen operation span en IQ gemeten en hun samenhang met de individuele 
dubbeltaakprestatie (Hoofdstuk 3). Vervolgens is de rol van visueel-spatiële aandacht 
in de verwerking van dubbeltaken onderzocht. De vraag hierbij was of visueel-spatiële 
aandacht en andere belastende processen onderhevig zijn aan dezelfde 
capaciteitsbeperking. Daartoe zijn event-related potentials gemeten. Een event-related 
potential is een electrische potentiaal geassocieerd met een specifieke gebeurtenis 
(Luck, 2003). De event-related potential wordt toegepast om het gebruik van visueel-
spatiële aandacht te meten en de encodering van deze visueel-spatiële informatie in 
het visueel korte-termijn geheugen (Hoofdstuk 4). Een laatste doel was de invloed van 
een extra werkgeheugenbelasting op de verwerking van compatibele processen te 
meten en om de specifieke locatie van de dubbeltaakvertraging beter te bepalen 
(hoofdstuk 5). Een samenvatting van de resultaten en de implicaties daarvan wordt 
hieronder beschreven. 
 
Samenvatting van de resultaten 
Compatibiliteit van processen en dubbeltaakvertraging   
Het doel van hoofdstuk 2 was om te onderzoeken of het vermogen om twee 
stimuli tegelijkertijd te verwerken alleen afhankelijk is van de moeilijkheid van de taak – 
zoals gesuggereerd in structurele modellen over dubbeltaakbeperkingen (bv. Pashler, 
1994; Tombu & Jolicœur, 2002; 2003) – of dat andere factoren als compatibiliteit 
tussen taken ook een rol speelt – zoals gesuggereerd in functionele modellen (bv. 
Hommel, 1998; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Meyer & Kieras, 1997a; 1997b). De invloed 
van compatibiliteit van processen op de snelheid van de respons werd gemeten in de 
PRP. 
In de dubbeltaak in hoofdstuk 2 werd in beide taken een letter of een cijfer 
aangeboden. Dit alfanumerieke karakter kon normaal of in spiegelbeeld weergegeven 
zijn, en kon met de klok mee of tegen de klok in gedraaid staan. De taak voor de 
proefpersoon was om te beoordelen of de tekens normaal of in spiegelbeeld stonden. 
Het lukt de proefpersoon alleen om dit te beoordelen door eerst het teken mentaal 
naar de normale stand te roteren. Als deze tekens allebei normaal of allebei in 
spiegelbeeld afgebeeld zijn dan matchen zowel de responscategorieën (ze zijn allebei 
normaal of allebei in spiegelbeeld gepresenteerd) als de processen (beide stimuli 
draaien via de kortste weg tegen de klok in naar rechtopstaand). Er zijn ook andere 
combinaties mogelijk: als het ene teken normaal en het andere teken in spiegelbeeld is 





ene teken klokwaarts de snelste weg naar rechtop volgt, en het andere teken tegen de 
klok in, dan zijn de processen niet compatibel.  
Het voornaamste resultaat van dit experiment is facilitatie van de respons op 
stimulus 1 als de responscategorieën matchen, maar alleen als de bijbehorende 
processen compatibel zijn. Deze facilitatie van de respons op stimulus 1 bij matchende 
responscategorieën suggereert dat de reactiesnelheid op een taak niet alleen afhangt 
van de moeilijkheidsgraad, maar ook van de combinatie van taakprocessen. De 
compatibiliteit van processen heeft geen gevolgen voor de werkgeheugenbelasting en 
de moeilijkheid van de taak verschilt dus niet. Dit resultaat gaat in tegen de structurele 
dubbeltaakmodellen waarin dubbeltaakvertraging alleen wordt verklaard door de 
taakmoeilijkheid. Het resultaat is een argument vóór functionele dubbeltaakmodellen 
waarin niet alleen de taakmoeilijkheid maar ook de combinatie van taakkenmerken of –
processen van invloed is op taakprestatie. 
 In het tweede experiment werd de compatibiliteit tussen een proces (mentale 
rotatietaak) van stimulus 1 en een irrelevante, fysieke beweging van stimulus 2 
bekeken. De beweging van stimulus 2 rondom stimulus 1 is niet belastend voor het 
werkgeheugen aangezien de beweging van stimulus 2 irrelevant voor de respons is. 
Het experiment laat weer facilitatie zien van de respons op stimulus 1 als de 
responscategorieën matchen, maar alleen als de bijbehorende processen compatibel 
zijn. Dit suggereert een conflict tussen de richting die het teken in taak 1 via de kortste 
weg naar rechtop draait en de richting van de fysieke rotatie in taak 2. Omdat de 
combinatie van een proces (mentale rotatie) met een fysieke beweging geen verschil 
introduceert in de taakmoeilijkheid, is dit een argument voor functionele 
beperkingsmodellen.  
 
Overeenkomsten tussen de PRP en de AB 
 Het doel in hoofdstuk 3 was om te onderzoeken of de vertraging die optreedt 
in verschillende dubbeltaken een volledige gezamenlijke functionele basis heeft 
(Jolicœur, 1999; Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1999) of slechts gedeeltelijk (Arnell et al., 
2004; Duncan & Arnell, 2002; Wong, 2002). Dit onderzoek kan bijdragen aan een beter 
begrip van de onderliggende mechanismen van dubbeltaakprocessen. We hebben de 
samenhang tussen de AB (Raymond et al., 1992) en de PRP (Telford, 1931; Welford, 
1952) onderzocht. De vraag hierbij was of de vermindering in prestatie bij de AB en de 
vertraging in reactiesnelheid bij de PRP een gezamelijke of een verschillende basis 
hebben. Naast deze twee taken zijn ook IQ en werkgeheugen operation span (een 
maat voor de grootte van het actieve gedeelte van het werkgeheugen) gemeten. De 
samenhang tussen IQ en werkgeheugen operation span met zowel AB en PRP helpt 
bij het beantwoorden van bovenstaande vraag. 





De resultaten laten zien dat een hoge blink in de AB samenhangt met een 
groot PRP effect. Daarnaast hing een goede prestatie op beide dubbeltaakeffecten (bij 
AB iets meer) samen met een hoge score op werkgeheugen operation span. Deze 
twee bevindingen wijzen op een functionele relatie tussen AB en PRP. Correctie voor 
IQ zorgde voor een kleine reductie van de samenhang zowel tussen de AB en 
werkgeheugen operation span als tussen de PRP en werkgeheugen operation span. 
De eerste correlatie bleef bestaan maar de tweede correlatie verdween doordat deze 
tweede correlatie vóór de correctie al iets zwakker was. Dit suggereert dat 
werkgeheugen operation span meer gebruikt wordt tijdens de AB dan tijdens de PRP. 
Een oorzaak hiervan zou het hogere aantal distractoren in de AB kunnen zijn en de 
noodzaak voor de proefpersonen om deze weg te filteren. Samenvattend is er aan de 
ene kant bewijs voor een gezamenlijke functionele basis voor de vertraging die 
optreedt tijdens het uitvoeren van een dubbeltaak. Aan de andere kant laten de 
resultaten zien dat de werkgeheugen operation span sterker correleert met de AB dan 
de PRP en dat er nog steeds een deel onverklaarde variantie is. 
 
Het effect van twee niet-responsselectie processen op dubbeltaakvertraging  
In hoofdstuk 4 zijn dubbeltaakprocessen en –beperkingen verder onderzocht, 
deze keer met behulp van electrofysiologische metingen. In eerder onderzoek is 
gesuggereerd dat responsselectie de voornaamste oorzaak van de 
dubbeltaakvertraging is (e.g., Pashler, 1994; Tombu & Jolicœur, 2003). Resultaten in 
dit hoofdstuk wijzen er op dat dubbeltaakvertraging  ook kan ontstaan bij het uitvoeren 
van twee processen waarbij géén responsselectie gebruikt wordt. In dit geval werd een 
vertraging van het verplaatsen van visueel-spatiële aandacht en het arriveren van die 
informatie in het visueel korte-termijn geheugen van taak 2 door een 
capaciteitsbeperkend proces (mentale rotatie) in taak 1 gemeten door twee 
componenten van de event-related potential. Allereerst werd de N2pc gebruikt als 
maat voor het gebruik van spatiële aandacht. Als tweede werd de sustained posterior 
contralateral negativity (SPCN) gemeten als maat voor het encoderen van informatie in 
visueel korte-termijn geheugen. Deze resultaten wijzen er op dat de processen 
mentale rotatie en visueel-spatiële aandacht - die beiden voorafgaan aan 
responsselectie - niet tegelijkertijd kunnen plaatsvinden en dat responsselectie niet de 
enige oorzaak is van dubbeltaakbeperkingen. Verder laten de resultaten zien dat 
responsselectie, mentale rotatie en visueel-spatiële aandacht waarschijnlijk alledrie 
een beroep doen op cognitieve controle. De organisatie van cognitieve controle heeft 
een beperkte capaciteit of zorgt ervoor dat de processen achter elkaar plaatsvinden 
waardoor er dubbeltaakvertaging optreedt. Deze resultaten kunnen worden verklaard 






Compatibiliteit tussen processen, werkgeheugen en dubbeltaakvertraging  
Het doel in hoofdstuk 5 was tweeledig. Allereerst is in experiment 1 de bijdrage 
van functionele verwerkingsbeperkingen aan dubbeltaakbeperkingen verder 
onderzocht. Ten tweede is in experiment 2 gespecificeerd welke processen nu precies 
capaciteitsbeperkend zijn. In experiment 1 werd een extra werkgeheugentaak 
toegevoegd aan het eerste experiment in hoofdstuk 2 die er op gericht was een 
substantieel gedeelte van de werkgeheugenruimte in beslag te nemen tijdens de 
uitvoering van de PRP taak. Het doel was te onderzoeken of deze extra 
werkgeheugentaak invloed had op de snelheid van de respons op stimulus 1 als de 
responscategorieën matchten en de processen van taak 1 en taak 2 compatibel waren.  
 De resultaten laten zien dat alhoewel een aanzienlijk gedeelte van het 
werkgeheugen inderdaad werd ingenomen door de extra taak, er nog steeds facilitatie 
was van de respons op stimulus 1 in het geval van een match tussen de 
responscategorieën en de processen van taak 1 en taak 2 compatibel waren. Dit 
resultaat suggereert dat de invloed van stimulus 2 processen op de respons op 
stimulus 1 niet afhankelijk is van werkgeheugenopslag. Het zijn waarschijnlijk niet de 
processen zelf die worden opgeslagen in het werkgeheugen maar juist de uitkomsten 
van deze processen zodat deze actief blijven en niet vergeten worden. In het 
algemeen onderstrepen deze resultaten de noodzaak om een functionele component 
in dubbeltaak beperkingsmodellen toe te voegen. 
In het tweede experiment is de aandacht gericht op de vondst dat een match 
tussen de responscategorieën de respons op stimulus 1 faciliteert maar alleen bij 
compatibele processen. De beperking van het tegelijkertijd uitvoeren van twee 
processen kan liggen in de implementatie of in de uitvoering van een taak. De 
resultaten laten zien dat het implementeren van verschillende parameters van 
hetzelfde proces mogelijk is, maar dat de uitvoering daarvan serieel plaatsvindt. Deze 
uitkomst suggereert dat implementatie geen capaciteitsbeperkingen heeft en geen 
werkgeheugenruimte inneemt. De capaciteitsbeperking zou veroorzaakt kunnen 




De resultaten van de experimenten over dubbeltaken, werkgeheugen en 
visueel-spatiële aandacht beschreven in dit proefschrift laten het belang zien van een 
uitleg van dubbeltaakprestaties aan de hand van functionele beperkingen. Allereerst 
werd aangetoond dat compatibiliteit tussen processen de responssnelheid faciliteert 
(Hoofdstuk 2). Daarnaast toonde onderzoek in dit proefschrift aan dat de dubbeltaken 





PRP en AB capaciteitsbeperkingen een gemeenschappelijke oorsprong hebben. Deze 
oorsprong wordt gedeeld met werkgeheugen operation span en niet met IQ (Hoofdstuk 
3). Tegelijkertijd werd in dit proefschrift aannemelijk gemaakt dat visueel-spatiële 
aandacht, mentale rotatie en responsselectie waarschijnlijk alledrie een beroep doen 
op cognitieve controle (Hoofdstuk 4). Als laatste toonde onderzoek in dit proefschrift 
aan dat de facilitatie tussen processen geen beroep doet op werkgeheugenopslag, en 
dat deze facilitatieprocessen wel tegelijkertijd geimplementeerd maar niet tegelijkertijd 
uitgevoerd kunnen worden (Hoofdstuk 5). Concluderend kunnen beperkingen in het 
uitvoeren van dubbeltaken ons de grenzen van het werkgeheugen laten zien. 
Op een luchtigere toon, als laatste wat advies voor iedereen die te weinig tijd 
heeft (en wie heeft dat tegenwoordig niet): neem de wijze woorden van Lord 
Chesterfield (1694-1773) ter harte die zei: “Er is genoeg tijd in de dag als je alles 
achter elkaar doet maar er is niet genoeg tijd in een jaar als je twee dingen tegelijk 
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